MADAGASCAR: IMPASSE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANTANANARIVO 000428

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/E - MBEYZEROV
PARIS FOR RKANEDA
LONDON FOR PLORD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2018
TAGS: PGOV MA
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: IMPASSE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS

Classified By: POLOFF JEFF HULSE FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D.

1.(C) SUMMARY: Negotiations between Madagascar's four main
political movements remain blocked over the details of an
amnesty deal for former President Didier Ratsiraka and his
supporters. During a meeting this morning (June 12) with the
International Contact Group on Madagascar (ICG-M),
representatives of each movement in turn gave a lengthy
explanation for their intransigence, and they are unlikely to
be any more flexible when the negotiations resume this
afternoon at 1500. Without agreement on the amnesty,
mediators will likely call for a suspension of talks, and
return to shuttle diplomacy next week or later. There is
increasingly a sense that some sort of resolution will be
necessary before the national holiday on June 26; if not, at
least two of the movements (those of the HAT and
TIM/Legalists) are likely to lose patience with the AU/UN
process, with the HAT tempted to seek a unilateral solution
that will not work.


2. (C) However, it is not clear that any of the movements
(save perhaps that of Albert Zafy) are willing to make the
kind of compromises that will be required for the
negotiations to succeed. The defacto HAT government of Andry
Rajoelina appears convinced that it may be able to govern on
its own (or with direct French assistance),former President
Marc Ravalomanana is reportedly calling on his team to simply
block negotiations rather than legitimize a coup government,
and former President Didier Ratsiraka has nothing to lose by
dragging his feet as the HAT struggles to manage an
increasingly unruly country. Pro-Ravalomanana "Legalist"
demonstrators continue their daily demonstrations, but their
shadow government remains sidelined: "Prime Minister"
Manandafy Rakotonirina has been in house arrest outside of
Tana for the last six weeks, and his "cabinet" doesn't dare
appear in public for legitimate fear of arrest. END SUMMARY.

THE POLITICS OF AMNESTY


3. (C) Negotiations have been blocked since May 25, when
Ratsiraka launched a boycott to force approval on an amnesty
deal, and Ravalomanana pulled out in response. AU and UN
mediators shuttled between the parties for the following two
weeks, hammering out an arrangement that would meet
Ratsiraka's demand that the amnesty come first, as a separate
document ("the Declaration"),before negotiations proceed on
the other issues outlined in the May 22 UN/AU/OIF/SADC press
release. (Notably, this included the assignment of positions
within the new transition executive and legislative bodies.)
At the end of two weeks, a document had taken shape, focusing
on three points: the "cancellation" of judgments, judicial
condemnations, and administrative sanctions for infractions
linked to the events of 2002; the reinstatement of affected
civil servants, members of the military, and civilians to
their former rank and position in their previous career; and
the compensation by the state for past injustices. This
"preliminary" amnesty would be linked to a lengthier passage
in the final Charter of the Transition ("the Charter"),which
also adds that serious violations of human rights or
fundamental liberties will not be covered, and that the
period covered will be from January 1, 1997 up to the date of
signature of the Charter. While the Ravalomanana and HAT
representatives are not actually in agreement over this end
date (the HAT would like it to exclude all events of 2009),
they are at least willing to discuss it in the broader
negotiations; the specifics of the Declaration are simply
designed to keep Ratsiraka on board.


4. (C) On June 8, the movements met again for the first time
since May 25, only to discover that the Ratsiraka,
Ravalomanana, and Zafy movements were in agreement - but the
High Transitional Authority (HAT) wasn't. HAT Foreign
Minister Ny Hasina Andriamanjato stated that he was unable to
sign without consulting the HAT and the Council of Ministers,
and then issued a statement the following day asserting that
an amnesty was a legislative act, and couldn't be granted
without some form of a legislative body. He reiterated this
point today, and is not likely to compromise in talks this
afternoon. Since the HAT suspended the parliament in March,
and no agreement has yet been reached on a transition
legislature, the HAT essentially admitted its reticence to
signing an amnesty at all - which a contact within the HAT
confirmed verbally to EmbOff on June 10. According to this
source, HAT President Andry Rajoelina has privately admitted
to having broken his December 2008 deal with Ratsiraka (which
would have put Ratsiraka in the presidency),and now fears a
retaliation if Ratsiraka or his allies are permitted back in
the country. Andriamanjato also suspects, perhaps not
without cause, that this is a ploy by Ratsiraka to gain an
amnesty without having to sign the final Charter; Ratsiraka's
representatives have given no indication that this may be the
case, but the HAT clearly would prefer that there be only one
document.


