MADAGASCAR: ALL EYES ON ADDIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANTANANARIVO 000752

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS


STATE FOR AF/EPS AND AF/E - MBEYZEROV
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTR -- WJACKSON
USDOC FOR RTELCHIN
TREASURY FOR FBOYE
PARIS FOR WBAIN AND RKANEDA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2019
TAGS: ECON ETRD EAGR EAID PHUM MA
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: ALL EYES ON ADDIS

REF: A. ANTAN 728

B. PRETORIA 2098

Classified By: AMBASSADOR NIELS MARQUARDT FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D.


1. (C) Summary: The African Union will host a meeting of
Madagascar's four vying political chiefs Nov 3-5 in Addis
Ababa. The meeting has been touted alternately as a forum
for getting the four chiefs' seal of approval on the
provisional agreements made during the Oct 6 international
contact group (ICG) meeting, or as a meeting to name all
ministers and other institution heads, taking the Oct 6
agreements, particularly on Rajoelina as transition
president, as faits accomplis. Given its unclear purpose and
especially the continuing animosity between ousted President
Ravalomanana and de facto leader "TGV" Rajoelina, odds are at
best even for achieving a truly consensual resolution of
Madagascar's political crisis in Addis. If an agreement of
three entities, excluding Ravalomanana, emerges, the AU will
likely push those entities to fill their allocated
ministerial and other slots and deem the transition
government formed. France is likely to accept such a
government quickly, but much of the international community
would (and should) react at best tepidly to such a
disappointing outcome. Maximum pressure has been exerted on
the four parties to consider further concessions to resolve
this crisis. End summary.


2. (C) African Union Envoy Ablasse Ouedraogo convoked the
diplomatic corps Oct 28 to discuss the planned meeting of
Madagascar's four main political rivals Nov 3-5 in Addis. AU
Chairman Jean Ping will lead the meeting, but UN and SADC
Mediators Drame and Chissano will also participate. Country
members of the international contact group (ICG) have not
been invited. Ouedraogo explained that all four leaders --
de facto transition leader Andry Rajoelina, ousted President
Ravalomanana, and former Presidents Ratsiraka and Zafy -- had
agreed to go to Addis and that the purpose of the meeting was
to name the ministers and heads of institution for the
power-sharing transition government envisioned by the Maputo
Accords signed in August. He said that the 28 ministerial
seats would be divided five per movement with eight going to
other political actors, civil society, and the armed forces.
Ouedraogo argued that the question of who would hold the post
of transition president was resolved in favor of Rajoelina,
and thus would not be revisited in Addis. While in
Madagascar, he made similar public assertions to the local
press, provoking a strong rebuke from Ravalomanana and his
side. French Cooperation Minister Joyandet seemingly
seconded this sentiment while speaking to the French National
Assembly last week, stating inaccurately that "the
international community confirmed Rajoelina" as president of
the transition during the Oct 6 ICG. The Ravalomanana
movement, however, still views the question of the presidency
as open, while Ravalomanana himself -- in a recent
international media blitz -- continues to assert that he will
never accept "a putschist" as head of state. Ouedraogo
asserted that AU Chairman Jean Ping is calling SADC leaders
to ask them to tell Ravalomanana that he must cooperate in
Addis.


3. (C) During the Oct 6 ICG, all delegations (with no chiefs
present) agreed on a consensus prime minister. When next the
question of the presidency rose to the fore, the leader of
the Ravalomanana movement, Fetison, stated clearly that his
movement was opposed to TGV retaining his position.
Following further negotiations, Fetison agreed that his
movement would accept TGV if he agreed not to run in the next
presidential election. Fetison told the Ambassador in a
private meeting Oct 29 that he had withdrawn this offer to
the mediators after they were unable to secure agreement from
TGV on Oct 6 that he wouldn't run, but that the mediators had
announced his offer anyway during the plenary session. He
alleged that he had gone beyond his instructions from
Ravalomanana in making the offer in the first place. At the
end of the ICG, it was decided that the AU would issue a
communique noting the Ravalomanana delegation's strong
objection to TGV's ability to run in the next election and
that a meeting of the four chiefs themselves would be

ANTANANARI 00000752 002 OF 003


arranged to seek their seal of approval for the schema
discussed at the ICG - with TGV as president, Rakotovahiny as
VP, and Mangalaza as PM. The chiefs would then name their
allocated ministers and institution heads. Fetison expressed
his concern to the Ambassador Oct 29 that the outcome of the
negotiations in Addis was already predetermined, and asserted
that in fact, the mediators had guaranteed Rajoelina that he
would keep his position as president to convince him to go to
prior negotiations in Maputo last August. The Ambassador
noted that he had gone to Johannesburg on Oct 15 to see
Ravalomanana with Ambassador Carter (ref B),impressing upon
Fetison the urgency of finding a solution in Addis and the
importance of compromise on all sides. He urged him as
Ravalomanana's representative to focus on the elections and
the future, rather than merely on the transition, which would
be of short duration.


