SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: WORRIED MALAGASY CHOD WARNS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 000756

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/E MBEYZEROV
PARIS FOR WBAIN
LONDON FOR PLORD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2019
TAGS: ASEC MA MOPS PREL PGOV
SUBJECT: SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: WORRIED MALAGASY CHOD WARNS
THE AMBASSADOR

REF: ANTAN 710

Classified By: DCM Eric Stromayer for reasons 1.4 B and D.


1. (C) SUMMARY: Malagasy Army Defense Chief,
(newly-promoted) Brigadier General Andre Ndriarijaona, and
his Chief of Staff, Colonel Raphael Ramasy called on the
Ambassador and Defense Attache November 3, at their request.
General Ndriarijaona expressed concern over the lack of
concrete progress towards a political agreement and doubted
whether the ongoing meetings in Addis Ababa will produce
results. He said he feared a &social explosion8 if such an
agreement is not reached. His veiled message -- and likely
main reason for seeking the meeting -- appeared to be serious
consideration of military intervention if the talks in Addis
fail. The Ambassador advised him bluntly that any such action
would not resolve anything and would only further delay the
return to constitutional order on which any future
restoration of aid and military assistance will depend.
Nonetheless, the General's basic message was clear: if the
situation deteriorates following a failure to reach agreement
in Addis, he will seriously consider pushing Madagascar's
inept politicians aside and taking charge. END SUMMARY.


Pessimism over political progress: Potential "social
explosion"
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2. (C) The Malagasy Army Chief of Staff (CEMGAM,
CHOD-equivalent),General Ndriarijaona, met at his request
with Ambassador and Defense Attache on November 3,
(coincidentially) the day after his promotion to Brigadier
General was announced. Without pleasantries, the General
began by expressing concern over the likelihood of
insufficient political progress in Addis this week towards a
consensual four party agreement. He suggested that any
continuing impasse would cause a "social explosion8 and
significant misery for the general population, especially if
the impasse leads to a suspension of AGOA and further
sanctions. He indicated a desire for continued diplomatic
efforts to pressure the political participants (none of whom
he expressed particular support for) to reach an agreement.
The Ambassador reassured him that this was being done, citing
his personal visits to Ravalomanana in Johannesburg as an
example.


Concern over role of Ravalomanana
--------------


3. (C) The General also raised the specific topic of former
President Ravalomanana and his capability to disrupt the
political process due to his access to significant personal
funds. He suggested efforts on the part of Ravelomanana to
use these funds to influence Malagasy military, although he
admitted that there was no confirmation of this. He then
suggested that freezing Ravelomanana,s assets would reduce
the chances that he could use them to block a political
agreement. The Ambassador explained that it is not possible
to undertake such an action against someone who has not been
indicted or condemned for criminal actions. However, he
reasured the General that Ravalomanana's presence in South
Africa provided ample opportunity for concerned parties to
ensure that he was not engaged in inappropriate or illegal
activities there, such as the much rumored attempts to hire
mercenaries. The General stated clearly that Ravalomanana's
return to Madagascar at this time could trigger unrest,
possibly civil war. His Chief of Staff said Ravalomanana
should not return "during the transition." The Ambassador
noted that Ravalomanana may wish to run in the next election
and is free to do so, which would necessitate his return
during the transition, although not necessarily any time
soon. The Ambassador stressed the need for reconciliation,
including between Ravalomanana and the military. The General
responded that the problem is that "no politicians here keep
their promises."


Military Intervention?
--------------


ANTANANARI 00000756 002.2 OF 002



4. (C) Behind the General,s comments about a &social
explosion8 and the expected misery of the Malagasy people --
both repeated twice -- lay a veiled message that military
intervention might be considered in case of political failure
in Addis. Sensing this, the Ambassador suggested that the
General probably experiences daily solicitations of partisan
military intervention in the current situation, which the
General acknowledged while stating that they have resisted
such suggestions until now. The Ambassador advised bluntly
that any counter-coup or establishment of military control
would only delay the necessary return to constitutional order
-- so desired by both the Malagsy people and the
international community. It will also delay, he said, any
future resumption of foreign military support, which the
General had said was an increasingly important issue in terms
of both training and equipment. In closing, the Ambassador
stressed that the military must give the
political/negotiation process the maximum opportunity to
succeed, and invited the General to stay closely in touch as
the political situation evolves.

Comment
--------------


5. (C) The continued political maneuvering by all four
parties makes optimism difficult for observers on the
sideline, to include the military. As in our last
conversation with the CHOD (reftel),it still appears that
the he and the military prefer to avoid involvement in the
political process. However, such neutrality is difficult in
practice. The military leadership is still struggling to
maintain their own unity in the face of numerous internal
problems. This is compounded by the fact that senior members
(including him) are linked closely to the situation, with
many active-duty Colonels and Generals embedded within other
government ministries. In this period of uncertainty, HAT
President Rajoelina has just taken the opportunity in
conjunction with his Council of Ministers to reinforce his
support within the military by confirming promotions for 22
new Generals, concentrating on those officers whose actions
actively or tacitly supported his displacement of
Ravelomanana last March. These newly-promoted officers
include the current Ministers of Defense and Environment, the
husband of acting Prime Minister Cecile Manarohanta, the
Commander of the Gendarmerie and, of course, General
Ndriarijaona himself. While clearly unhappy with the
political elite, the military leadership generally seems at a
loss as to how to move the process forward. However, the
General's basic message was clear: if the situation
deteriorates following a failure to reach agreement in Addis,
he will seriously consider pushing Madagascar's inept
politicians aside and taking charge. End comment.
MARQUARDT