Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ANTANANARIVO701
2009-10-05 14:24:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Antananarivo
Cable title:  

MADAGASCAR: TGV DIMS HOPE OF CRISIS RESOLUTION ON

Tags:  PGOV PREL MA 
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P 051424Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2905
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEWMFC/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 000701 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/E-MBEYZEROV
USAU FOR JMAYBURY
PARIS FOR WBAIN AND RKANEDA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MA
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: TGV DIMS HOPE OF CRISIS RESOLUTION ON
EVE OF ICG-M

Classified By: P/E CHIEF DOVIE HOLLAND FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 000701

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/E-MBEYZEROV
USAU FOR JMAYBURY
PARIS FOR WBAIN AND RKANEDA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MA
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: TGV DIMS HOPE OF CRISIS RESOLUTION ON
EVE OF ICG-M

Classified By: P/E CHIEF DOVIE HOLLAND FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D.


1. (C) Summary: On the eve of the third ICG-M hosted by the
AU in Antananarivo, de facto transition leader Rajoelina
failed to make good on his promises to replace his prime
minister with a consensus candidate. Instead, he demanded on
national television that the international community make
several guarantees before he will take action to implement
the transition charter signed in Maputo August 9. The
French, who continue quietly to back TGV, reportedly favor
early elections (before the end of the year) to resolve the
crisis, even if they are of dubious quality, due to pressure
from French residents of Madagascar to protect their
interests. If TGV continues his waffling leadership,
however, SADC mediator Chissano told Ambassador Phil Carter
that he risks being removed by the military -- an eventuality
perhaps almost welcomed by the beleaguered mediator
frustrated by Rajoelina's ability to act on his words. The
AU and SADC are considering sanctions (travel bans and
freezing assets) against the leaders of the illegal
transition authority, which Carter said the USG would
support. However, such maneuvers will have real teeth only
if France is also on board. TGV then convoked the entire
international community today to give a softer version of his
address to the nation, stressing his commitment to Maputo
without demanding outright guarantees. All in all, Tuesday's
ICG-M meeting already is off to a shaky start, with hopes
dimmed for any easy or early breakthrough. End summary.


Rajoelina Tries to Blackmail International Community
--------------

2. (C) Late on the evening of October 4 -- two days prior to
the third international contact group meeting on Madagascar
(ICG-M) hosted by the AU -- de facto transition leader Andry
"TGV" Rajoelina delivered a televised address to the nation
(starting two hours late) in which he once again proved that
he lacks the authority to govern Madagascar. Submitting to
apparent pressure from hard-liners in his political movement
-- and notwithstanding multiple promises to the ICG and
others that he would replace his prime minister with a

consensus candidate -- he once again failed to follow
through on his word. He announced instead that he would only
implement the Maputo agreements (which he signed himself
August 9) if the international community provided a guaranty
in writing that it would suspend sanctions, support
elections, and restore over USD 600 million of suspended aid.
If such guaranty were provided, he said, he would replace
Monja with a consensus prime minister suggested by the other
political movements.

. . . And Then Asks for Its Support
--------------

3. (C) Rajoelina then convoked the diplomatic corps and
visiting ICG-M participants to the presidential palace in the
afternoon of Oct 5 to restate his position, albeit with
nuances. He stressed the difficulty of deciding to implement
Maputo and solicited the continuing support of the
international community "for the people of Madagascar." He
appealed to the diplomats to support him by hinting that if
they did not, the military may take action -- "guns do not
talk with their mouths," he said. He did not demand or even
mention any written guarantees, but reiterated his desire for
the nation's next leader to have been elected before the 50th
anniversary of Malagasy independence next June 26. By prior
agreement, there was no substantive response to his remarks
from the assembled diplomats. When invited to cocktails
following the address, the American and Chinese Ambassadors
promptly departed. The Chinese Ambassador noted on the way
out that they had suspended all of their projects in
Madagascar due to the lack of leadership in the government
and that they shared the US position that Maputo should be
implemented without delay.

