MADAGASCAR: CHISSANO STAKES STOCK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANTANANARIVO 000515

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/EPS AND AF/E - MBEYZEROV
USDOC FOR BECKY ERKUL - DESK OFFICER
TREASURY FOR FBOYE
STATE PLEASE PASS USTR - WJACKSON
USAU FOR JOEL MAYBURY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL MA
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: CHISSANO STAKES STOCK

Classified By: P/E CHIEF DOVIE HOLLAND FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D.


1. (C) Summary: During his July 9-12 visit to Madagascar,
SADC mediator Chissano solicited advice from the dip corps
then met with transition authority (HAT) president Andry
Rajoelina July 10, followe by weeekend meetings with the
delegations of the other three movements (Zafy, Ratsiraka,
Ravalomanana),civil society representatives, and traditional
leaders. He departed for New York July 12, stopping en route
to meet with ousted President Ravalomanana in South Africa.
Rajoelina and the three delegations all indicated their
willingness to resume negotiations which had been officially
suspended since June 15. Chissano plans to see exiled former
President Ratsiraka July 19 in Paris. SADC Special Envoy
Dlamini will participate in an AU meeting of envoys in Addis
July 21, and Chissano will join him the 22nd for the second
ICG consultative group meeting there. Tensions over who --
the AU or SADC? -- is leading this mediation are rising.
Most of the diplomats who spoke during the July 10 meeting
expressed concern regarding the HAT's proposed plan to move
forward to elections unilaterally prior to achieving a
consensual political agreement with the other main political
factions -- a problematic outcome confirmed by TGV in an
interview broadcast later on Friday to the nation. Such
concerns were reiterated to the Swedish Ambassador Lena
Sundh, who arrived in Madagascar July 12 for a four-day
fact-finding mission on the political situation following
Sweden's assumption of the EU presidency July 1.
Pro-Ravalomanana/TIM representatives raised the same concern
with the Ambassador July 13, and requested the international
community's help reigning in the HAT and promoting a prompt
return to the negotiating table. End summary.

Chissano Meets the Players
--------------

2. (C) SADC mediator, and former Mozambican President,
Joaquim Chissano, accompanied by former Swazi Prime Minister
Themba Dlamini, former Mozambican Foreign Minister Leonardo
Simao, and former South African Defense Minister Charles
Ngakula, convoked a meeting of the diplomatic corps July 10
to explain his mission to Madagascar and solicit the
recommendations of local diplomats. The SADC mediation team
arrived in Madagascar July 9 for a three day visit, during
which it met with transition authority president Andry
Rajoelina; the delegations of President Ravalomanana, former
President Zafy Albert, and former President Ratsiraka; the
French and American Ambassadors; various civil society
representatives; Catholic Archbishop Odon; and traditional
Malagasy leaders. Following his departure from Madagascar
July 12, Chissano met with President Ravalomanana in South
Africa before traveling on to New York. Chissano will see
exiled former President Ratsiraka, along with the
International Francophonie Organization (OIF) and the French
government, July 19 in Paris. Dlamini will attend a July 21
meeting of special envoys in Addis July 21, and Chissano will
join him there for the second consultative meeting of the
international contact group July 22.


3. (C) Chissano explained that he had been appointed by SADC
June 20 as a mediator in the current political crisis to seek
to bring together the various viewpoints to create a lasting
peace and reconciliation. He plans to coordinate with the
AU, UN, and OIF to carry out this mission. He did not
respond clearly to the question of which organization would
take the lead role, but the South African Ambassador
indicated that it would be SADC. This question will be
addressed and, hopefully, definitively resolved at the
special envoy meeting in Addis July 21. (UN mediator Drame
told the Ambassador today by phone from Bamako that the AU is
unwilling to cede the lead to SADC. He confirmed that AU
mediator Ablasse Ouedraogo had unilaterally convoked the
heads of the four main movements to Addis, either to attend
the ICG or to participate in side meetings -- a move he
disagreed with but was powerless to stop.)

