MADAGASCAR'S COUP LEADER FACES RENEWED

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANTANANARIVO 000643

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/E - MBEYZEROV
PARIS FOR WBAIN
LONDON FOR PLORD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2019
TAGS: PGOV MA
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR'S COUP LEADER FACES RENEWED
DEMONSTRATIONS

REF: A. ANTANANARIVO 634

B. ANTANANARIVO 618

Classified By: POL/ECON CHIEF DOVIE HOLLAND FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D.


1. (S) SUMMARY: Following the High Transitional Authority's
(HAT) unilateral formation of a purportedly "consensual and
inclusive" (but substantially unchanged) government on
September 8 (ref A),Madagascar's three other major political
movements have joined forces to condemn the HAT's actions and
call for a return to international mediation, while former
president Zafy has threatened a return to street protests if
their request is ignored. There is a growing consensus that
HAT President Andry Rajoelina severely miscalculated in his
decision to retain Roindefo Monja as Prime Minister and
proceed unilaterally, with increasing indications that key
elements in the military may be prepared to withdraw support
for him in the face of an increasingly unified opposition,
rising international condemnation, and the growing
possibility of renewed demonstrations. In order to put the
negotiation process back on track, one increasingly likely
scenario would have Rajoelina stepping down "voluntarily"
(albeit under intense pressure from the military),
eliminating the problem that blocked an agreement at Maputo
II, and allowing a return to the negotiating table.
Alternatively, he could still save himself by belatedly
agreeing to a truly consensual prime minister. Post has
indications that he may revisit this latter decision, and, in
another positive signal, late on Thursday, September 10 he
agreed behind closed doors to resume negotiations with the
three other movements on Sunday. END SUMMARY.

THE RAJOELINA-MONJA TANDEM - A FATAL MISTAKE?
--------------

2. (C) It has been a week since Rajoelina announced his
intention to form a new government unilaterally, essentially
knocking the Maputo Process off the rails. The international
community has condemned the move via both the International
Contact Group, as well as separate statements from SADC, the
UN, France, and the US. Opposition political parties have
refused to participate in the government (announced on
September 8),with Ravalomanana and Ratsiraka labeling as
"traitors" those who broke ranks and accepted the handful of
positions not reserved for the HAT. Civil society groups and
respected academics also have spoken out against the move,
some questioning its legal justification, others simply
decrying the failure of Rajoelina and his Prime Minister,
Roindefo Monja, to comply with even the sketchy details
agreed upon at the Maputo II talks (ref B).


3. (C) The three main opposition movements (of Zafy, Didier
Ratsiraka, and Marc Ravalomanana) are united in their
opposition to Rajoelina's "new" government, but for the
moment, their unity appears to extend no further than
agreeing to push the HAT back to the negotiating table.
Prior to Rajoelina's speech on September 4, Zafy announced
that the three other groups were prepared to accept having
the military fill the top three positions in the
administration, as a route around the Maputo II impasse.
Zafy, and politicians affiliated with his movement, continue
to present the three groups as united, and preparing to
announce a parallel government of their own. However,
Fetison Andrianirina Rakoto, a leader within the Ravalomanana
movement, later indicated to Emboff that this was not be the
case. In an meeting with the ambassador on September 11
(septel),Zafy himself made no claims to the existence of any
common platform, nor of any current move to develope a
consensual list of nominees for a parallel government. Until
they actually announce a parallel government, opposition
unity cannot be taken for granted, even in the face of
current challenges.

SEVERAL POSSIBLE RESPONSES TO GROWING INSTABILITY
-------------- --------------

4. (S) With the mediation process sidelined, and the
opposition parties growing desperate as the HAT further
entrenches itself, the situation in Antananarivo may again
become unstable. Following up on Zafy's proposal last week
for the military to appoint key leaders, Zafy ally Pierrot
Rajaonarivelo outlined a scenario to the ambassador on
September 9 in which renewed street protests in the city
center would give the military an excuse to intervene -
causing not a "military coup", in his words, but rather an
opportunity for them to "assume responsibility" to stop an
otherwise certain downward spiral into violence and

ANTANANARI 00000643 002 OF 003


international sanctions. Rajaonarivelo stated that the
military had already lost faith in Rajoelina, but was not
prepared to simply take power - they are (justifiably)
concerned of being blamed for the current state of the
economy, the lack of international recognition, and further
cuts in assistance programs and trade deals that would follow
a continued failure to resolve this crisis. This scenario
would allow them to paint themselves as saviors, although the
ability of military leaders to solve this crisis any faster
than civilians is not a given - nor is the extent to which
the international community would see it as progress.


