Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ANTANANARIVO523
2009-07-15 09:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Antananarivo
Cable title:  

MADAGASCAR: TGV - A HIGH SPEED TRAIN WRECK

Tags:  PGOV PINR PREL MA 
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 150905Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2659
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0178
RUEWMFC/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0095
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANTANANARIVO 000523 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/E - MBEYZEROV

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL MA
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: TGV - A HIGH SPEED TRAIN WRECK
ORCHESTRATED BY THE FRENCH?

REF: ANTANANARIVO 511

Classified By: POL/ECON CHIEF DOVIE HOLLAND FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANTANANARIVO 000523

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/E - MBEYZEROV

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINR PREL MA
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: TGV - A HIGH SPEED TRAIN WRECK
ORCHESTRATED BY THE FRENCH?

REF: ANTANANARIVO 511

Classified By: POL/ECON CHIEF DOVIE HOLLAND FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D.


1. (C) Summary: The Malagasy Permanent Rep to the UN
Rajemison -- a former Senate President, former TIKO employee
and erstwhile Ravalomanana faithful -- recently returned to
Madagascar to moderate the regional conferences organized by
the illegal transition government (HAT) with an eye towards
advancing his future political career. He presents himself
as neutral, although he is increasingly aligned with the HAT
and its leader Andry "TGV" Rajoelina. In a July 8 meeting
between Rajemison and ousted President Ravalomanana's Foreign
Minister Elyett Rasendratsirofo, both agreed that a
consensual transition government, with a mandate solely
focused on preparing for and organizing elections, should be
installed. They agreed that eventual elections should not be
rushed, but rather time should be taken to ensure that all of
the necessary legal reforms are thoroughly completed
beforehand to avoid the elections being subsequently
contested. Both expressed their skepticism that a move of
the SADC-AU-UN negotiations offshore would be able to break
the impasse between Ravalomanana and Rajoelina and his
military backers, with Elyett demanding international
intervention to stop this coup from benefiting its
perpetrators and becoming a precedent for future generations.
In a subsequent meeting, however, Rajemison's adviser
explained that the French were prepared to finance a national
conference to be held in late July that would likely produce
a "consensus" that would leave out Ravalomanana and his
supporters and pave the way for rapid elections. Rajemison
has not pressured the HAT to alter this plan, and enlisted
the USG's support in discouraging Ravalomanana from
proclaiming or undertaking a return to Madagascar in the near
future. In a separate meeting, the HAT finance minister
confirmed that the HAT was growing impatient and was pushing
to move straight away to "consensual" elections without
signing a transition charter or implementing a consensual
transition government. End summary.


2. (C) Malagasy Ambassador to the UN/Geneva Guy Rajemison

Rakotomaharo told the Ambassador July 4 that he was working
with the Caux Foundation in Switzerland to promote national
reconciliation and civic education through a three-phase plan
involving training Malagasy participants in Switzerland to
disseminate lessons on conflict resolution widely around the
island. This process, for which Rajemison requested USG
financing, is intended to complement the soon to be
relaunched SADC-AU-UN negotiations, he asserted. Rajemison's
assistant admitted to Emboff July 9 that the Caux plan was
mainly a pretext for their trip to Madagascar to assess the
evolution of the political landscape.


3. (C) Rajemison, permanent representative to the UN in
Geneva since 2008 and president of the senate from 2002-2008
(when he was ungraciously ousted by Ravalomanana to make room
for another crony),is walking a narrow line in an apparent
attempt to advance his political career; he is widely seen as
a possible consensus presidential candidate. Although
previously a close adviser of exiled President Ravalomanana,
he is attempting to portray himself as "neutral" in the
current context (his demotion last year helps in this regard)
and he has taken several large steps toward the Rajoelina/HAT
camp. He has stopped short of jumping in fully, however, and
refused the HAT's offer to become a vice president. He did
accept to return from Geneva to chair the reconciliation
committee of the regional conference in the capital area
organized by the HAT that ran from June 29 through July 3.
He explained that these conferences had not reached any
conclusions, but had rather lain the groundwork for the
national conference to be held later in July. Discussion
covered topics ranging from lower and upper age limits for
presidential candidates (30 to 60 was discussed),to the
structure of the government (centralized, decentralized,
federal),to the terms of amnesty (72% of participants in the
capital region favored a selective amnesty that would likely
rule out Ravalomanana) (see reftel on regional conferences
for more detail).


4. (C) Rajemison explained that he had been estranged from
Ravalomanana, because he had provided him honest advice
concerning his entourage and dared to criticize him publicly.
He further elaborated in a July 8 meeting, saying that he
had been deeply hurt by the TIM party's move to push him

ANTANANARI 00000523 002 OF 003


aside in 2008, when he was left out of the polit bureau and
lost the senate presidency. He felt that TIM and
Ravalomanana had abandoned him. He said that he had last
spoken to the ousted president in April 2008 and now only
received direction from the HAT. He was ambivalent regarding
Rajoelina's future plans, stating that although Rajoelina had
originally said he did not want to be president, he could
easily change his mind if he felt that the "people" wanted
him to run.


5. (C) Rajemison has held discussions with local
pro-Ravalomanana/Legalist leaders and encouraged them to
focus on the return to constitutionality and democratic
institutions rather than an individual. He agreed with the
Ambassador that Ravalomanana's return to Madagascar at this
time would have a negative impact on the country, but also
expressed concern about the human rights violations, such as
arbitrary searches and arrests, being perpetrated by the HAT.
(Note: A potential victim of political arrest, Elyett, is
discussed in the following paragraph. She and her husband
have been in hiding since she accepted to become
Ravalomanana's foreign minister in late April. End note.)


