MADAGASCAR: FRAGILE POWER-SHARING DEAL REACHED AT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANTANANARIVO 000707

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MA
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: FRAGILE POWER-SHARING DEAL REACHED AT
ICG-M

REF: A. ANTANANARIVO 701

B. ANTANANARIVO 618

Classified By: POL/ECON CHIEF DOVIE HOLLAND FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D.


1. (C) Summary: Following de facto transition leader Andry
Rajoelina's announcement Oct 4 that he agreed to replace his
prime minister Monja Roindefo with a consensus candidate to
form a unity government, high-level officials attending the
third international contact group meeting on Madagascar
(ICG-M) pressured Roindefo to cede his place for the good of
the country. AU Commissioner Jean Ping then led the charge
to convince the representatives of the nation's four vying
political factions that they must agree on a replacement.
Following high-level French intervention, a name acceptable
to all four movements was found. The elation felt over this
breakthrough was short-lived however as it became clear that
the next stumbling block would be over who held the post of
transition president. Although the Ravalomanana movement's
demands that either Rajoelina be replaced or that he agree
not to run in the next election were noted, the ICG, urged by
France, the AU, and SADC Mediator Chissano, concluded that
consensus had been reached on the top three posts of a unity
transition government, with the caveat that another offshore
meeting of the leaders of the four movements would be
arranged as soon as possible to concretize the fragile verbal
agreements of the four delegations and iron out the remaining
"details". Ravalomanana declared the following day that he
would never recognize Rajoelina as transition president, but
it remains to be seen if he will pull out of the mediation --
and power-sharing -- process. A consensus transition
government without the notional approval or acquiescence of
the ousted president could face serious challenges
implementing the objectives of the Maputo transition charter;
however, Ravalomanana's business and political interests here
may be compelling enough to keep him in the fold. End
summary.

AU Convenes High-Level ICG in Madagascar
--------------

2. (U) The African Union convened the third international
contact group meeting on Madagascar (ICG-M) in Antananarivo
Oct 6. Although pro-HAT groups had threatened to block the
mediators' arrival at the airport following SADC's recent
move to stop HAT leader Rajoelina from speaking at the UNGA,
security was ensured by the HAT, which even went so far as to
break up a small gathering of peaceful protesters outside the
meeting venue on Oct 6 by firing tear gas to disperse the
approximately 100 people. The local nature of the event
significantly altered the dynamic compared to the previous
ICG-M's held in Addis. Discussions were heated and not
particularly diplomatic. The meeting, presided over by AU
Commission Chairperson Jean Ping, was attended by mediators
from the AU, SADC, the UN, and the OIF, as well as
representatives from the Indian Ocean Commission, the EU,
Libya, the five permanent members of the Security Council,
and Japan as an observer. Ambassador Phillip Carter led the
US delegation; other high-ranking officials included French
Minister of Cooperation Alain Joyandet, Swedish EU Presidency
Ambassador Lena Sundh, and former Mozambican President and
lead mediator Joachim Chissano. These high-level officials,
with a forceful Jean Ping at the helm, successfully pressured
Madagascar's main political rivals to reach consensus on
several key points that could lead to the implementation of a
unity transition government, although much work remains to be
done.

Monja's Humiliating Withdrawal
--------------

3. (C) After attending diplomats had been briefed by the
mediators on events since the second ICG July 22 in Addis
Ababa, the delegations expressed their support for the
mediators and the continuation of negotiations to achieve a
consensual, inclusive transition government that could
prepare credible elections within the next 13 months. All
agreed that implementation of the Maputo transition charter
and other accords signed in Mozambique by the leaders of the
four political movements August 9 was the only way forward
out of the nation's political crisis. The meeting then took
an unusual turn when Ambassador Carter urged AU Envoy

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Ouedraogo to invite the four delegations into the room
together for an interactive session with the ICG members.
Initially Ouedraogo rejected Carter's recommendation, but
other ICG members chimed in, as did Commissioner Ping,
leading to a brief scuffle between Ouedraogo and Ping on
whether the delegations would be invited in single file or
all at once. Ping prevailed, and the four delegation leaders
were seated at the main table, including Rajoelina's
representative, Ny Hasina Andriamanjato (vice PM in charge of
foreign affairs). Shortly thereafter, Rajoelina's prime
minister Monja Roindefo -- whom Rajoelina had promised the
international community he would replace with a consensus
candidate (ref A) -- took Ny Hasina's seat. Following
Monja's appeal to the ICG that it should consider the
political stability and the "reality on the ground", rather
than just the terms of Maputo, which he claimed were unclear,
he was squarely told by President Chissano, Commissioner
Ping, Minister Joyandet, Ambassador Carter, and Ambassador
Sundh that he must cede his place to a consensus prime
minister in order to resolve the political crisis. Soon
after this humiliating exchange, Ny Hasina provided a letter
to Ping from Rajoelina explaining that Ny Hasina, not Monja,
was his movement's representative. Monja promptly departed
and was replaced by Ny Hasina, who stressed his movement's
willingness to implement the Maputo accords, including
replacing Monja with a consensus prime minister.