TGV Flouts Agreements Reached in Maputo
--------------

4. (C) Ambassador Phillip Carter met early on October 5 with
SADC lead mediator Chissano. Chissano recounted that during
the second round of negotiations in Maputo in August, three
of the four delegations (notably not including that of ousted
President Ravalomanana, whose overarching goal is taking out
TGV) had agreed that TGV could retain the presidency if he
agreed to give former President Zafy's movement the vice
presidency and allow Ratsiraka to nominate a consensus prime
minister. During TGV's meetings in Paris (Sept 26-30),

ANTANANARI 00000701 002 OF 002


Ratsiraka proposed three names to TGV, but he refused them
all and Ratsiraka to date has failed to produce alternatives.
Chissano clarified that the French would like to see TGV
retain his post and opined that they appear more concerned
about the urgency of elections than their quality.
Secretary-General Claude Gueant of the Elysee explained to
Chissano that the French presidency is under pressure from
private French and Franco-Malagasy interests in Madagascar to
act more quickly and decisively to protect their interests
and resolve the situation.

Ravalomanana Left out in the Cold
--------------

5. (C) In Paris, Ratsiraka and TGV did agree on a partition
of the 28 ministerial posts envisioned by the Maputo
transition charter, with five going to each of the four
movements and the remaining 8 going to TGV to allocate
tactically to people outside his own movement. TGV requested
that the French participate in this meeting to provide him
support; they joined the discussion following a two-hour
tete-a-tete between Ratsiraka and TGV. In South Africa on
October 3, Chissano discussed the agreement that was reached
by the latter two with Ravalomanana, who rejected it.
Chissano said that Zafy, who has not held political power in
over a decade, is flexible because he only stands to gain;
thus, he accepted the proposal when Chissano presented it to
him Oct 4. After Ambassador Carter pointed out in the Oct 4
meeting of local ICG members that a consensus agreement must
also take Ravalomanana into account, Chissano explained
privately that the mediators' plan was to get the Rajoelina,
Ratsiraka, and Zafy movements to come to agreement and then
to push Ravalomanana to go along with the "majority"
coalition. Chissano believed that Ravalomanana would, in
fact, acquiesce. Given the opportunity to name five
ministers if the others reached agreement on the top posts,
Ravalomanana is already demanding the foreign minister slot.
Ravalomanana also said he is eager to protect his business
interests in Madagascar from further looting.

Where Do We Go From Here?
--------------

6. (C) Chissano explained privately that he sees two options
for the future -- the optimistic one being the implementation
of the Maputo accords (consensus government, constitutional
referendum, elections in 2010). However, discussing a second
possible outcome, Chissano said he thought TGV might be
removed in a counter-coup. He joked that might actually be
preferable to have a coup so at least the mediators would
know with whom to talk. Chissano of SADC and Ouedraogo of
the AU both expressed their organizations' likely
implementation of sanctions (travel bans and asset freezing)
on the HAT leaders if they fail to implement Maputo.
Ambassador Carter noted USG support for the idea of
additional sanctions, but for such a system to be effective,
said that the EU must also be on board. Unfortunately,
France, as evinced by comments made on several occasions in
reaction to the possibility of AU sanctions, likely will
oppose such moves.

Comment
--------------

7. (C) Although the international community at large supports
the SADC-led mediation process and is calling with one
(public) voice for the implementation of the Maputo
transition charter (even the usually apolitical Chinese
Ambassador called for respecting Maputo during their recent
national day),continuing French double-dealing makes them a
wild card. They cannot afford for Madagascar to turn into a
failed state or descend into violence, and they would prefer
to retain a Francophile (evidently even a feckless one) at
the helm. Their mixed signals to TGV may have emboldened
special interests and hard-liners around him to push him to
equivocate again in the face of pressure of the rest of the
international community to form a consensus government. TGV
now is trying, clumsily, to use one speech with his people
and another with the donors on whom they depend. Tomorrow's
ICG-M is likely to feature some spirited sparring between the
French -- perhaps arguing alone -- and those like us who will
want to see a firm international community position going
forward.
MARQUARDT