Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ANTANANARIVO547
2009-07-22 08:30:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Antananarivo
Cable title:  

EAC CONVENED TO REVIEW TRIPWIRES, DISCUSS RECENT

Tags:  ASEC CASC MA MP PGOV PREL PTER 
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VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAN #0547/01 2030830
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 220830Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2692
S E C R E T ANTANANARIVO 000547 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DS, D, P, M. S/CT, CA, AF AND INR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2029
TAGS: ASEC CASC MA MP PGOV PREL PTER
SUBJECT: EAC CONVENED TO REVIEW TRIPWIRES, DISCUSS RECENT
TANA BOMBINGS AND MSG M4 USE

Classified By: RSO R.J. BENT FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D

S E C R E T ANTANANARIVO 000547

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DS, D, P, M. S/CT, CA, AF AND INR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2029
TAGS: ASEC CASC MA MP PGOV PREL PTER
SUBJECT: EAC CONVENED TO REVIEW TRIPWIRES, DISCUSS RECENT
TANA BOMBINGS AND MSG M4 USE

Classified By: RSO R.J. BENT FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Emergency Action Committee (EAC)
convened on July 20, 2009 to review the current tripwires,
specifically those for Civil Disorder/Armed Combat and the
updated Health and Environment tripwires. This was especially
timely in light of the weekend plot reported by local
authorities to detonate multiple bombs at various law
enforcement related and other strategic sights. Given the
rising crime and recent violence in Madagascar, the EAC
unanimously recommended to the Ambassador that the new Maine
Security Guard (MSG) detachment to commence in the New
Embassy Compound (NEC) be authorized to use the M4 weapon.
END SUMMARY.


2. (S/NF) After having experienced the crisis in Madagascar and
the subsequent ordered departure (OD),the EAC reviewed the
current tripwires to ensure that they were sufficient and met
Posts' needs. The EAC did not make any edits to the current
tripwires for Civil Disorder/Armed Combat feeling that they
had served us well previously and were tried and tested. In
regards to the Health and Environment tripwires that were
recommended by the Foreign Service Health Practitioner (FSHP)
and the Regional Security Officer (RSO),the EAC members
approved the current ones, but requested that another be
added which states, "Request risk assessment of the situation
from the Regional Medical Officer (RMO)". The EAC also wanted
RSO to further investigate exactly who would determine when
an epidemic had occurred.


3. (C) The Public Affairs Officer (PAO) reported that some
media outlets were reporting that the absence of U.S.
statement about the weekend bombings translated into support
for the violence and noted that the French had publicly
condemned the bombings. The EAC decided that issuing a press
statement was premature as numerous previous statements
expressed support for finding non-violent means of resolution
and suggested that the embassy continue to maintain a low

profile. Since March, there have been no direct threats
lobbed at the U.S. Embassy or the American community. There
was some recent grumbling when the media criticized the
Ambassador for not inviting any members of the HAT (High
Transitional Authority) to the July 4th event.


4. (C) The Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM),reporting on behalf
of the POL/ECON section, noted that mediation between the
various political parties and the HAT is still in play and
the international community is still engaged in negotiations.
The most prominent issue now is the future of U.S. African
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA),which can not continue
until there is clear progress toward a return of the rule of
law and democratic governance in play. The loss of
AGOA-related jobs could, in effect, translate into the loss
of an estimated 100,000 jobs, which support perhaps a million
people.


5. (C) The Defense AttachQ Officer (DAO) expressed that
within the military, there is currently a lot of grumbling
about work related conditions, but it appears to be all talk
with no indications that the discontent would culminate into
any violence or coordinated activity against the regime.
Later that day, the DAO planned to meet with the Regional
Gendarme Commander, Colonel Richard Ravalomanana (no relation
to the former president) in order to obtain more information
about the weekend bombings.


6. (S/NF) The Regional Affairs Officer (RAO) also noted a
feeling of discontent amongst some members of the security
forces, but concurring with DAO, did not believe that there
would be any form of organized revolt. RAO noted that over
the last few weeks, their relationship with Malagasy
counterparts has gone from hostile to neutral, but engaged.
Members of the Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) continue to
indicate that there is no current threat against the U.S. or
its' interests.