International Community Views: Generally in Agreement
--------------

4. (C) UN Coordinator Xavier Leus said that the UN received a
request from the HAT to send a team of experts to assess the
country's capacity for organizing elections, which the UN was

ANTANANARI 00000515 002 OF 004


currently reviewing. Most countries, with the exception of
France, seemed to be in favor of holding off on providing
electoral support, even technical analysis, until a consensus
was reached. EU Ambassador Jean Claude Boidin noted that the
EU had received a similar request but would not respond due
to the HAT's failure in discussions in Brussels July 6-7 to
present a roadmap leading to consensual, fair elections. He
explained that the EU had clearly stated to Rajoelina that an
inclusive political agreement must be reached for the EU to
continue its assistance to Madagascar, and added that the
international contact group had agreed that a comprehensive
political agreement was a prerequisite to the organization of
elections. He further noted that Malagasy political parties
were based on their leaders rather than platforms so it was
important that SADC meet with the leaders and not only their
delegations, and thus recommended moving the negotiations to
another country to accommodate the two exiled presidents.
The South African Ambassador confirmed in a subsequent
meeting that the delegations had agreed to move the talks to
either Mauritius (preferred by TGV and Zafy) or Angola
(preferred by Ravalomanana); Drame told the Ambassador that
Ratsiraka is unwilling to attend talks held anywhere in SADC.
The German Ambassador added that Ravalomanana must be a part
of the agreement, or a lasting peace could not be achieved
and suggested that an amnesty be given to him and Ratsiraka
and a truth and reconciliation commission set up.


5. (C) The French DCM noted that some donors had suspended
budget support for the Ravalomanana administration in
December 2008 due to the ousted president's abuses of power,
and raised the question of whether or not all participants in
the negotiations should be placed on an equal pedestal,
implying that Rajoelina should be given a higher position.
She suggested that a deadline for negotiations and elections
be imposed, and that the negotiations not focus on former
heads of state (i.e., Ravalomanana and Ratsiraka who "took
the negotiations hostage") but on problem solving, to avoid
further economic deterioration. The French Ambassador
subsequently intervened somewhat contrarily (perhaps
indicative of the apparent divide in French policy) to say
that achieving a consensus prior to elections was more
important than the election timetable, and that the HAT
should be discouraged by everyone from moving unilaterally to
elections at this time. He suggested that the election
timeframe could be sped up if the parties focused on agreeing
only on the main principles, such as candidate eligibility
requirements and electoral code reform, prior to elections
and left the other agenda items (unclear what that would be,
presumably constitutional reform) to be resolved following
elections. He proposed that Rajoelina and the three
ex-presidents be pressed to agree not to run for president.
Chissano replied that perhaps all four should be able to run,
but Rajoelina would have to give up control of the
transition, which the French Ambassador viewed as an unlikely
scenario.

Swedish Ambassador Pushes for Consensus
--------------

6. (C) Sweden assumed the EU presidency July 1, but has
delegated local leadership on Madagascar to the German
embassy here as Sweden does not have a mission on the ground.
Swedish Ambassador Lena Sundh, who participated in the EU
discussions with the HAT under the Cotonou Agreement in
Brussels to determine the future of EU cooperation with the
island, is in Madagascar July 12-16 for a fact-finding
mission. She will meet with AREMA leader Pierrot
Razaonarivelo, TIM, economic actors, generals, and perhaps
former President Zafy. She explained to the dip corps July
13 that the EU had given the HAT a strong message during the
Brussels meetings that unilateral moves towards elections,
without consensus, were unacceptable. She therefore was
puzzled by Chissano's assertion, which he expressed in a
bilateral meeting with her on Sunday before he left, that the
HAT has "misunderstood" the views of the EU and international
community and was pressing ahead unilaterally with elections
because it thought that was what we wanted. Ambassador
Marquardt opined that bad faith, rather than any
misunderstanding, was the explanation for the HAT's decision
to press forward unilaterally on elections before the end of
the year -- a point he also made to Chiassano in their

ANTANANARI 00000515 003 OF 004


meeting. The South African Ambassador said that Chissano had
delivered a strong message in his July 10 meeting with
Rajoelina on the need for consensus and the dangers of a
unilateral approach.

