MADAGASCAR: SOMETHING HAS TO GIVE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 000662

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/E - MBEYZEROV
PARIS FOR WBAIN
LONDON FOR PLORD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2019
TAGS: PGOV MA
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: SOMETHING HAS TO GIVE

REF: A. ANTANANARIVO 659

B. ANTANANARIVO 643

C. ANTANANARIVO 634

D. ANTANANARIVO 642

Classified By: AMBASSADOR NIELS MARQUARDT FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D.


1. (S) SUMMARY: As the opposition grows more unified in its
bid to force a return to the negotiating table (ref A),
relations among competing factions within the High
Transitional Authority (HAT) appear to have hit a low point.
HAT President Andry Rajoelina may be seeking to resolve the
current impasse by either stepping down himself, or
(preferably) forcing Prime Minister Monja to do so. The
latter scenario at least could lead toward a resolution of
the crisis. Their continued tandem rule was the reason
Maputo II broke down on August 27, and remains the most
obvious indicator of the HAT's bad-faith interpretation of
the August 9 Maputo I accords. In any case, the status quo
cannot persist; if the two leaders cannot agree to separate
voluntarily, then one may seek to unseat the other, or the
military may still consider stepping in (ref B). Whether or
not the opposition can rally enough support to stage protests
on the scale of February or March 2009, their continued
agitation -- along with mounting international pressure --
may be enough to keep the HAT off balance, permitting the
conflict of personalities within to play out on its own. END
SUMMARY.

RAJOELINA NERVOUS, WHILE MONJA DIGS IN
--------------

2. (S) The HAT of President Andry Rajoelina and PM Roindefo
Monja has failed in its recent bid to simply "move on" by
unilaterally expanding its government (ref C),"implementing"
Maputo by decree (with Presidential Ordinance 2009-09 on
September 8),and appealing directly to the international
community (ref D) for assistance with elections. They now
face growing enthusiasm for targeted sanctions from SADC and
the AU, and their recent posturing has given the USG and EU
partners ever less to work with as decisions on AGOA, the
EU's Cotonou process, and EU commercial agreements draw
closer. The three opposition parties have given the HAT
until September 20 to return to negotiations, and although
they have yet to deliver on promised anti-HAT demonstrations
in Antananarivo and elsewhere, they have managed to maintain
unity in their minimal demands for upholding the Maputo
Process begun in August. On September 15, a local
intermediary told Ambassador Marquardt that Rajoelina is
aware of the dire problems he's facing, and may be seeking a
way out, possibly out of fear for his life from none other
than his own Prime Minister.


3. (S) While Rajoelina may now have a better grip on current
reality, Monja and many in his cabinet appear to be seeking
to further entrench themselves. On September 14, HAT
Minister of Justice Christine Razanamahasoa said she was
"shocked" by recent declarations from opposition leaders
(notably former president Albert Zafy) denying the existence
of a legitimate government; this has "created confusion in
the minds of the people" she alleged, before stating that the
current opposition alliance represents "a new movement, not
covered by the Maputo accords" -- and therefore not an entity
they are obliged to deal with. In response to recent
low-level protests in Antananarivo, a former TIM senator has
been arrested, and several pro-Ravalomanana organizers are
currently either wanted or in detention; Monja has made clear
his intention to use these small demonstrations as a pretext
for avoiding or delaying further dialogue. RAO sources also
indicate that Monja is actively countering Zafy's moves to
stir up provincial support by providing financing to the 22
HAT-appointed Regional Chiefs.

LOOKING FORWARD: SEVERAL OPTIONS
--------------

4. (C) The most tempting option for the embattled HAT remains
the status quo: in the face of difficult leadership questions
over the duration of this crisis, successive administrations
have routinely chosen inaction over compromise or
confrontation. Rajoelina can remain silent, Monja can
continue throwing resources at the some in the security
forces and silencing opposition voices, and the HAT can
continue hoping that the three other movements' support fails
to materialize in the capital and elsewhere. However, this
path is also the straightest line to further aid and trade
cuts and other possible sanctions over the next 90 days, and
this administration has yet to deliver on its promised ties
to "non-traditional" donors or any semblance of diplomatic

ANTANANARI 00000662 002 OF 002


recognition from any quarter. Rajoelina may hope that his
planned trip to New York for UNGA on September 20 will yield
some useful diplomatic dividends, but that remains an
unlikely scenario in the face of across-the-board
international condemnation of his having derailed the Maputo
Process.


5. (S) With the status quo an untenable option, something
will have to give. The quickest route back to the Maputo
Process would be for either Rajoelina or Monja to step down,
or be forced out -- preferably the thuggish Monja. Monja has
already rejected the opportunity to do so, even when offered
a dignified and substantial role in the transition as
president of the upper house of Parliament. If Rajoelina
manages to fire him (and it's not evident that he can),he
would be free to replace him with a consensus candidate, thus
putting Maputo back on the rails. This could provoke a
dangerous response from those loyal to and directed by Monja,
however, including the unpredictable Special Intervention
Force (FIS) of the widely-feared Lt. Colonel Charles
Andrianasoavina, as well as Monja's ethnic-Antandroy support
base in south-west Madagascar. However, with the right
incentives (including a renewed attempt to move him laterally
within the transition institutions),this route probably
would permit a return to talks potentially leading to a
resolution.


6. (S) If Rajoelina is unable to remove Monja, however, he
may opt to step down himself -- or be forced out by Monja.
This would theoretically open the way for the appointment of
a consensus President of the Transition, perhaps a respected
and rather neutral person like newly-named Vice President Guy
Rajamieson. It is also possible, however, that Monja would
seek to elevate himself to the presidency, thus enabling
himself (per the Maputo I accords) to run in an eventual
presidential election from which all other members of the
transition government are barred from participation. While
there is declining popular affection and support for the
affable but inept Rajoelina, Monja is widely despised across
the political spectrum, generally seen as an opportunistic,
dishonest thug, and thus he would be far more divisive as the
new leader. He would have to rely on power, rather than
popularity, to remain in office -- a dubious and probably
ephemeral proposition.


7. (S) Should none of these scenarios play out, there remains
the possibility that the military will eventually cave to
pressures from the opposition (and from the tired people of
Madagascar) to intervene "responsibly". Recent conversations
with opposition leaders indicate that the current military
leadership understands the problems and incompetence of the
current administration. Nonetheless, they may be reticent to
get involved for fear of being saddled with and blamed for
these problems themselves. With weak command and control,
and lingering fear that some in the opposition still seek to
reinstall Ravalomanana (anathema to many in the military who
fear retribution if he were to return),paralysis and inertia
remain the more likely military responses at this time.

NOT MUCH MORE MUDDLING
--------------

8. (S) COMMENT: At present, Monja's resignation remains the
only clear path to resuming negotiations, but Rajoelina's
departure might become the more likely scenario as this
impasse continues. In the context of Maputo II, when it was
suggested to Monja that he step aside for a consensus Prime
Minister, he made clear to Rajoelina that the two either
stayed in office together, or left together. While this
played in political circles as an expression of his
solidarity with their revolutionary movement, a more accurate
interpretation would be as a threat: either Rajoelina keeps
him as PM, or Monja would make sure that Rajoelina's career
ended with his. Of the scenarios outlined above, the least
tenable is for the HAT to simply muddle on; indeed, something
has to give. Growing opposition agitation, internal
jockeying within the HAT, and solid international
condemnation suggest that either Rajoelina or Monja may make
a decisive move in the coming days or weeks. END COMMENT.
MARQUARDT