MADAGASCAR: TIME TO REGROUP AFTER TALKS COLLAPSE

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SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MA UN
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: TIME TO REGROUP AFTER TALKS COLLAPSE

REF: APRIL 11 CARTER-MARQUARDT TELCON AND EMAILS

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Classified By: AMBASSADOR NIELS MARQUARDT FOR REASONS 1.4 D AND E.


1. (C) Summary: The collapse of weekend talks facilitated
by the UN and AU between the four main Malagasy political
"families" is being followed by a pause. Clarification of
SADC's current position, especially as regards the possible
return to Madagascar of Marc Ravalomanana, is needed before
any new effort can move ahead. At the same time, former
President Ratsiraka also withdrew his team, with no clarity
on how or whether it might return to the table. Qaddhafi
seems intent on leading the African effort to resolve this
crisis, and clearly is opposed to the UN's involvement; no
one here knows the content of his own recent discussions with
Ravalomanana in Sirte. A Thursday SADC meeting in
Johannesburg may be the next relevant event, where it is
hoped a statement clarifying SADC's March 30 call for a
"return to constitutional order" will be forthcoming.
Efforts are also underway to convince TGV to give up
leadership of the transition authority, which will organize
elections likely to occur before the end of 2009, in exchange
for agreement that he be allowed to run in them. End Summary


2. (C) The ambassadors of the US, France, and South Africa
met on Saturday afternoon and again on Tuesday morning with
AU Envoy Ablasse Ouedraogo and UN Senior Mediator Tiebile
Drame for updates on the AU/UN's joint efforts to foster
dialogue among the four main Malagasy political "families" --
Ravalomanana's TIM, HAT President TGV's group, Ratsiraka's
Arema, and Zafy's CRN. The purpose of this dialogue is to
agree on and sign a "charter for the transition" that would
settle the insittutions and committees needed to bring the
country to elections and divide up leadership positions among
the four families. By Saturday both TIM and Arema had walked
out, under specific instructions from their two leaders. On
Saturday the AU/UN asked for France to pressure Ratsiraka to
send his team back, and for South Africa and/or SADC to do
the same with Ravalomanana, reinforced afterwards with a call
from Washington (ref). Ravalomanana called the South African
ambassador on Sunday from Mbabane to say that not only had he
not been pressured by King Mswati II to rejoin the talks, but
in fact -- he claimed -- the King had told him not/not to
send the team back at all. Indeed, Ravalomanana claimed to
have gotten the same advice last week from Jean Ping in Addis
and from Qaddhafi in Sirte, where he spent several days.
Furthermore, he claimed that Qaddhafi and he jointly had
called Ban Ki-Moon to request the immediate withdrawal of
Drame, claiming that "this is a matter for Africa, not the
UN, to settle," and also suggesting that Drame is "biased
against Ravalomanana" and his return to Madagascar. (Indeed,
Drame has said repeatedly that he does not consider
Ravalomanana's return at this time to be a "factor of
stability" for Madagascar -- a view which Ouedraogo and every
diplomat involved seems to share. This is especially so as
no one can envisage his return without accompanying armed
security, which seems both unrealistic and inflammatory.)


3. (C) For his part, Ouedraogo commented that he had spoken
to Adbou Diouf of the Francophonie, who had told him frankly
that "Ravalomanana is a big liar" and that Diouf refused to
discuss directly with him any more. Apparently both
Presidents Wade of Senegal and ATT of Mali are trying to
reach Ravalomanana in Swaziland to advise him to drop his bid
to return, but neither have been able to get through. The
South African ambassador provided three possible phone
numbers to pass along to them. No one is sure what, in fact,
Mswati or Salamao of SADC, who was also in Mbabane this
weekend, might have said to Ravalomanana. Ambassador
Marquardt advised that additional clarity on the SADC message
remains a necessary prerequisite to any USG call to
Ravalomanana.