7. (C) The Management Officer expressed concern about a Force
d'Intervention Speciale (FIS) checkpoint consisting of four
vehicles, lights flashing, that he observed late at night
July 20, near the embassy residential community. Other EAC
members, including the RSO, noted that recently there have
been an increasing number of FIS patrols and checkpoints.
Note: FIS is a mixed intervention team comprised of members
of the police, gendarme and military with the mission of
restoring public order and cracking down on gangs). RSO later
confirmed that after the weekend bombings, FIS was instructed
to augment checkpoints and be a visible presence in the city.


8. (C) Although the exact details are still unclear, over the
weekend, the government and security forces alleged there
E

were multiple bomb attempts targeted at security force
installations and at the HAT president's radio station.
Although the press is claiming that there were 20 homemade
artisinal bombs discovered, they targeted only six government
or regime-related sites including Viva Radio Station (owned
by HAT President Rajoelina),Gendarme Camp Fort Duchesne,
Gendarme Camp Ankadilalana, the Central Police Data Storage
Building and the Commission Nationale Mixte d'Enquete (CNME)
headquarters and the Urban Commune of Antananarivo.


9. (C) Only two of the six attempts resulted in casualties.
The most severe of the events occurred at Viva Radio Station,
located in the Tana Waterfront, approximately 2 miles away
from the American residential area. At the Gendarme press
conference it was announced that early Sunday morning (July
19) between 12-20 armed men scaled the walls of the compound
with at least a few AK-47s (The "Gazetiko" claimed that the
attackers also had other weapons and rocket launchers but
this was not mentioned in the subsequent press conference)
and killed either two or three of the station security
guards. Allegedly, the attackers intended to place explosive
devices inside the radio station, but their efforts were
halted when five military assets assigned to the area heard
the gunshots and responded to the area with gunfire. All of
the attackers fled the area. The contract Local Guard Force
Coordinator alerted RSO to the gunfire early Sunday morning
as their office is located across the street from the Tana
Waterfront. The second significant event occurred near the
CMNE headquarters. It is reported that an explosion took
place inside a Puegeot 104 and caused the bomber to loose his
thumb (later confirmed by DAO who saw the evidence). Even
after the first detonation, the car continued to advance in
the direction of the CMNE. 50 meters later, a second bomb
detonated and killed one of the men inside the car, severely
injured the other two and the fourth man was not harmed and
was arrested by the Gendarme soon after. During the interview
and investigation of the fourth subject, Gendarme discovered
a map of the Tana Waterfront and other maps in his pocket and
connected the two incidents. According to RSO LEO contacts,
the second bomb detonated when an occupant of the car
received a phone call. RSO speculates that as the bombs were
all to be remotely detonated by cell phone, the explosion
occurred because the bombers did not have any sophisticated
knowledge of IEDs.


10. (C) Currently, the government is moving to arrest five
prominent figures associated with ex-President Ravalomanana
and the TIM Party. The suspect list includes: a minister,
secretary general, a parliamentary deputy, and a highly
ranked official from the Ministry of Budget and Finance. EAC
members personally knew some of the suspects and clearly
stated that none of them had the capacity to be terrorists.
During a press conference, Commander Richard Ravalomanana
declared that he believed there were about 6,000 artisinal
bombs hidden around the city by these "terrorists" and only
48 have been recovered. RSO advised the EAC that these
numbers seem incredible and EAC members concurred.


11. (S/NF) The RSO presented information about the M4's use and
recommended that the future MSG Detachment be allowed to use
this weapon. Additionally, RSO noted that every other MSG
Detachment in Africa already uses the M4, with the exception
of Kigali, who will receive their M4 inventory in the fall.
The EAC unanimously decided to recommend to the Ambassador
that U.S. Embassy Antananarivo also adopt M4 use by the MSG
Detachment.

STROMAYER