4. (C) The mediation appears divided over how to handle the
prickly question of the presidency. While all mediators have
been encouraging Ravalomanana to accept TGV, UN Mediator
Drame and SADC Mediator Chissano seem to realize that the
question is not resolved; however, the AU, which has taken
ownership (and financial responsibility) of the Addis
negotiations and will play the lead role there, may already
have closed the book on this topic. During the Oct 28
briefing by Ouedraogo, representatives from Russia, the US,
South Africa, Germany, the EU, Morocco, and the World Bank
all questioned Ouedraogo's sweeping assertions that the issue
had been decided consensually. Ouedraogo further argued, as
had French Cooperation Minister Joyandet Oct 6, that if one
of the four doesn't agree, they can decide to participate
later per the Maputo Charter. However, the Charter states
that "the political movements (the four named therein) will
be invited to sign the charter (which they all did in August)
and other movements can adhere to it later." It does not
discuss the case of one of the four not agreeing to the
staffing of the transition.


5. (C) In a meeting with Ambassador Marquardt on November 1,
former President Albert Zafy presented a relatively
optimistic reading of the situation, asserting that Rajoelina
was beginning to understand the limits of his power and the
need for real consensus in the government, and that it was
unlikely in any case that the minimum age for the presidency
would be lowered to accommodate him in any 2010 bid. Zafy
underlined the highly personal nature of the conflict between
Ravalomanana and Rajoelina, but said he continues to believe
that they will reach an agreement in Addis. He sees a clear
roadmap moving forward, and is already focused on a new round
of debate on constitutional reforms and the structure of
Madagascar's government, followed by a referendum on the
constitution for the "fourth republic" within the next six or
seven months. Although his movement is the weakest of the
four, he made clear his intention to keep parity among the
movements' representation in the transition government, and
did not seem to contemplate any concessions from his own side
that might help Ravalomanana and Rajoelina find a workable
balance. Zafy's main contribution in Addis may simply be
that he has no real demands that weren't already addressed in
the Maputo accords - but he also had little to offer to
resolve the Ravalomanana/Rajoelina feud.


6. (C) The four movements agreed in the charter to work for a
"neutral, inclusive, consensual" transition. Fetison argued
to the Ambassador that a transition government led by
Rajoelina could not be considered neutral and recommended
that other names, such as retired ICJ Judge Raymond Ranjeva
(the former foreign minister's highly respected brother),be
considered. His movement would even be willing to accept
someone from TGV's movement, just not TGV himself. Fetison
confided that Ravalomanana was fixated on his personal
dislike of Rajoelina and that this obsession had cost him
ministerial posts in Maputo. The Ambassador said that it was
up to the four chiefs to negotiate the issue; no one can
negotiate in Ravalomanana's place if he fails to do so
himself. He explained that the US would prefer to see a
truly neutral figure lead the transition, but that it was not
our prerogative to determine who that would be. That should
have been clarified in Maputo, he said, but it was not. He

ANTANANARI 00000752 003 OF 003


added that we support the principle that the coup leaders
should not be able to run in elections that they organize,
and would be pleased with that outcome if achieved in Addis,
but stressed again that Ravalomanana should negotiate these
points himself. Fetison was unsure if Ravalomanana would in
fact agree to accept TGV as transition head if he agreed not
to run in the next election, but thought that Ravalomanana
might go for such a compromise, as it would allow him to save
face.


7. (C) Before Rajoelina and his delegation departed
Antananarivo this morning, the Ambassador delivered a strong
message to him, a bookend to the one delivered to
Ravalomanana in Johannesburg, urging him to compromise
further in Addis to avert failure. He stressed that saving
AGOA and avoiding EU sanctions may be possible only if there
is success in Addis in launching a truly consensual and
inclusive transition. As examples of concessions TGV could
make, the Ambassador asked TGV to consider stepping down from
the transition presidency now in favor of a truly neutral
third person, stating now his intention not to run in 2010
elections, and/or at least agreeing now to leave the
presidency if he later decides to run. The message was
received without comment. UN mediator Drame told the
Ambassador on October 30 that he was sending the same message
to TGV and that he had asked the French (Marechaux) to do
likewise during his most recent transit through Paris;
however, he was not sanguine on prospects for the French
following suit. Drame also despaired in that conversation of
the breakdown of teamwork among the mediators, confirming
that Chissano and he had had no further contact with
Ouedraogo since the Oct 6 ICG here.


8. (C) Comment: The underlying problem of Madagascar's
political crisis has not changed -- Ravalomanana and
Rajoelina hate each other -- and both need (at least
minimally) to save face for any agreement to work.
Ravalomanana vows he will never accept TGV as transition
head, but TGV is unlikely to agree to step down, particularly
given the encouragement of the apparent French and AU
endorsements. This issue will not easily be resolved in
Addis and could block an agreement of all four. Ratsiraka
has said previously that he will not go forward without
Ravalomanana, but an agreement among Ratsiraka, Zafy, and
Rajoelina excluding the ousted president (but maybe retaining
part of his movement) may still be possible. Zafy himself
said yesterday: "I do not know if this is all just a big
bluff." The French would not hesitate to recognize such an
agreement as a done deal, but it is unclear how the rest of
the international community would react. During the Oct 6
ICG, the Addis summit was portrayed as "the last chance" to
get all four on board before the train left the station.
While the dip corps in general agrees that the transition
should be blessed by Ravalomanana, patience is wearing thin.
The 120-day EU clock for making a determination on hundreds
of millions of dollars of critical aid for Madagascar ends
Nov 6, and no one is eager to see that ax fall. With an AGOA
decision following closely on its heels, the pressure to
accept a deal coming out of Addis, even if not ideal, is
mounting, both on the international community and on the
Malagasy themselves. Post will continue to urge all sides to
compromise, but the main action has now shifted from Tana to
Addis. End comment.
MARQUARDT