Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ANTANANARIVO642
2009-09-11 07:33:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Antananarivo
Cable title:  

MADAGASCAR: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY DELIVERS BLUNT

Tags:  PGOV PREL MA 
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FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2817
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANTANANARIVO 000642 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/EPS AND AF/E - MBEYZEROV
TREASURY FOR FBOYE
PARIS FOR WBAIN AND RKANEDA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MA
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY DELIVERS BLUNT
MESSAGE TO TGV

Classified By: AMBASSADOR NIELS MARQUARDT FOR REASONS 1.4B AND D.

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANTANANARIVO 000642

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/EPS AND AF/E - MBEYZEROV
TREASURY FOR FBOYE
PARIS FOR WBAIN AND RKANEDA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MA
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY DELIVERS BLUNT
MESSAGE TO TGV

Classified By: AMBASSADOR NIELS MARQUARDT FOR REASONS 1.4B AND D.


1. (C) Summary. Urgently convoked by HAT President
Rajoelina on September 10, key ambassadors responded to his
soft-soap appeal for understanding and support with a firm,
unified reply denouncing his unilateral formation of a
non-consensual government and stating that further sanctions
and difficulties await Madagascar if there is no change in
direction. "TGV" responded with a polite repetition of his
opening remarks, showing no sign of comprehending our
message. However, 90 minutes later, his foreign minister
told me "TGV understood completely", has now agreed to resume
negotiations with the other movements, and is going to find a
consensus prime minister to unblock the current impasse.
Talk is cheap in Madagascar, and TGV is famously erratic in
taking decisions, so we'll believe it when we see it -- but
the foreign minister's remarks leave some room for optimism
that the Malagasy may yet find a way back to the Maputo
Process without a further unraveling of the situation on the
ground. End Summary.


2. (C) I and my French, German, and EU colleagues were
convoked urgently to see Andry "TGV" Rajoelina Thursday
afternoon. Before going to the palace, I met briefly with my
French colleague, Jean-Marc Chataigner, to compare notes and
coordinate our approach. I expressed concern (septel) that
TGV may have reached the end of the line with his failure to
name a consensus prime minister or form a truly inclusive
government. I referred to reports that the military might be
ready to abandon TGV, either forcing him to resign or
otherwise removing him. Chataigner agreed that retaining
Monja as prime minister had been a huge mistake and told me
that he had gone to see Monja Wednesday to suggest that he
resign in the best interests of Madagascar. However, he did
not think TGV was finished or that the military was ready to
cut him loose. I agreed that the best outcome would be the
selection of a consensus prime minister, if that were still
possible.


3. (C) Sitting alone, TGV opened the meeting with a
friendly but naive appeal for international support for

elections that he said must be organized as soon as possible.
He said "we did our best" in forming a consensus government,
but blamed the three opposition movements for making things
difficult for him, especially last Friday when Zafy and co.
had proposed that the military "assume its responsibilities"
by taking the top three posts in the transition (president,
vice-president, and prime minister). He touted the new
government as inclusive and consistent with the Maputo
accords and sang the praises of several of his nominations,
including former Senate President Guy Rajemison (now
Vice-President),former Defense Minister Cecile Manorohanta
(VPM),and former Prime Minister Jacques Sylla (President of
the Congress). He spoke for twenty minutes and repeated
himself often before asking for comments.


4. (C) After noting that I appreciated the difficulty of
his situation, I made clear that the new government was, in
our view, a step backwards and away from the Maputo accords
and process, was formed in respect to neither the Transition
Charter nor the previous constitution which it replaced, was
neither inclusive nor consensual, and that the retention of
the previous prime minister now threatened to plunge the
country back into chaos and potential violence. I said that
there is no basis for arguing to retain AGOA eligibility if
this approach continues, and opined that international
sanctions were also likely to follow absent a significant
change. I appealed to him to get back to the negotiation
table and to find a truly consensual prime minister, noting
the willingness of many fine Malagasy to join a government if
it were truly consensual and consistent with Maputo. With
respect to his appeal for elections support, I said the USG
was prepared to provide help, but only with a consensual
government in place first.


5. (C) Chataigner spoke next, repeating and reinforcing the
same points. He noted a "positive nuance" in the French
position, calling the inclusion of people like Rajemison and
Sylla "a small and welcome step in the direction of
inclusion" but making clear that it was grossly insufficient
to justify any change in the French position or support for
elections. He noted that he had just gone to see Monja and

appealed to him to resign, which remains the French position,
he said. The EU Charge d'Affaires said that the EU regrets
being unable to continue its cooperation with Madagascar but
sees no way to justify resuming it; indeed, she said, the
ongoing "Article 96 negotiations are headed toward a negative
conclusion" (read sanctions),as things now stand. The
German, just back from vacation that morning, said only that
the AU and SADC seem determined to make an example of
Madagascar and that he expected his and other countries to
follow their example closely. As we departed, I invited the
ambassadors to join in an informal ICG discussion at the CMR
on Saturday afternoon.


6. (C) Ninety minutes after the meeting with TGV, I spoke
at some length with newly-promoted Vice Prime Minister in
charge of Foreign Affairs Ny Hasina Andriamanjato. He
evidently had gone to see TGV just after we left, and came
straight from that meeting. I asked him if TGV had
understood us ambassadors. Yes, he answered emphatically,
loud and clear. He said that TGV had just decided to respond
positively to Zafy's invitation for the four movements to
meet and resume negotiations, to start on Sunday morning. Ny
Hasina also said that TGV had told him of his decision to
replace Monja with a consensual prime minister, identity to
be determined later, without specifying when this might
occur. I encouraged them to move quickly as the situation is
again fragile with street demonstrations once again resuming.
I offered that I doubted TGV would survive politically if he
did not appoint a consensus prime minister and thus unblock
the situation. Ny Hasina said he agreed. He also gave me a
copy of an ordinance TGV has just signed which committed the
government to implementing the Maputo Charter. He emphasized
the gravity he perceived in this decision, which he said
committed TGV to finding a new prime minister.


7. (C) Comment: TGV remains an exceedingly erratic,
unsteady decision-maker (and implementer),as witnessed by
the continuing zigzagging over filling the prime ministerial
slot. And while Ny Hasina is one of his closest, most
competent (among few who are),and longest-serving
collaborators, TGV has repeatedly disappointed him by taking
decisions contrary to his advice. We have to hope that this
time will be different and that a new Prime Minister will
soon be named, as the consequences of maintaining the status
quo will be serious, but no one here can be sure of either
the resumption of dialogue or the naming of a consensus prime
minister until they actually occur. If TGV continues to
dither, one question is how long the military will be patient
before forcing his hand one way or the other. End comment.

MARQUARDT