MADAGASCAR: BRINKMANSHIP AS NEGOTIATIONS PROCEED

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANTANANARIVO 000370

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/E-MBEYZEROV

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL MA
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: BRINKMANSHIP AS NEGOTIATIONS PROCEED

REF: ANTANANARIVO 364


1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Contrary to media reports on the faltering
negotiations between Madagascar's four main political movements, UN
and AU mediators remain confident that talks will continue, that
last week's negotiated gains will not be lost, and that the
increasingly loud rhetoric emanating from the TIM and AREMA
movements will not derail their slow advance towards a political
solution. Moving into a third phase of negotiations, the key
unresolved issues will be the distribution of positions in the
executive and legislative institutions of the transitional
government, and the exact wording of the amnesty covering political
leaders since 2002. In the meantime, the High Transitional
Authority (HAT) is pressing ahead with government appointments and
even an independent electoral commission, in an attempt to
demonstrate their independence and ability to govern despite the
deadlock. END SUMMARY.

RAVALOMANANA AND RATSIRAKA STEP BACK . . . FOR NOW
--------------

2. (SBU) Following instructions from their leaders abroad,
representatives of former Presidents Didier Ratsiraka and Marc
Ravalomanana have pulled out of negotiations hosted jointly by the
African Union, SADC, the Francophonie, and the United Nations.
Press reports have noisily seized on the moves as indicators of
failure in the negotiations, but contacts familiar with the
negotiations have a more nuanced view. They maintain that all four
parties still stand behind last week's gains, and this week's
belligerent stances are a ploy to control at least two of the
remaining issues: who will preside over the HAT (of great concern
primarily to Ratsiraka) and what will be the terms of the amnesty
(which has become primarily a Ravalomanana issue - at this stage,
all parties are already in agreement on Ratsiraka's demands
pertaining to the "cancellation" of his charges from 2001/02). For
the international mediators, this is merely a "technical pause
between phase two (May 20-22 at the Carlton Hotel) and phase three
(which hasn't begun yet)" of the negotiations; they recognize that
the remaining issues will be the most contentious, but are generally
pleased with the results from phase two.

MEDIATORS TALLY THEIR WINS AND PREPARE FOR THE NEXT ROUND
--------------

3. (SBU) On Saturday, May 23, the mediators released a statement
summarizing what had been accomplished in phase two, and outlining
the remaining difficulties. Per the statement, all agreed that the
transition must be neutral, peaceful, and consensual; that the
former heads of state, and the current President of the HAT, will be
permitted to run in the next election; that the elections would be
held as soon as possible within a period of 14 months; and that all
former heads of state would benefit from a special statute ensuring
their dignity and security. In addition, UN contacts maintain that
the four parties remain committed to eight transitional
institutions, mostly unchanged from previous drafts of the
Transition Charter that UN Senior Mediator Tiebiele Drame worked on
before the Carlton negotiations. As of Tuesday, May 26, no parties
had yet indicated they would renege on these points.


4. (SBU) The document also outlined two key points for the next
round of talks: the composition and formula for the proportional
distribution of seats among executive and legislative institutions,
and the terms of a general amnesty. While Ratsiraka claims to
demand the complete cancellation of all legal complaints against him
and his colleagues (including military) dating from the 2001/02
conflict, embassy contacts believe that this is a figleaf for his
real demand: that Andry Rajoelina give up the presidency of the HAT.
Strengthening this argument is the fact that the other movements
have already agreed to such a "cancellation", and that the "terms of
a general amnesty" in the statement actually refer to an argument
between Rajoelina's HAT and Ravalomanana's TIM: the HAT wants the
amnesty to extend only to December 31, 2008 (thus leaving
Ravalomanana open for judgment on everything that happened since),
while the TIM negotiators demand that the amnesty extend up to the
date of signature of an eventual "Transition Charter".

