PRESIDENT MAY BE OPEN TO MEETING -- BUT NOT TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANTANANARIVO 000069

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/30/2019
TAGS: MA PGOV PINR PREL

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT MAY BE OPEN TO MEETING -- BUT NOT TO
REAL DIALOGUE

REF: ANTAN 68 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Niels Marquardt for reasons 1.4b and d.


1. (C) Summary: President Ravalomanana told ambassadors
Thursday that he is open to meeting the Mayor, but not to any
broad dialogue with him, or anyone else. A meeting may or
may not occur Friday at 1500 at the German residence.
Prospects for the meeting have dimmed as the Mayor publicly
stated that the meeting would be to discuss a transition
government, after the President had insisted on meeting
without conditions. The situation is therefore not yet ripe
here for any message from Washington to the President. End
summary.


2. (C) The chiefs of mission from US, France, Germany, EU,
and the UN system met President Ravalomanana Thursday at 1700
for about 30 minutes. Our intent was to stress the dire
sitution now prevailing in Madagascar and to push the
President to accept the need for a wide-ranging dialogue,
intially with the Mayor but eventually with a broader
spectrum of political actors, about the future of the country
and its governance. In the event, we took turns raising the
same issues and each time the President cut us off crisply
but politely with reassurances that there is no need to
change the government, to change any ministers, to hold any
conferences, or to include other actors in the dialogue. He
agreed in principle to meet the Mayor alone, saying "we can
take this little by little." He complained of the Mayor's
duplicitous nature and therefore of the difficulty in
negotiating with him. He stressed confidence-building
measures he has already approved, like restoring Viva radio
and TV and a public denial of the "ridiculous rumor" of the
presence in Madagascar of foreign mercenaries. He confirmed
his commitment to avoiding further bloodshed and said that
the restraint of the military earlier this week had been
intentional. The President mentioned the change in
leadership of the National Gendarmerie approved that day,
saying that it will help to have a Cotier in charge as they
deal with problems on the coasts.He also listed various
political actors from both the coast and the plateau "with
whom I will deal with separately and individually". He named
the price that each of these actors would require in exchange
for acquiescence to Ravalomanana's continuing rule: some want
money, others want a place in the government, others (Zafy)
want coastal interest to be emphasized. He said he would not
deal with the ex-Arema leadership at all, including Roland
Ratsiraka. He also requested our help in rebuilding his
country after this week's destruction.


3. (C) I relayed the President's openness to a meeting to
the Mayor afterward. He readily accepted and proposed 1500
Friday. By Friday morning the word back from the Presidency
on that proposal was that the President was extremely annoyed
that the Mayor had said publicly by radio that he would be
meeting the President "to discuss a transition government,"
and that he was only willing to meet without pre-conditions.
Foreign Minister Ranjeva came to see me mid-morning on Friday
to discuss ways to get the President back on track for the
meeting this afternoon. He agreed that the status quo ante
is not possible and asked us to keep pushing the President to
accept the meeting and, over time, to agree to make
concessions. He left to see the Prime Minister to discuss
the situation, and then hoped to see the President directly
to encourage him to keep the 1500 appointment. I and the
German Ambassador have a 1200 appointment with the Mayor to
encourage him to tone down his public rhetoric and to prepare
him for a first encounter with the President that clearly
will fall short of his expectations. Our objective is to
dissuade him from any inflammatory statements after the
meeting, including at tomorrow's demonstration on the Place
du 13. Mai.


4. (C) Comment: Notwithstanding assurances from both sides
of their willingness to meet, this week's several failed
meetings highlight the difficulty of actually bringing the
two parties together. Culturally, it is important for
Malagasy leaders to appear open to dialogue, and indeed the
public is hanging here on this meeting taking place, if only
as a modest first step toward eventual real dialogue. The
President probably perceives the balance of power shifting in
his favor, as he has restored order, notes the fractious
nature of the Mayor's coalition and his difficulties in
holding it together, sees the public getting tired of
confrontation, perhaps thinks the Mayor's popularity is
falling (evidenced by yesterday's failed "ville morte," and
reinforced if a smaller crowd show up tomorrow),and -- given

his statements to us about the "price" of various opposition
camps -- intends to do whatever it takes to peel them off one
by one. As such, the President probably sees time as being
on his side and is in no hurry to accept negotiations or
offer concessions. The quixotic Mayor's calculations are
harder to perceive, but if he also senses his coalition
weakening or his popularity falling, he might be more
inclined to double-down with more extreme statements that
worsen the situation. Concerning the President, it is clear
from conversations with Ranjeva and others that he remains
overly confident, unpredictable, isolated, and is not
listening to much advice from anyone (nor is anyone inclined
to give him any hard messages). For now, we recommend
keeping a line open to Paris on their plans and perceptions.
It is clearly premature to make any call to Ravalomanana now
or soon, as he is in not open to hearing any hard messages at
this time. End comment.

MARQUARDT