MADAGASCAR: BAPTISM BY FIRE -- RAJOELINA'S FIRST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANTANANARIVO 000282

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/E - MBEYZEROV
PARIS FOR RKANEDA
LONDON FOR PLORD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/04/2018
TAGS: PGOV MA
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: BAPTISM BY FIRE -- RAJOELINA'S FIRST
30 DAYS

REF: A. ANTANANARIVO 204

B. ANTANANARIVO 282

C. ANTANANARIVO 267

D. ANTANANARIVO 265

E. ANTANANARIVO 227

Classified By: AMBASSADOR NIELS MARQUARDT FOR REASONS 1.4 B AND D.


1. (C) SUMMARY: Andry Rajoelina took power on March 17 in a
military coup, and has spent his first month fending off
political attacks, economic crises, and international
condemnation. Rajoelina's High Transitional Authority (HAT)
has a tenuous hold on the country, and his government retains
an edge of revolutionary fervor - along with the accompanying
political disorder, intolerance for dissent, and inability to
work with the opposition that that entails. The HAT presses
on, however, and maintains control by intimidating or buying
off countervailing media, military, and political forces;
where former President Ravalomanana often pushed aside
democracy and civil liberties in the name of "development",
Rajoelina is doing the same simply to stay in power.
Meanwhile, negotiations between the four current political
factions (Rajoelina's HAT, Ravalomanana's TIM, former
President Albert Zafy's CRN, and former President Didier
Ratsiraka's AREMA) are stalled, as negotiators try to
navigate each parties' conflicting demands. Most political
leaders appear more concerned with getting a seat at the
transition table than with launching an effective government.
Thirty days in, there's been much change here, but no
progress. END SUMMARY.

RAJOELINA'S GOVERNMENT: OFF TO A SLOW START
--------------


2. (C) When he took power on March 17, Rajoelina was prepared
with 13 ministerial appointments, a blueprint for the
structure of his transition government (elaborated in
Ordinance 2009/003, reftel A),and a host of
former-opposition allies ready to take their seats in the
HAT. His government has made little progress since: only 12
ministers (out of a planned 25) have been named, as his
original Minister of Defense was effectively vetoed by the
military's former mutineer leaders (reftel B). Forty-one
seats in the HAT's 44-member executive body were named on
March 31, but the remaining three appear to be stuck, as with
the remaining ministers, in a search for consensus candidates
to appease the opposition. The HAT has nominated six vice
presidents (one for each of Madagascar's former provinces),
and on April 15 formed 10 committees on such issues as trade,
finance, defense, and foreign relations. Lacking a
legislative body, these committees will theoretically play an
oversight and policy planning role, although they, like the
ministers themselves, all remain subordinate to HAT President
Rajoelina.


3. (C) Rajoelina's blueprint also included a 120-member
"Council for Economic and Social Recovery" (CRES),but no
appointments have yet been made and the CRES appears to have
been forgotten for the moment. His plans for an expanded
(from nine to eleven members) High Constitutional Court (HCC)
have yet to be acted upon, as he is rumored to be seeking two
qualified candidates that the High Council of the Magistracy
will endorse - no small feat, if it happens. On April 10, he
dismissed all 22 of the country's Regional Chiefs, who were
appointed by Ravalomanana, and has yet to name replacements.
The nominally-independent Central Bank is now on strike for a
second time (although they are maintaining a minimal level of
service),protesting against what they see as HAT moves that
endanger their independence. Worse still, Rajoelina's
opposition alliance has fractured, with Ratsiraka's AREMA now
in opposition to the HAT, along with Ravalomanana's TIM and
associated "pro-constitutional/legalist" parties.


4. (C) Judged against their inaugural promises at the
"installation" ceremony on March 21, the HAT is faring little
better. Looting and vandalism in Antananarivo have stopped,
but personal security and petty crime remain as bad as ever.
Crimes such as illegal logging for rare hardwood trees have
increased as security forces have failed to restore order
around the country (or are themselves involved),and former
President of the National Assembly Jacques Sylla recently
suffered a grenade attack on his home. Rajoelina's promise
to release political prisoners and invite exiled politicians
back has only been delivered halfway: he "released" 48
prisoners (of very questionable "political" credentials,
reftel C) to house arrest, but has only pardoned 32, leaving

ANTANANARI 00000282 002 OF 003


the most controversial ones in a politically expedient limbo.
The "exiles" he welcomed back, notably Ratsiraka and former
AREMA prime ministers Pierrot Rajaonarivelo and Tantely
Andrianarivo, are waiting for legal clarity before returning:
they are seeking an amnesty (which would allow them to
re-enter politics) rather than a pardon. For the moment
Rajoelina has offered neither, but an amnesty for AREMA
exilees is clearly a vital part of any settlement to which
AREMA would associate itself.. As for economic policy, any
broader vision for the economy has been obscured by populist
measures to buy support through cheap staple goods. The
alleged Daewoo agricultural deal has been officially
canceled, and Madagascar's few large mining contracts have
been threatened with a review of their terms and a lack of
performance on GOM obligations like timely VAT reimbursements
to the investors.

