Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ANTANANARIVO68
2009-01-29 10:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Antananarivo
Cable title:  

REFLECTIONS ON THE CURRENT MALAGASY POLITICAL

Tags:  MA PGOV PINR PREL 
pdf how-to read a cable
O 291030Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2018
INFO AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP PRIORITY
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANTANANARIVO 000068 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2019
TAGS: MA PGOV PINR PREL
SUBJECT: REFLECTIONS ON THE CURRENT MALAGASY POLITICAL
CRISIS

REF: ANTAN 60 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Niels Marquardt

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANTANANARIVO 000068

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/29/2019
TAGS: MA PGOV PINR PREL
SUBJECT: REFLECTIONS ON THE CURRENT MALAGASY POLITICAL
CRISIS

REF: ANTAN 60 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Niels Marquardt


1. (C) Summary: Whatever we might decide to do here to
help defuse the current political crisis -- perhaps a phone
call to the President from the Secretary -- should first be
coordinated with Paris. They, unlike us, have extensive
interests in Madagascar and are properly in the lead of any
international effort. Foreign Minister Kouchner is already
engaged directly with both the Mayor and Presidnet, and
may/may be preparing to come mediate at some point. End
Summary.


2. (C) Today's "Ville Morte" and attendent calm offers the
first chance for any considered reflection and classified
communication on the crisis that has overtaken Antananarivo
and much of the country over the past week. The city is
eerily calm, with businesses and schools closed; I saw
families lined up at the morgue this morning to identify the
corpses of loved ones, and the President is holding his third
cabinet meeting in 36 hours as I write this. He and the
Mayor remain unconnected in any dialogue whatsoever, with
Malagasy friends strongly encouraging us diplomats to
continue to broker an opening between the two. In many ways,
it feels like the calm before the (next) storm, or the eye of
the hurricane, as the French charge called it today. Our
cell phones, ringing incessantly for the past three days,
have gone silent, suggesting that all parties to the conflict
are licking their wounds, considering their options, and
planning their next moves. One minister told me he is
sending his family tonight to Mauritius to get them
indefinitely out of harm's way -- one indication of how
uneasy someone in the know is about what might come next.


3. (C) I see a large danger in the wide gap in calculations
and perceptions of the situation on the two sides (indeed,
there are more than just two sides here -- important to keep
in mind). Although the President has avoided all contact
with the diplomatic community since last week (despite our
repeated, urgent appeals to meet and one narrowly missed
appointment as he flew off on his helicopter),I think he has
an enormously exaggerated sense of control. His largely
sycophant ministers -- even those who like us do see the
situation as urgent and dire -- are unlikely to be passing

him any hard mesages -- indeed, that is why many of them want
us to see him so urgently. My only contact with the
government this morning was with Economics Minister Ivohasina
Razafimahefa. "Ivo" is close to the President and evidently
trying to push him toward dialogue -- but rather than telling
me, he asked me why I think the President is avoiding
dialogue! I told him that I think the President is
overcalculating the strength of his hand, that thinks that he
does not need to make peace with the Mayor in order to
re-establish calm, and that he needs to start considering a
government of national unity that will get the strife in the
streets into a negotiating structure of their own design. In
this, I also suggested that it will be critical to include
"Cotier" (coastal ethnic groups) elements, otherwise they
will be furious with any perceived solution worked out only
between two members of the President's/Mayor's Merina ethnic
group. My staff met yesterday with leading members of the
Cotier opposition, who were all over the place in their ideas
but united in insisting on a place for them at whatever table
is set. This aspect must not be ignored.


4. (C) The Mayor of Tana is young, naive, appealing, but
has a limited feel for national -- as opposed to Tana --
politics. He does not appear to be taking sufficiently into
account the Cotier element and is in only limited contact
with them. In fact, I agree with many here who think he and
his popularity has been used by the Cotiers to open up the
political field, and who now intend to march on it
themselves, over him (and even his dead body) if necessary.
Former Mayor Roland Ratsiraka of Tamatave (former President
Ratsiraka's nephew) is perhaps foremost among them, but none
of them really commands the others. On the other hand, we
just learned that the Mayor will meet this afternoon with the
Cotier opposition, including Ratsiraka. They have told us
directly that their five pre-conditions for any meeting of
their side with the President would be: 1) withdrawing arrest
warrants against Ratsiraka and the Mayor's chief of staff; 2)
release of some jailed students (three already were released
yesterday); 3) resumption of broadcasting by all closed TV
and radio stations (already largely the case); 4) departure
of alleged mercenaries from Malagasy soil; and 5)
cancellation of the alleged Daewoo deal. (Once they meet the