BRINKMANSHIP, INTRIGUE, AND SHIFTING LOYALTIES
--------------

5. (SBU) In light of Ratsiraka's statement, his team simply did not
show up on Monday, May 25, for the latest round of negotiations.
Ravalomanana's "Legalist" supporters did come, but then left since
Ratsiraka's team was absent; regardless, they were under orders from
Ravalomanana to boycott, so the appearance was little more than a
means of blaming Ratsiraka for allowing the negotiations to falter.
Publicly, Ravalomanana has announced three additional preconditions:
he must be allowed to return (and his security must be assured); the
"hostages" (the imprisoned political leaders of his "Legalist"
movement, including his appointed Prime Minister Manandafy
Rakotonirina) must be released unconditionally; and there must be
better guarantees for the protection of the people and property
associated with his former government and current political
movement. Support for a 48-hour "ultimatum" for the release of

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these political prisoners, set to expire today, appears to have
waned; by 1600, there has been no abnormal activity outside the
small, controlled, daily demonstrations north of city center.

6. (SBU) With supporters of Ratsiraka and Ravalomanana momentarily
stepping away from the negotiating table, others are eyeing the
empty chairs. On May 25, three of the "political prisoners"
released in April 2009 announced their willingness to serve as a
fifth movement in the negotiations, although their agenda is largely
identical to that of the HAT. Speculation is rife that the split
between Pierrot Rajoanarivelo and Ratsiraka may be widening, and
that he may make a bid to join the discussion. There is also the
possibility that a faction of the Legalist camp may split off from
those loyal to Ravalomanana; TIM was never monolithic, and his
refusal to negotiate may encourage others to fill the gap. For the
moment, however, it remains unlikely that any of the four movements
(of Ratsiraka, Ravalomanana, Rajoelina, and Zafy) will permit any
additions. This issue was tentatively dealt with last week by
expanding the movements' delegations from five members to seven, to
accommodate newly emerging players. No single group outside the
four main movements has enough support to force their way in at this
time.
TGV STEAMS AHEAD
--------------

7. (SBU) At the moment, Rajoelina's HAT has the least to gain from
the status quo: their role at the helm of the country means they are
being associated with ongoing increases in urban crime, political
protests, economic decline, and international isolation.
Ravalomanana and Ratsiraka, watching from abroad, have nothing to
lose by dragging out the negotiations, so the HAT remains on the
offensive: in a cabinet meeting on May 25, the HAT named five more
Regional Chiefs (only one out of 22 now remains un-named, that of
Analamange Region, where Antananarivo is located),and unilaterally
declared the creation of an Independent Electoral Commmission via
Decree 2009-721. They have rescheduled the "Assises Regionales"
(Regional Meetings) for June 8-13 in advance of a National
Conference before June 26 which, entirely outside of the ongoing
negotiations, will determine the course of the transition
government, barring agreement at the negotiating table. In
addition, the HAT is hosting a two-day "Military Conference" this
week, purportedly to discuss military living conditions and respect
for social and military hierarchies. (NOTE: Per sources familiar
with the HAT, the biggest fear of Rajoelina and his team is that the
others won't agree to anything, and are simply trying to wear them
down by attrition. These attempts to simply "move on", misguided
though they may be, are meant to demonstrate that the HAT does have
an alternative to the international mediation process. END NOTE)

COMMENT: STILL MOVING FORWARD SLOWLY
--------------

8. (SBU) COMMENT: Last Friday's apparent progress on an agreement,
followed by setbacks over the weekend, represents a challenge for
the international mediators on the scene, but does not likely pose
an existential threat to the negotiations. Ratsiraka and
Ravalomanana are jockeying for position on key issues, but their
supporters in country will only stand for so much - which will in
turn pressure them to stay engaged, if only so that they aren't
replaced at the negotiating table. Media outlets have been
expressing a certain amount of discontent with the international
mediation effort, but Post is frequently contacted by concerned
partisans of all sides that clearly find the international community
an indispensable piece of the puzzle.


9. (SBU) A comprehensive political solution remains distant, and the
boycott of Ravalomanana and Ratsiraka is an incremental step back
from the apparent progress made through last Friday. However,
there is no sign that any movement intends to return to the street
in any serious way now that the real stakes are to be found in the
negotiating room. UN contacts remain confident that another
"interim" phase of shuttle diplomacy between the parties will push
things forward, and the SADC envoy will have an opportunity to work
on Ravalomanana's position when he returns to Swaziland tomorrow
(May 27). The International Contact Group on Madagascar will meet
again on May 27, and a third phase of negotiations, focusing on the
key points raised in paragraph four, should begin shortly
thereafter. END COMMENT.

STROMAYER