Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ANTANANARIVO596
2009-08-14 11:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Antananarivo
Cable title:  

MADAGASCAR'S MAPUTO DEAL: SHAKY SUPPORT, BUT STILL

Tags:  PGOV MA MZ 
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DE RUEHAN #0596/01 2261128
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 141128Z AUG 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2755
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 000596 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/E - MBEYZEROV
PARIS FOR RKANEDA
LONDON FOR PLORD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2018
TAGS: PGOV MA MZ
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR'S MAPUTO DEAL: SHAKY SUPPORT, BUT STILL
INTACT

REF: A. 09 ANTANANARIVO 586

B. 09 ANTANANARIVO 589

ANTANANARI 00000596 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: CHARGE ERIC STROMAYER FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 000596

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/E - MBEYZEROV
PARIS FOR RKANEDA
LONDON FOR PLORD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2018
TAGS: PGOV MA MZ
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR'S MAPUTO DEAL: SHAKY SUPPORT, BUT STILL
INTACT

REF: A. 09 ANTANANARIVO 586

B. 09 ANTANANARIVO 589

ANTANANARI 00000596 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: CHARGE ERIC STROMAYER FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D.


1. (C) SUMMARY: Four days after Madagascar's feuding
political leaders reached agreement at talks in Maputo
(reftel B),a majority of the population appears to
cautiously accept it as a good first step - but significant
opposition remains among factions that stand to lose out once
the deal is finalized in the coming weeks. The leadership of
the four main political movements continue to defend the
accords, and the military has expressed that it is generally
"satisfied" with the outcome, with a few reservations.
However, members of the current regime have begun speaking
out against their upcoming displacement in favor of a unity
government, and factions not included in Maputo are
displeased with their loss of influence. Nothing has yet
happened to derail the planned Maputo II talks next week, but
nor has Maputo I been greeted as warmly as the mediators were
hoping. END SUMMARY.

ANXIOUS POLITICIANS NOT QUITE READY TO LEAVE OFFICE
-------------- --------------


2. (C) The greatest opposition to the Transition Charter and
accompanying political agreements (henceforth, "the accords")
has come, predictably, from within the current High
Transitional Authority (HAT) of Andry Rajoelina. Although he
has downplayed the compromises made in Maputo and appears to
want the accords to succeed, many of those who came to power
on his coattails are concerned about what they rightly see as
an imminent decline in their influence. A Maputo II summit
of the four leaders is planned for next week (although it may
be postponed) in which the four movements will divide up the
positions foreseen in the accords - and up to three quarters
of the current government will most likely have to cede their
place to one of the other movements (reftel B).


3. (C) Leading this opposition is a new group of politicians
calling itself the Forces for Change - although its goal is
to maintain the status quo to the greatest extent possible,
and legitimize the current transition government in the
context of the accords. Composed mostly of members of the

current HAT, and led by Pasteur Richard Andriamanjato (AKFM
party) and Manasse Esoavelomandroso (Leader Fanilo party),
their position is that HAT President Andry Rajoelina and
Prime Minister Roindefo Monja should remain in their current
jobs, and the HAT should retain a majority of government
positions. They denounce what they see as "foreign
interference" in Maputo, and have disguised their distaste
for compromise as nationalist pride - in their version,
Rajoelina and his team won a "democratic revolution" against
former President Ravalomanana, and the mediators have no
right to question their authority or force the old guard back
into power. Rajoelina himself retains the support of those
within his government who recognize that compromise is the
only hope for a stable transition, but the Forces for Change
has grown louder in the days since Maputo, and will likely
continue to make their case up to, and through, Maputo II.

STILL WAITING FOR CONFIDENCE BUILDING


4. (C) The media has grown slowly more concerned as well,
after initially greeting the accords with optimism. On
Tuesday and Wednesday, the papers began focusing on the
sketchy details of Ravalomanana's return and possible
amnesty, as well as the political reality of dividing up jobs
in the transition government. By Thursday, the accords were
already "being reconsidered" by the HAT, according to the
generally pro-Rajoelina daily La Gazette. None of the
movements' leadership have backed away from the accords yet,
however, and Rajoelina himself is scheduled for a television
appearance on August 14 to discuss his vision of what was
agreed upon. He has been noticeably silent all week, and
much depends on what he says in this appearance: according to
his advisors, he remains firmly behind the accords, despite
the growing rift within his own movement.