5. (S) A more palatable option for many would be the
resignation of Rajoelina, either of his own volition, or with
as strong a nudge as necessary from the military. The major
blockage at Maputo II was the HAT insistence that they retain
both the President and the Prime Minister positions; this
would allow them to walk back from that demand, and restart
negotiations where they left off in August after Maputo I.
It is not clear how Monja would react to this scenario, but
it would permit talks to start again, and provide a
face-saving way to reopen discussion of a unity government.


6. (S) However, in a September 10 meeting with the ambassador
and representatives of France, Germany, and the European
Union, Rajoelina gave no indication that he had any intention
of stepping down, asking instead for support as they
implement their transition regime and work towards elections
(septel). Shortly afterwards, however, transition Deputy
Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs Ny Hasina Andriamanjato
informed the Ambassador privately that Rajoelina took their
negative reaction seriously, and was prepared to restart
talks with the other movements on Sunday, September 13 in
response to a 72-hour deadline announced by Zafy earlier that
day. He also repeated that Rajoelina was ready to give up
Monja as Prime Minister - but that was a well-known position
prior to Maputo II, and Rajoelina has repeatedly proven
unable to unseat Monja, even with the promise of another high
profile position in the transition government.


7. (S) There are several far less ideal scenarios that could
play out, depending on actions over the next several days.
At present, it remains unclear whether the other movements
will lead protests in the city center, whether the military
is as unified as some opposition leaders suggest, and how
much appetite there really is for further agitation on all
sides. Should Rajoelina remain in office, and the military
decline to take control, there is the possibility that the
opposition movements will gain momentum, and succeed in
holding larger demonstrations. The response of the security
forces, however, is more likely to resemble the rapid (and
less violent) interventions of April and May, rather than the
violent disarray of January and February that only served to
provoke the protesters further. A more remote possibility is
that a continued stalemate could push the other movements out
to the provinces, in what could eventually resemble the
Antananarivo/Tamatave standoff of 2002. Political contacts
have routinely invoked such dire possibilities since the
beginning of the crisis, although they have remained firmly
hypothetical. If a stalemate persists, however, and the HAT
resists further engagement, Ratsiraka and Zafy may be tempted
to move out of the capital to their political bases on the
coast.

TOO LATE FOR A TIMELY EXIT?
--------------

8. (S) COMMENT: If Andriamanjato's message proves correct,
and Rajoelina is seriously considering a return to the
negotiating table and the replacement of his Prime Minister,
next week could begin on a more positive note, and a way out
of the larger crisis could emerge, following the Maputo
Process. At time of writing, however, Zafy was not yet aware
of any response from Rajoelina, and it remains possible that
infighting within the HAT will derail that initiative.
Pressure will mount today and tomorrow with planned rallies
both at Magro, north of city center, and a renewed
demonstrations on Democracy Square in central Antananarivo.
Security forces turned out early, blocked access to the
square, and used tear gas to disburse the 500-700 protesters
who had assembled. (As a precautionary measure, Mission has
issued an updated security alert advising all Americans to
remain vigilent and to avoid certain parts of town until
further notice.)


9. (S) Should that fail, Rajoelina's resignation (forced or

ANTANANARI 00000643 003 OF 003


voluntary, per para 5) could be the least bad scenario.
Although it would not resolve all the work left unfinished at
Maputo I, it would at least provide a peaceful path forward.
South African Ambassador Monaisa told the ambassador that
SADC lead mediator Joaquim Chissano had advised Rajoelina to
step down in a telcon from TGV during the Kinshasa SADC
Summit. Chissano's voice will not be easy to ignore -- but
TGV consistently puts more weight on reacting to difficult
dynamics within the HAT. Rajoelina now ironically finds
himself in a similar predicament to that of his deposed
predecessor in March - stepping down might not be appealing
to him and his supporters, but staying put could make things
even worse. END COMMENT.
MARQUARDT