5. (C) The four movements met again on June 11; the HAT team
requested more time to evaluate the amnesty proposal, and the
meeting was postponed to June 12 at 1500. Once the HAT
formally rejects the Declaration, Rasiraka's team will likely
walk out. Ravalomanana's team will then either follow
Ratsiraka out the door, and negations will be formally
suspended, or they will press on with only the three teams,
and sideline Ratsiraka by boosting Zafy's visibility in the
negotiations to keep coastal ethnic groups on board (the HAT
and TIM delegations are generally seen as representing
highland ethnic groups). If Ravalomanana has a say in it,
however, he will likely use the opportunity to quit the
negotiations, and blame Ratsiraka for the failure; TIM
members have confirmed to us that Ravalomanana would prefer
that they did not participate in the talks. However, should
TIM remain, a member of the UN mediation team has privately
confirmed that the negotiations stand a much better chance of
success.


6. (C) There remain significant disagreements between the HAT
and Ravalomanana, but neither they nor the representatives of
Zafy are as fixated on preconditions as Ratsiraka. The TIM
representatives are unhappy with a new plan to divide up 160
seats of a "transition congress" evenly, with exactly 40
seats per movement; in their view, all of the elected members
of parliament should be reinstated (most of whom were TIM
members, although many have since defected to support the
HAT),the HAT members should be integrated into parliament to
form a "constituent assembly", and Ratsiraka and Zafy would
be given a nominal number of seats as well as some cabinet
positions. The HAT is more concerned about keeping as many
of its current positions as possible, and will likely only
remain engaged in dialogue as long as they can retain control
of a strong set of institutions. Agreement can be reached on
the end date of the amnesty, once the HAT is reassured that
the violence of February 7th would not be covered.
Negotiations will not be easy, but Ratsiraka's departure
could at least keep the other three parties at the table,
allow them to engage on a broader range of issues, and move
past this three-week impasse over amnesty.

THE VIEW FROM INSIDE THE HAT


7. (C) Private conversations with key players inside the
movements, however, indicate that the HAT and Ravalomanana
movements may not be fully invested in the success of these
talks. Zaza Ramandimbiarison, Chief of Staff to HAT
President Andry Rajoelina, suggested on June 11 to the
Ambassador that the most effective way to reach agreement on
a transition charter would be to gather all four principals,
without their advisors, around a table in a neutral, nearby
place like Mauritius. He said that Rajoelina would not agree
to go to Addis Ababa, as the AU proposed, because he views
the AU as favoring Ravalomanana. According to Zaza, time is
of the essence. Although UN Envoy Tiebile Drame is pushing
the approach that difficult issues should be worked out
before the principals come together, Zaza thinks such an
approach will only cause more problems to arise, making
eventual agreement all the more difficult. As the
negotiations falter, the economic situation continues to
deteriorate and the government has fewer and fewer resources
at its disposal. Zaza believes that the four can reach
agreement if away from the pressure of their advisors, many
of whom reportedly have economic interests in prolonging the
current lawless business environment, maintaining their
transition positions, and perhaps also in seeing their
principals fail as they wait in the wings. Such an agreement
would have to be closely monitored by the international
community to ensure that it was in fact implemented once the
principals returned home and were again subject to
clientelist pressures.


8. (C) If the negotiations fail, Zaza recommended that the
alternative approach should be for civil society groups,
backed by the international community, to organize elections
as soon as possible. However, he recognized that there are
currently few if any civil society groups that have remained
neutral in the current conflict. He does not predict that
the military would intervene in the event of failed
negotiations, but rather asserted that the military is
becoming more unified and responsible. At the ICG-M meeting,
HAT Foreign Minister Andriamanjato agreed that "the military
has had its reconciliation conference, and is now
reconciled", indicating a level of confidence in military
cohesion not yet supported by the facts. Zaza also did not
believe that it would be possible for Ravalomanana to return
as a figurehead in the current transition government. Due to
Ravalomanana,s personality, Zaza (correctly) feared that
Ravalomanana would never be able to sit on the sidelines
without intervening. He suggested that the most effective
way to get Ravalomanana to bow out and/or stop blocking
negotiations would be to guarantee protection of his Malagasy
business interests (which are currently being pilfered).