LACKING LEGITIMACY, RAJOELINA TURNS TO INTIMIDATION
-------------- --------------


5. (C) The 30-day snapshot inside the transition government
is just as troubling. The suspension of foreign assistance
has cut the overall national budget by roughly a quarter,
while the global and domestic economic crises will reduce GDP
growth by at least half (reftel D),with a concurrent impact
on tax and customs revenues. In addition, Ravalomanana is
reported to have run through half of the annual budget in the
first quarter of 2009 alone, due to his actions during the
political crisis. Minister of Finance Benja Razafimahaleo
has assured civil servants that their salaries are safe "at
least until the end of 2009", but declared that the
government would otherwise be forced to focus on the
"priority areas" announced on March 31 (reftel E). This week
he made clear his intention to re-allocate funds away from
planned investment (in development, construction, and social
programs, including education and health care) to operational
expenses. The country's "Road Maintenance Fund" (FER) will
be rerouted to deal with cyclone damage, and may be tapped
further if needed. Plans to sell the controversial
presidential jet and recoup lost taxes and customs duties
from Tiko have not yet been implemented, but their impact
would regardless be more political than financial.
Razafimahaleo has also promised less official travel, the
cancellation of the AU summit, and the revocation of
Ravalomanana's promise that businesses looting in January
2009 would be exempt from taxes to make up their losses. It
is not clear how the HAT plans to pay for Rajoelina's
populist announcements of cheap rice and cooking oil, reduced
transportation fares, and lower utility prices through
state-owned JIRAMA. The IMF rep here today described every
economic decision made so far by the HAT as "illegal."


6. (C) Lacking democratic legitimacy or financial means, the
HAT has frequently turned to intimidation when support is
otherwise lacking. Within the military, the current Army
Chief of Staff and other leaders from the March mutiny have
not yet consolidated their power, and retain some
independence from the HAT leadership. Mid-level officers
thought disloyal are quickly sidelined, and no generals have
been entrusted with any leadership positions. In the media,
criticism of the HAT, even from relatively favorable outlets
such as Radio Antsiva, is met with swift denunciation from
HAT Minister of Telecommunications Augustin Andriamananoro;
media outlets report active self-censorship to avoid trouble
with the administration, and several radio stations have been
physically prevented from broadcasting. In local government,
several city mayors have been replaced with HAT-appointed
"Presidents de Delegation Speciale" (PDS); the legal case for
such appointments is as weak now as it was when
then-President Ravalomanana did the same to Rajoelina in
Antananarivo, but the court system cannot effectively deal
with HAT pressure against TIM-party politicians.


TIM, CRN, AND AREMA PLAY THE FIELD
--------------


7. (C) In this context, there is plenty of political space
for the opposition movements of Ravalomanana's TIM, former
President Albert Zafy's CRN, and former President Didier
Ratsiraka's AREMA. The AU and UN's negotiations last weekend
failed when these parties' negotiators couldn't get past the
non-negotiable demands of their respective leaders, leading
to unconfirmed speculation that the next round may take place
between the principals themselves outside of the country
(side-stepping the former leaders' problems about returning

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to Madagascar). AU Envoy Ouedraogo flatly denied today that
discussions between principals outside Madagascar were under
discussion, but the French ambassador suggested privately
that something of this nature may be in the works, possibly
in the Seychelles. The largest grouping of civil society
organizations, the CCOC, is concerned that their supporters
in Madagascar might not buy into any deal they make among
themselves.


8. (C) In the meantime, rumors persist -- and often are
believed here -- that Ravalomanana will return soon (some say
tomorrow, March 18),Pierrot Rajaonarivelo (of AREMA) by next
week, and Ratsiraka himself by Independence Day (June 26);
post has no indication that any of these are well founded.
Further heating up the prevailing bizarre political climate,
Ravalomanana yesterday revealed two April 10 decrees, the
first rescinding his March 17 decree appointing a military
directorate (and thereby allegedly restoring his own
executive powers),and the second naming MFM leader Manandafy
Rakotonirina as his new Prime Minister. His supporters
continue to hold daily rallies on Place de la Democracy, with
occasional marches and sit-ins elsewhere in central
Antananarivo; the Thursday crowd was massive and
well-behaved. His supporters demand the restoration of the
legislative branch, possibly with an enlarged "constituent
assembly", including all members of the former TIM-dominated
parliament. They also call for his legal return to the
county, and all refuse to recognize the HAT's legitimacy.


9. (C) Zafy has widespread support in some of the coastal
regions, although he appears to have backed down on previous
declarations that he was now heading a government of six
newly-autonomous provinces. According to the CCOC, his
supporters do not have any specific non-negotiable demands,
but take issue with the formation of the transition
government and would prefer to start over with a new national
conference and everything back on the table. Ratsiraka's
supporters demand an amnesty for their leader (although he
himself reportedly refuses to request it from a government he
doesn't recognize),as well as the resignation of the HAT.
As for Rajoelina, his own non-negotiables in any
negotiations, thus far, have been that the HAT President
(himself),Prime Minister (Monja),and 41 HAT members keep
their positions, although more members could be added in the
future, to make them more inclusive. All appear to agree on
the idea of some separations of power and judicial
independence, but they fundamentally disagree on the HAT's
continued role, the reinstatement of the parliament, and the
right of Ravalomanana to return as head of state.

MUCH CHANGE, LITTLE PROGRESS
--------------


10. (C) COMMENT: The next 30 days may look much like the past
30: the HAT will continue to struggle to consolidate its
power, opposition groups will grow in strength (and possibly
in number),and a bad fiscal situation will only get worse.
The fundamental disagreements between the four main political
movements will persist as long as each remains more concerned
about their seat at the table -- and opportunities to get
ahead -- than with the substance of managing a transition.
The HAT, meanwhile, do not appear prepared to compromise on
the gains they've already made, even as their popularity --
and thus their leverage -- both weaken. END COMMENT
MARQUARDT