RAVALOMANANA'S RUMORED RETURN WITH MERCENARIES:

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 000435

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/E - MBEYZEROV
PARIS FOR RKANEDA
LONDON FOR PLORD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2018
TAGS: PGOV MA
SUBJECT: RAVALOMANANA'S RUMORED RETURN WITH MERCENARIES:
ANOTHER MALAGASY FAIRYTALE

REF: ANTANANARIVO 428

Classified By: POLOFF JEFF HULSE FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D.


1. (C) SUMMARY: With negotiations at a standstill, rumors of
former President Ravalomanana's imminent return -- with or
without mercenary support -- have been slowly but steadily
reinforced by media reports, opposition statements, and
alleged military preparations by the transition government.
While we are aware of his recent discussions around securing
private security support (i.e. bodyguards) in South Africa,
France, and the U.S., we have no credible indications that
this project is advancing; indeed, warned through
intermediaries that we are following his discussions and
object to them, he passed the message to the Ambassador over
the weekend that he is not seeking to engage mercenaries.
Last week's unhelpful COMESA statement lending rhetorical
support to SADC's lingering but equally feckless "military
option" fueled Ravalomanana's supporters here to claim that
he will return by June 26 (Malagasy National Day),by force
if necessary. Leaders in the transition government are
appealing to patriotism for support against the alleged
arrival of "foreign mercenaries", reinforcing airports to
repel them. This has been just the latest useful propaganda
opportunity for extremists in both camps, following the
successful and equally specious playing of the mercenary card
by the HAT in February and March. The only real effect thus
far has been to weaken support for the AU/UN negotiations,
while Ravalomanana himself remains unable to return without a
prior political solution. When he fails to appear, the HAT
will have successfully "repelled" an attack, while it will be
obvious that the pro-Ravalomanana side has again overplayed
its hand. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) Ravalomanana has resided in South Africa since fleeing
the country after the March 17 coup, and on June 3 was
convicted in abstentia to four years in jail and a USD 70
million fine for abuses of power. HAT President Andry
Rajoelina has made clear his opposition to Ravalomanana's
return under any circumstances, stating as recently as June
13 that there is "no possibility he will be allowed back"
soon. Ravalomanana, however, has promised to return ever
since departing: June 26 will be at least the fourth major
"deadline" (following May 1, Easter, and Pentecost) that he
will likely miss. Bolstering the rumors are recent reports
misconstruing Ravalomanana's recent discussions with a U.S.
security firm (over a personal security contract) as him
seeking to hire foreign "mercenaries". There are also
reports of similar discussions with South African and French
entities.


3. (C) Whatever the truth of these rumors, the transition
government has reinforced security (with an anti-aircraft
battery) at the airport here, and reportedly is taking
similar measures in Fort Dauphin (south) and Morondava (west
coast). They also are appealing to Malagasy nationalism
against the possibility of foreign mercenaries. With the
national day on June 26 approaching, the HAT has capitalized
on an uptick in flag-waving patriotism - made easier by the
fact that Ravalomanana has apparently called on his own
supporters to avoid using the Malagasy flag in their own
rallies. HAT Minister of Defense Noel Rakotonandrasana has
put the armed forces on "high alert", although this is not
readily apparent even at Ivato airport here; media also
reported that eight armored vehicles left Tana to assist in
the south, but the reports are unconfirmed and rely on
anonymous sources. Sareraka, a trusted advisor to Rajoelina,
has declared that the HAT should "take care of (the Legalist
protesters) who continue to call for COMESA and foreign
troops to bring (Ravalomanana) back". No action has been
taken against the protesters, but the threat of
Ravalomanana's return has given them an excuse to confront
the remaining demonstrations more forcefully, after they had
been largely out of reach for the last two months.


4. (C) The (pro-Ravalomanana) Legalists have been spreading
the rumor as well, hoping that fear of a military
confrontation will give them an edge in whatever process
emerges from the current standoff at the negotiating table.
While Legalist interlocutors recognize that foreign
mercenaries would be anathema to most Malagasy, they are
exploiting the threat in order to promote a deal with the HAT
outside the context of the AU/UN negotiations. Alain
Andriamiseza, leader of the non-TIM members of the Legalist
movement, has attempted to sell Post on the idea of
recognizing a HAT/Legalist deal as a means of avoiding the

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violent return of Ravalomanana, but Post has deferred to the
AU and UN mediators, and attempted to push all parties back
towards the negotiations.


5. (C) COMMENT: Even long-time observers living here continue
to be astounded by the degree to which alternative or
parallel realities are created and exploited here for
partisan political gain. The allegation of imminent
mercenary landings is not a new play here, having worked like
a charm for TGV's side -- with equally little substance
behind it -- just before the coup, inflaming nationalist
sentiment for his side. The discredited Malagasy military
sees this as red flag it cannot ignore -- and a useful
opportunity to enhance its credibility by "stopping" an
invasion that will never occur anyway. Last week the
Ambassador advised Ravalomanana, through three separate
channels, against pursuing any return by force; he responded
with denials on Friday via the same three channels. In any
case, we have no credible evidence that he is planning a
return at this time, and none of this charade has any impact
on dialy life here. That said, partisan passions are rising
with the approach of June 26, and both the HAT and the
Legalists almost certainly will continue using the threat of
his return to justify their actions. The international
mediation process is likely to suffer most from their antics.
We will continue monitoring the situation carefully for any
sign of credibility, however unlikely that is, but a much
greater concern at this time is how to salvage the
negotiations (septel). END COMMENT.
MARQUARDT