President, they say their demand will be nothing less than
his resignation.) The Mayor also overestimates the strength
of his position, thinking that the President is truly on the
verge of falling and that he will almost magically soon find
himself as the Prime Minister of a transition government,
with or without Ravalomanana staying on as President. If and
when the two meet, I suspect the width of the chasm
separating their perceptions will become quickly apparent --
which makes me pessimistic that dialogue, while still the
best (and perhaps only) next step, will settle anything fast.
The Mayor is genuinely fearful for his personal safety --
yesterday he described to me in detail several assassination
plots he claimed to have uncovered, one from the President's
side, the other from the Cotiers (to me the latter is far
more likely than the former) -- before donning a bulletproof
vest and heading off to his rally. He also has a hard time
absorbing the international consequences of his forming what
could only be considered an illegal government (unless
Ravalomanana goes along with it) that partners would have to
denounce while suspending their aid.


5. (C) A similarly neglected but crucial aspect of the
crisis is what it has already done to ruin Madagascar's
investment climate, which had been improving in recent years.
Major mining projects like the dols 3.5 billion Ambatovy
nickel/cobalt enterprise are at risk of losing access to
credit in an already difficult financial market, due to
political risk clauses in their loan agreements if the legal
government is dissolved; this would probably cause the entire
operation to cease in mid-stream. AGOA-based textile
factories are complaining to us of tens of millions of
dollars in lost orders just this week, and are threatened
already with closure and layoffs. With perhaps one third of
all formal sector employment in Madagascar in the textile
sector, this would have a catastrophic impact on the economic
well-being of the country, especially in the 'Tana region
where most factories are located. I have repreated these
arguments widely, and they were included in the joint
declaration made yesterday by the diplomatic community. They
seem, however, to have little effect on Malagasy leaders'
behaviors. Air France is cancelling flights not due to the
crisis itself but because no one is coming to Madagascar; the
once-promising tourism sector has already taken a major hit.


6. (C) French charge Marie-Claire Girardin told me this
morning that she had met last night with the leaders of the
various security forces here (army, gendarmerie, police).
Those leaders or at least senior subordinates are in direct
contact with the Mayor's side as well as the civilian chain
of command, and have been intent thus far on minimizing
direct confrontation with Malagasy compatriots, even at the
cost of the physical destruction (and despite up to 60 lost
lives) that has taken place so far. Girardin said that she
understands that the military is likely to step in if there
is no sign of dialogue soon from the two protagonists. She
has launched another appeal to the Mayor's side for dialogue,
and, like us, is seeking every opportunity to make the case
directly or indirectly to the President.


7. (C) What comes next is hard to say. Today's "ville
morte" appears to be at best a minor success for the Mayor,
as many Malagasy seem to have ignored it as an expression of
their disgust with him and/or current politics. The
President was slated to leave for Addis by Saturday for the
AU Summit, but it now seems unlikely (and unwise) that he
would go. Getting the AU Summit now seems an impossibility
for 'Tana, so why go to Addis and come back empty-handed and
humiliated? Indeed, the whole AU connection -- along with
his ill-considered purchase last month of a new dols 60
million executive 737-700 -- has been a flashpoint for the
strong popular reaction against the President personally.
Over the past year, he strayed from his "development,
development, development" focus to a sudden fascination with
garnering international prestige. Attracting the July AU
Summit to 'Tana became a priority, as well as the 2010
Francophonie Summit. Poor Malagasy then saw him building
prestige villas and a five-star hotel for visiting heads of
state and purchasing an expensive new aircraft for himself --
instead of improving their own housing or transport.
Combined with the growing perception of enormous conflicts of
interest between the president's personal and official
interests, this suddenly bacame an easy target for
exploitation by an opposition that he had grossly
underestimated.


8. (C) For the moment, as we look ahead, it is important to
keep sight of the limits of U.S. national interests here in

faraway Madagascar. Our only critical national interest is
the safety of all Americans living here, who so far have not
been threatened in any way -- and I do not expect this to
change. If I can be helpful, I am willing to remain engaged
in pushing for dialogue, and supporting whatever political
process might follow. There may be a helpful role for the
Department, even for the Secretary herself, in phoning
Ravalomanana to encourage him to see the current situation
realistically and to truly open a negotiation with the
opposition. However, I recommend we follow the French lead
here, and consult closely with Paris before we initiate
anything. Unlike us, the French have extensive interests
here. Foreign Minister Kouchner is already engaged directly
with both parties, and may even be preparing to come here as
a mediator if events permit. Whatever we might decide to do
should be in support of the French lead.

MARQUARDT