5. (C) As the planned Maputo II draws closer, Ravalomanana's
supporters in particular are watching the HAT for signs of
good faith. Edem Kodjo, the Francophonie's representative in
the mediation group, was in Madagascar on August 11 to answer
questions on the accords, and he was categorical that current
political detainees being held by the HAT should be released
"immediately", with some allowance for procedural issues.

ANTANANARI 00000596 002.2 OF 002


This would include, at a minimum, Ravalomanana's appointed
shadow prime minister, Manandafy Rakotonirina, as well as the
leader of the Legalist Women, Ihanta Randriamandranto. There
are also four TIM-party parliamentarians that have been in
prison since April, and a case could be made for an
additional four who were arrested in July in connection with
recent "terrorist" threats in Antananarivo - but have yet to
be charged. To date, no action has been taken, and the
Maputo accords have in fact been used as an excuse for
further delay. In the case of the four parliamentarians
specifically, the court ruled on August 12 to postpone their
case further "in order to examine the implications of the
Maputo accords". For those who have been detained but not
charged yet, media reports have relayed a view that they
can't be amnestied until they've been charged - leaving them
in a difficult legal limbo. Ravalomanana's supporters are
growing frustrated with this approach: having canceled their
daily Magro rallies as a show of good faith, they are anxious
to see reciprocal confidence-building moves from the HAT.


6. (C) A group of civil society organizations came out in
favor of the accords on August 13, as did army chief Andre
Ndriarijoana on August 12. Several top representatives of
the security forces on August 13 issued a joint statement
generally supporting the accords, but with a caveat: they
disagree with Article 22 of the Charter, which permits each
of the four political movements to name members to a new
"Think Tank on National Defense and Security" that would have
oversight and planning functions. They propose instead that
the armed forces themselves designate their representatives -
essentially removing a level of civilian control over the
military (NOTE: It is also unlikely that they envision the
replacement of the current Minister of the Armed Forces, Noel
Rakotonandrasana, although this wasn't discussed. END NOTE).
More problematic still was a separate declaration from
Minister of Interior Security Organes Rakotomihantarizaka and
the Director General of the National Police in which they
align themselves roughly with the position of the Forces for
Change - Rajoelina and Monja stay in their positions, and
Ravalomanana's shouldn't come back in the near future.
Comment: From their statements it is unclear whether they are
expressing their views with the hope they will be duly
registered in further discussions, or if they actually intend
or are able of taking actions against Rajoelina and the HAT
if he stands by the agreements as signed. In either case
they are intended to intimidate. End comment.


7. (C) According to sources within the HAT, PM Monja is
reportedly lobbying extensively within the government to keep
his job, but doesn't appear to be undermining the accords
publicly, and has refrained from making any statements to the
media. Alain Ramaroson, a divisive figure who currently
heads the HAT's defense committee and is widely accused of
involvement with some of the more abusive security force
activity in recent months, has been notably silent as well.
Jean Eugene Voninahitsy (RPSD party) has distinguished
himself as the only member of a delegation in Maputo (with
the HAT) to be actively working against the accords; he has
essentially signed on to the Forces for Change position.

THE HAT, PLAYING WITH FIRE
--------------


8. (C) COMMENT: Maputo II is intended to focus on dividing up
some 550 jobs in the transition, but at the present rate
either Rajoelina or Ravalomanana will be forced to reopen
issues that were already "closed" in Maputo I - at the risk
of derailing the process entirely. If the HAT doesn't
release any political detainees, Ravalomanana's supporters
will be unlikely to support a second round of talks at all.
If the Forces for Change, or some element of the security
forces, hold firm on demands that the HAT retain the
presidency, prime ministership, and a majority of other
posts, the other three movements will all find it difficult
to justify continued participation to their supporters. At
present, a majority of Malagasy political forces remain in
favor of Maputo II, even if their optimism is at best
cautious. However, Rajoelina must quickly gain control over
his fracturing movement, or Maputo II may not even occur. END
COMMENT.
STROMAYER