TIM Says Time is Right and Asks for Help
--------------

7. (C) Pro-Ravalomanana/TIM delegation leaders Fetison
Rakotonirina and Meza Razafimihary told the Ambassador July
13 that Chissano had listened to their explanation of events
and TIM's position for over two hours. They explained that
AU envoy Ouedraogo had invited the four delegations to Addis
Ababa for a meeting July 21, but expressed some confusion
regarding who will lead the negotiation effort -- SADC or AU.
Although they expressed a willingness to work with the SADC
and AU teams, they are increasingly concerned that the HAT is
ever-more-deeply entrenching itself in power and will move
forward unilaterally with elections -- a move which would not
resolve the crisis, but lead to more extremism, they argued.
Thus, they said that the time is right to get the four
delegations together evenbefore Addis. Fetison was
optimistic that an accord could be reached if the talks were
held now; he added that TIM was even willing to accept the
HAT Prime Minister Monja Roindefo (who is said to have
control over the mutinous, coup-backing CAPSAT/FIS forces)
retaining his current role. He argued that Ravalomanana
should return (not with mercenaries, which they dissuaded him
from using) and play a role in the transition, but said that
TIM wasn't opposed to Rajoelina running for election, as his
lack of popularity would then become apparent. In the
meantime, Fetison supports the idea of "offshoring" the
negotiations so that Ravalomanana may participate directly,
and argued against broadening the talks to include more
political actors.

Ambiguous French Role
--------------

8. (C) Fetison said that the French ambassador had called him
to complain about the TIM leader's critical remarks after the
French ambassador had given a speech ("in my personal
capacity", he lamely explained later) at a ceremony in which
two French military officers were decorated by the HAT
Defense Minister. Fetison complained that the French
position was opaque, and solicited the Ambassador's advice
prior to a meeting with the French ambassador later that same
day. The Ambassador said that there seemed to be a divide in
Paris, which put the local French ambassador in a difficult
position. (Drame had told the Ambassador that he met
recently in Paris with Stephane Gompertz of the Quai and Remy
Marechaux in the Elysee, both of whom complained to him about
the strong role being played by "Francafrique" veterans
Robert Bourgi -- who reportedly was in Tana again for the
June 26 national day celebration -- and Secretary General of
the Elysee Claude Gueant. In addition to the
publicly-acknowledged meeting last week between Minister for
Cooperation and Francophonie Alain Joyandet and Rajoelina in
Paris, there apparently was another held privately between
TGV and Gueant. Marechaux and Gompertz expressed their
concern to Drame that the advice TGV was receiving from the
Francafrique side might be quite different from their own,
which is closely in line with that of the remainder of the
international community.)


9. (C) Comment: The international community appears on the
surface to be in agreement that a political consensus must be
obtained prior to the organization of elections if they are
to stand a chance of being considered legitimate -- and
without which none of us will support the electoral process
financially or with our expertise. What exactly a consensus
will look like or who will be included remains to be fleshed
out, but we will continue to urge that, at a minimum, it must
include both Rajoelina and Ravalomanana. With respect to
the ambiguous French position, all here complain privately
about a striking lack of clarity, and about specific actions
by the French here and in Paris which seem to portend --
and/or are presented by the HAT as -- impending recognition
of the HAT. It looks to us that the Francafrique side of
the house wants TGV to prevail, is unconcerned about their
moving ahead unilaterally, and that they are the ones who
have TGV's ear. End comment.

ANTANANARI 00000515 004 OF 004


MARQUARDT