All Agree on Consensus Prime Minister
--------------

4. (C) The mediators explained that, during the second round
of talks in Maputo, there was a consensus that Rajoelina
would retain the presidency of the unity transition
government, Ratsiraka would name a consensus prime minister,
and Zafy would name the vice president. (Note: All of the
movements except that of ousted President Ravalomanana had
agreed to this plan. Ravalomanana had agreed in general to
the schema, but had objected strongly to Rajoelina personally
retaining the transition presidency (ref B). End note.)
Prior to the ICG meeting, Ratsiraka had provided three names
for consideration, which were all rejected because of
affiliation or ethnicity. During the ICG, the French reached
Ratsiraka by phone and offered him a ten-minute meeting with
President Sarkozy if he agreed to give more names. During
the lunch break, Chissano discussed these names with the four
delegations, who agreed that Professor Eugene Mangalaza,
former IV program participant and former Rector of Tamatave
University living in exile since 2002, was acceptable as
prime minister. Zafy named his delegation leader Dr.
Emmanuel Rakotovahiny as vice president.

. . . But Not on the President
--------------

5. (C) Although the agreement on the prime minister was a
major breakthrough, the victory was short-lived. The
Ravalomanana delegation made it clear that they had never
agreed to Rajoelina personally occupying the transition
presidency and would not accept such an arrangement. They
later softened their tone and agreed to accept him if he
agreed that he would not run for president in the elections
to be organized in the coming year, but threatened to pull
out of the process altogether if their objections were
ignored. The mediators responded by explaining that the
question of who could run for president had already been
raised and resolved during the first round of discussions in
Maputo, that all four movements had agreed that only members
of the transition government (which, in the French system,
does not include the president) would be barred from running,
and that even though the AU has a general principle that coup
leaders should not be able to run in an election they
organize, that principle did not apply in this case as the
political leaders had agreed otherwise in writing. Ny Hasina
added that (the 35-year old) Rajoelina had not yet decided
even if he intended to run and that the population would have
to decide on his eligibility when they determined the terms
of the new constitution to be approved by referendum
(including lower age limits).

Deal or No Deal?: International Community Divided
--------------

6. (C) In the final closed door session of the ICG, without

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the Malagasy delegations, there was heated debate on whether
or not Ravalomanana could be forced to go along with the
schema, and if he did not, whether or not any "consensus"
which did not include the democratically-elected president,
who maintains a reasonable-sized following (and significant
financial resources),was truly a viable one. The French
argued that three out of four movements was a consensus and
that the ICG should announce the formation of a new
government as a fait accompli and move forward. The door
would remain open to Ravalomanana's movement to join later if
they chose to do so, Joyandet argued, reflecting a term in
the Maputo agreement. The EU and UK Ambassadors both then
raised concerns that the international community should not
oversell the agreement that had been reached in the final
communique as a consensus that definitively determined the
leaders of the transition, as they could then be embarrassed
later in the press when the Ravalomanana movement rejected
the agreements and perhaps pulled out of the negotiations
entirely. The UK Ambassador further noted that any
transition government without the participation of
Ravalomanana's representatives (he agreed in Maputo that he
would not personally participate) would not be viewed as
inclusive, as it would exclude the elected president.
Ambassador Carter subsequently intervened to say that,
without Ravalomanana's participation, any unity government
would likely fail to resolve the political crisis as his
supporters would not accept it. Ambassador Carter urged that
another last-ditch effort be made to bring Ravalomanana on
board. Ambassadors Carter, Marquardt, and others then
attempted to reach Ravalomanana by phone, but clearly he was
not taking any calls.


7. (C) Eventually, after 14 grueling hours, it was agreed
that the names of the transition president, vice president,
and prime minister would be publicized, along with an
explanation of the Ravalomanana movement's "strong objection"
to Rajoelina being able to run for president. Then, Chissano
received a call from Ratsiraka, who argued that Ravalomanana
must be part of the solution and called on the mediators to
organize another offshore meeting of the movement leaders
(Rajoelina, Ratsiraka, Zafy, and Ravalomanana) to seek to
reach agreement on pending issues. Chissano agreed to do
this as soon as possible to seek written confirmation by the
four leaders of the tenuous agreement made by their
delegations during the ICG. Today, Ravalomanana issued a
declaration stating that he would never accept a putschist as
the head of the transition, as that would provide a poor
example for all of Africa.

Comment: A Difficult Road to Hoe
--------------

8. (C) Ravalomanana's anti-putschist argument resonates, but
it got no traction yesterday precisely because he already had
lost it two months ago in Maputo: even those -- like the US,
EU, and UK -- who strongly sympathized with the principle at
stake had to agree that Ravalomanana was attempting to
re-open issues closed in an agreement he had signed and whose
implementation was the object of this meeting. (Indeed, one
of his closest advisors admitted to Ambassadors Marquardt and
Carter that they had "made a big mistake in Maputo.") The
agreement reached on a consensus prime minister was an
important breakthrough towards the implementation of a unity
government that can organize credible elections, but the
question of the presidency has now risen to the fore. It
remains to be seen if the mediators' plan to persuade
Ravalomanana to accept Rajoelina will succeed in unblocking
the way for the formation of a truly inclusive transition
government, or if it will backfire, causing Ravalomanana to
pull out of negotiations entirely. In a side bar discussion,
Carter offered USG assistance to Chissano, stating that AF
leadership would be willing to meet with Ravalomanana in
South Africa if that would help Chissano's mediation efforts.
Chissano said he appreciated the offer and would look to see
if US pressure on Ravalomanana would be needed.
Alternatively, it is not to be excluded that Rajoelina might
agree not to run, which would surely be welcomed by the ICG.
The resolution of this not-so-small detail will no doubt
prove difficult, but perhaps Ravalomanana's desire to protect
his business interests will be enough to keep him in the
fold. End comment.

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MARQUARDT