MADAGASCAR: WILL TGV CHOOSE CONSENSUS OR CHAOS?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 000630

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STATE FOR AF/EPS AND AF/E - MBEYZEROV
TREASURY FOR FBOYE
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2019
TAGS: PGOV MA
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: WILL TGV CHOOSE CONSENSUS OR CHAOS?

REF: ANTANANARIVO 618

Classified By: P/E CHIEF DOVIE HOLLAND FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D.


1. (C) Summary: The Malagasy are anxiously awaiting the
declaration by de facto transition leader, "TGV" Rajoelina,
expected late Sept 4, as to whether his movement will accept
a consensus candidate for prime minister, ceding their
control of the post. AU mediator Ouedraogo continues to push
the four main political factions towards agreement, but if
Rajoelina refuses to free up the post, the difficult
negotiations undertaken in Mozambique over who will fill
important transition government posts could be back to square
one. The international community is pessimistic about
Rajoelina's planned announcement, but are holding out hope
and expecting the unexpected. The U.S. Mission mirrored the
UNSYG's office in putting out a local press staement earlier
today pushing the parties back toward a consensual solution.
End summary.

Rajoelina Blocks Consensus
--------------

2. (C) Consensus on the posts of president, vice president,
and prime minister for a consensual transition government was
not reached during the second round of negotiations by
Madagascar's four main political movements last week in
Mozambique, and de facto transition leader Rajoelina
requested an extension, which was granted until September 4,
to confer with his supporters (reftel). According to AU
mediator Ablasse Ouedraogo, speaking during a meeting of the
local ICG-M this morning in 'Tana, the four movements had
almost reached agreement on the division of president to the
Rajoelina movement, vice president to that of Zafy, and prime
minister to Ratsiraka's group. However, Rajoelina's
hard-line delegation blocked him from agreeing to dump the
current prime minister, Monja Roindefo, in favor of a
Ratsiraka nominee. It is unclear if Ravalomanana would have
accepted Rajoelina as president, but Ouedraogo was confident
that the ousted president would have had no choice but to go
along if Rajoelina had not stymied the agreement.

All Sides Harden Public Posture
--------------

3. (C) Following their failure to agree in Maputo, the
Ravalomanana and Rajoelina camps proceeded to take
increasingly harder positions in the media, although they
continued to indicate some level of flexibility in private
conversations. Ravalomanana announced that he would never
accept either "coup-plotter" (Rajoelina and Roindefo) at the
head of the transition, while Rajoelina's camp vowed that
they would not be pressured by the international community,
whom he said they could do without. Zafy called all four
movements to negotiate, but Rajoelina refused to participate.
The other three movements (Zafy, Ravalomanana, Ratsiraka)
declared Sept 3 that the military should appoint the top
three posts, as the civilians could not decide, likely in an
effort to pressure Rajoelina to cede, but the military
leadership (not representative of the whole) adamantly
rejected the idea of intervention in a public announcement
early Sept 4. Their statement was possibly influenced by
both Ouedraogo's and the Ambassador's counseling against such
an idea when advice was sought by leaders of the military,
including General Rabarisoa, in separate meetings Sept 3.

But Are More Flexible in Private
--------------

4. (C) The leader of the Ravalomanana delegation, Fetison,
told Emboff that Ravalomanana was willing to accept that the
presidency go to any movement but Rajoelina's. He believed
Rajoelina was afraid of dumping Roindefo as prime minister
because he controlled the mutinous, CAPSAT military members
who now lead the military. In Fetison's opinion, Rajoelina
personally wanted to give up his post as transition
president, but was forced to remain by his advisers,
including militants Norbert Lala Ratsirihonana and Alain
Ramaroson. Many other embassy contacts share the view that
Rajoelina fears for his physical safety if he steps down --
and that he suffers from mood swings ranging from desperation
lows to power highs. The leader of the Rajoelina movement,
foreign minister Ny Hasina, told the Ambassador privately
that he understood that Rajoelina had to cede one of the top

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two posts, and said that he was encouraging him to remove
Roindefo by offering him the prestigious slot of Senate
President. He argued that the prime minister position should
be a consensus candidate that did not come from the four
movements, and suggested retired General Ismael Monibou (whom
he preferred as the General would have sway over the
military),Aristide Velompanahy (education minister under
Ratsiraka and, like Roindefa, a native of Tulear),or the
current Director General of the National Administration
School (ENA) as possible candidates.

International Pressure Builds
--------------

5. (C) Ouedraogo explained that the September 4 deadline had
been set by Mediator Chissano in order to have closure prior
to the Sept 6-7 SADC summit in Kinshasa. There Chissano is
expected to give a report, which could generate sanctions
(about which the French Charge expressed grave concern).
According to the transition charter signed in Maputo, the
four movements have until Sept 9 to put the transition
government and other new institutions in place, but it is now
clear that the deadline will not be met. The EU also plans
to hold consultations with Madagascar in mid-Sept in the
framework of the Cotonou Accords to assess progress, and the
AU may consider sanctions once the 6-month mark following the
March 17 coup is reached in mid-Sept. The four movements are
all also aware of the upcoming AGOA decision. Meanwhile, the
economic situation continues to deteriorate and the HAT is
increasingly strapped for cash. The UN and the embassy both
released press statements Sept 4 urging consensus. All of
these points of pressure are building, and Ouedraogo plans to
make a last-ditch effort to convince Rajoelina to compromise
and get the four movements together Sept 4, prior to the
anticipated announcement later in the day of Rajoelina's
decision. Ouedraogo also proposed holding a high-level
contact group meeting here during the first half of October,
attended by representatives from member country capitals, to
keep the pressure on the Malagasy political leaders. Various
members of the contact group suggested that such a meeting be
arranged instead in New York on the margins of the UNGA, both
to facilitate the meeting and to accelerate the timetable for
holding it. The U.S. Mission put out a press statement early
this morning mirroring that of the UNSYG's office, pushing
again for consensus under the Maputo process and accords.

Comment: Outcome Uncertain
--------------

6. (C) It is clear that the military is increasingly divided,
particularly between Rajoelina supporters and Ratsiraka
supporters -- but also between those behind Rajoelina and
those favoring Roindefa. However, it is not clear that those
divisions will lead to any concrete action. The military's
public announcement Sept 4 may have calmed fears of military
intervention, et least for the moment. All bets are off as
to what Rajoelina will announce today -- will he agree to
give up the prime minister position, or will he stand pat and
further isolate the HAT from the international community? If
he refuses to reach agreement with the other three movements,
how will they -- or elements of the military -- react? Do
the other movements have sufficient backing in the military
to react with force, or will they continue to rely on moral
persuasion and the insistence of the international community
on consensus to push their cause? Post believes the latter
to be more likely. The consensus of today's ICG-M was
pessimistic that Rajoelina will make the right decision later
today, but some are hoping to be surprised. Given the
importance of the pending decision, Ouedraogo agreed to hold
another ICG-M meeting Saturday morning Sept 5 to take stock
and possibly to coordinate a joint response to tonight's
announcement. End comment.

MARQUARDT