6. (C) In a July 8 meeting between Rajemison and
Ravalomanana's Foreign Minister Elyett Rasendratsirofo, both
agreed that a consensual transition government, with a
mandate solely focused on preparing for and organizing
elections, should be installed. They agreed that eventual
elections should not be rushed, in contrast to what they
viewed as the EU's position, but rather that all of the t's
should be crossed and i's dotted -- reformed constitution,
independent electoral commission, reformed political parties
law and electoral code -- before moving to elections to
prevent them from being contested afterwards. They disagreed
about how to get to that point, however, with Rajemison
arguing against Ravalomanana's return and Elyett insisting
that the international community should guarantee the exiled
president's safe return and impose a constitutional solution,
as the Malagasy parties would not agree to it on their own.
She lamented that the international community supported the
principles that she was fighting to uphold, but did not
provide the means with which to accomplish an extremely
difficult return to constitutional order. She pointed out
the HAT's moves over the past months to entrench itself
throughout the country by doling out positions and creating
vested interests that are now reluctant to cede power. While
Elyett and Emboff insisted that a consensual transition
government must take Ravalomanana into account, both Elyett
and Rajemison were skeptical that a move of SADC-AU-UN
negotiations offshore that would allow the ousted president
to participate would be feasible. Rajemison indicated that
Rajoelina was unlikely to accept such a move. Even if he
did, Elyett pointed out that the military elements behind him
-- which she adamantly claimed were funded by the French --
would not accept it. (Note: the French have indeed made a
public show of their support for the Malagasy military, with
the most recent example being the French ambassador's speech
last week at a ceremony in which French military officials
were decorated by the HAT Minister of Defense who led the
coup. End note.)


7. (C) Rajemison's assistant Aro told Emboff June 9 that
Rajemison agreed with Elyett's assertion that the French had
backed TGV during the coup and continued to do so. He said
that the action, at least initially, was driven by wealthy
dual nationality Franco-Malgaches who had friends in high
places in the French government and were unhappy about
Ravalomanana's impingement on their business interests. He
explained that Rajemison was being "recruited" by the French
government who had met with him several times during his stay
in Tana. According to Aro, the French are planning to finance
the national conference that the HAT has announced will be
held by the end of July and call the results of the
unilaterally-organized conference a "consensus". The
consensus would almost certainly not take Ravalomanana, nor
his close advisers, into account. (Aro explained that the
French consider Ravalomanana's cabinet named after the coup,
including jailed Prime Minister Manandafy and FM Elyett to be
"illegal".) Based on this consensus, the HAT would move
ahead with organizing elections.


8. (C) Aro claimed that Rajemison was concerned about
Ravalomanana losing credibility by continuing to announce his
imminent return. He requested the Ambassador's support in

ANTANANARI 00000523 003 OF 003


joining Rajemison in a telephone conference with Ravalomanana
to encourage him to forget the idea of returning in the near
future and, instead, focus his press statements on other
issues that would enable him to appear as a wise elder. Aro
argued that this would help preserve Ravalomanana's image and
credibility, which he would need to win an eventual election.
When pressed on what action had been or could be taken to
pressure the HAT to seek an agreement with Ravalomanana, Aro
indicated that the plan focused solely on convincing
Ravalomanana why he should not return. He implied that
Rajemison had taken no measures to alter the HAT's plans,
which Aro appeared to consider as a fait accompli given the
French backing. In a separate meeting on July 2, the HAT
finance minister confirmed to us that the HAT was growing
impatient and was pushing to move straight away to
"consensual" elections without signing a transition charter
and implementing a consensual transition government. How
"consensual" elections could be held without a consensual
entity to organize them was unclear, but we warned him
clearly that a non-consensual apporach would not received
international approval or support.


9. (C) Aro asserted that the French had not chosen their
favored candidate yet for the elections, but were considering
(increasingly) TGV himself, as well as three coastal
politicians -- Roland Ratsiraka (nephew of the former
president),Jacques Sylla (former National Assembly president
who jumped the sinking TIM ship around the time of the coup
to join the HAT),and Pierrot Rajaonarivelo (former vice
prime minister and leader of AREMA exiled in France until
after the coup). Although there has been much speculation
here that Rajemison is positioning himself for a presidential
bid, Aro said that the UN ambassador does not currently have
the intention to run and would not compete against another
Merina if TGV ran.


10. (C) Additional biographical details: Rajemison was born
January 12, 1950 in Andilamena. He is of Merina ethnicity.
Prior to becoming Senate President, he served as campaign
manager for Ravalomanana in 2001, and Deputy Mayor and
adviser to then Mayor Ravalomanana between 1999 and 2001. He
holds a degree in economics and management, and held a
position in Ravalomanana's TIKO Group prior to his entry into
politics in 1999. Until his forced departure for Geneva last
year, he was widely seen as Ravalomanana's heir apparent.


11. (C) Comment: Rajemison may have a useful role to play in
urging both the HAT and Ravalomanana toward consensus.
Although he is estranged from Ravalomanana, he retains some
level of access to him, and he clearly has access to
high-level HAT leaders. However, his intentions seem focused
on keeping his options open and advancing his own political
career, rather than reigning in the HAT as they march
forward, etching their power into stone slightly more each
day. The hope of restoring a semblance of legality to the
unconstitutional wreck of a Malagasy government that
currently exists, so that it could organize elections that
the USG might be able to recognize as legitimate, appears
increasingly to be a utopian dream. SADC mediator Chissano,
who made his first visit to Madagascar July 9-12, will
certainly be facing an uphill battle and will have to act
fast if he is to preempt the TGV train from leaving the
station. End comment.
MARQUARDT