4. (C) As for Ratsiraka, he also remains intransigent in
refusing to send his team back. He was called in Neuilly
over the weekend by both "an Elysee advisor" and Drame,
speaking to the latter for two hours. Ratsiraka refusd to do
anything that could be construed as "endorsing the coup
d'etat," and specifically rejected accepting TGV at the head
of the transition authority. Unbelievably, he suggested
returning to Ravalomanana's patently unconstitutional March
17 decree handing power to a military directorate; his aim
became clearer when he then suggested that he, as the highest

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ranking (albeit retired) Malagasy military officer, should
take charge. Drame thought he talked him back from this
position, but Ratsiraka continued to insist that the military
directorate would be preferable to the HAT. Drame also
reported a split between Ratsiraka and Arema former Deputy PM
Pierrot, also exiled in France but clearing planning his
return, who is now demanding a separate place at the
negotiating table for a team representing his interests. For
both Ratsiraka and Pierrot, the question of an amnesty is
critical to reaching any agreement on the way forward, as
only an amnesty will allow them fully to re-enter politics
after their returns here.


5. (C) Therefore, only Albert Zafy's CRN team remains at
the table with the TGV team. Zafy, the only former president
now in Madagascar, probably sees his presence here as a major
advantage, and perhaps, by remaining in the talks, is angling
to be put at the head of the transition if and when TGV steps
aside. Drame is focused on the need for TGV to step down
from that role, as he does not see the UN or the
international community accepting any transition process
leading to elections that is run by TGV. Drame is suggesting
that TGV be convinced to step down from his current role, in
tacit exchange for acceptance that he then be allowed to run
in the election (which would require a constitutional
amendment on age) in which he would have played no
organizational role. The French ambassador, who all along
has advocated a necessary exclusion of those running
elections from running in them (and vice versa),agreed to
"test" that idea with TGV and/or his team. He said he has an
appointment today with "Foreign Minister" Andriamanjato, and
will start there.


6. (C) Drame and Ouedraogo closed the Tuesday meeting with
a summary. He and the AU still think that getting all four
"families" back to the table to agree on a "charter for the
transition" is necessary to start any credible peace or
transition process. Therefore he wants France to keep
working on Ratsiraka, and SADC, with a follow-up call from
the US if the conditions are right, to keep working on
Ravalomanana. He likened the situation to Darfur: "we could
go ahead with fewer than all parties and perhaps get an
agreement, but we will never get peace or move beyond the
crisis if we do." He agreed with ambassadors that the UN and
AU should take a break of several days to let the dust settle
and see what the Malagasy themselves propose, if anything;
there was some agreement that the weekend process had been
forced and that this approach should cease. Ambassador
Marquardt asked the South African ambassador and Drame to
seek more clarity (perhaps from Salamao, whom Drame said he
would call) on what King Mswati -- and any others in SADC --
were actually telling Ravalomanana, and Ouedraogo to attempt
to discern what was the content of Ravalomanana's discussions
with Qaddhafi in Sirte. In reply, Ouedraogo first laughed,
then acknowledged that this is an area of total darkness and
could well be affecting Ravalomanana's thinking in
unrealistic directions. Ouedraogo also said he will
represent the AU at the Thursday SADC meeting in
Johannesburg, which should be followed by a joint SADC/AU
mission here (in which Ouedraogo will be the sole AU
representative). Ouedraogo said he will press SADC to make a
statement clarifying its position on what it means by the
"return to constitutional order" which it called for on March
30: does it mean Ravalomanana should return (as he insists
it does) and that SADC will somehow facilitiate this
happening (how?),or does it mean early elections (as
everyone here hopes it means). Regarding elections, it now
appears that TGV and the HAT have gotten the message from the
international community that they must take place within six
months, by the end of the year at the latest. Indeed, one
fear now is that, if these talks cannot be revived, TGV will
simply forge ahead unilaterally with an election process that
no one will deem credible.
MARQUARDT