PRO-RAVALOMANANA PROTESTS RETURN TO DEMOCRACY SQUARE


9. (C) On June 10, Legalist "Prime Minister" Manandafy
Rakotonirina (currently under house arrest in Mantasoa, 90
minutes outside Antananarivo) requested and received a visit
from Ambassador Marquardt. His objective was to ask once
more that the USG recognize his cabinet, appointed by
Ravalomanana in April, as the legitimate government of
Madagascar. The previous day, Legalist "Foreign Minister"
Elyett Rasendratsirofo had pressed the same point, alleging
that our failure to recognize them "put them on the same
level as the coup plotters". The essential elements of the
Legalist plan have not changed in months: they envision
Ravalomanana returning as titular president, Manandafy taking
over as Prime Minister, and Rajoelina becoming the head of
Senate. Manandafy asserted that the US and France should put
their foot down and force a solution on the negotiations
(presumably the Legalist plan),or the negotiations would
never succeed. Ambassador Marquardt made clear that the US
had no intention of picking sides, recognizing any of these
'governments", acting unilaterally, or supporting any use of
force in this conflict.


10. (C) After weeks of peaceful demonstrations confined to
the parking lot of a burnt-out Magro store (owned by
Ravalomanana's Tiko Group),the pro-Ravalomanana legalist
protesters marched into central Antananarivo on June 11,
passing by Place de 13 Mai and ending with a peaceful rally
on Place de la Democratie at Ambohijatovo Park - both key
locations in the demonstrations from January to March 2009.
Prior demonstrations had attracted around 1,000 people on
weekdays, and up to 4,000 on weekends; yesterday's march
attracted similar numbers, and ended peacefully around 1700.
Another rally was organized today, also on Place de la
Democratie, but was relocated to the Magro lot after security
forces made clear that Ambohijatovo was off limits. Tear gas
was used effectively to disperse a small number of protesters
who showed up at the park, but the event ended relatively
peacefully in both locations by early afternoon. Another
peaceful rally has been called for June 13 at 1000 at Magro,
resuming their regular pace and location.


11. (C) After several days of increasingly louder (and
entirely unjustified) claims of American support from
Ravalomanana and his supporters, the protest yesterday
featured numerous American flags, and a banner thanking the
U.S. for its support. According to one source in the
Legalist leadership, Manandafy unjustifiably had claimed US
support for the Legalist government after his conversation
with Ambassador Marquardt; combined with Ravalomanana's
similar claims from South Africa in the last week, there
appears to have been a growing belief within the Legalists
that this was true. Post released a statement on June 11
contradicting these claims, stress our impartiality, and
reiterating our support for the AU/UN process; we have also
engaged the Legalist street leadership directly to further
clarify the U.S. position. The Ambassador received three
separate phone calls on June 11 -- from Washington, Pretoria,
and "Fporeign Minister" Elyett -- apologizing pesonally on
behalf of Ravalomanana for the false claims (and denying all
responsibility for them).



12. (C) COMMENT: The current impasse is likely to persist,
but the AU and UN mediators remain convinced that their
patience will pay off in the end. If today's meeting results
in a suspension, the team of envoys is considering traveling
to southern African capitals to try to guide SADC and COMESA
governments away from the idea of military intervention or
the return of Ravalomanana as head of state, and giving the
negotiating teams in Tana time to reconsider their demands
under rising pressure. The persistent hope among TIM
supporters that Ravalomanana will return to retake power, by
any means possible, has only served to strengthen their
intransigence both on the street and in the negotiations; it
has also fed HAT paranoia, and distracted both teams from the
real issues on the table. As the important June 26 national
day festivities approach, there will be growing impetus to
either reach a solution in the AU/UN process, or to
reconsider the process itself. A possible "Plan B", according
to many here, might be for the HAT to press forward with
unilateral elections, having reportedly asked the Elysee
directly for five million Euros for this purpose. It may be
useful to remind our French friends, as frustrating as this
situation is, that support for any unilateral process will
not work and will only divide the international community.
END COMMENT.
MARQUARDT