Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ANTANANARIVO261
2009-04-08 12:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Antananarivo
Cable title:  

MADAGASCAR: POLITICAL PROCESS MOVING HALTINGLY

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINR MA UN 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2553
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHAN #0261/01 0981259
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 081259Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2309
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEWMFC/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0150
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANTANANARIVO 000261 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MA UN
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: POLITICAL PROCESS MOVING HALTINGLY
FORWARD, AS FAULT LINES EMERGE AMONG PARTNERS

REF: A. ANTAN 258

B. PARIS 505

ANTANANARI 00000261 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: AMBASSADOR NIELS MARQUARDT FOR REASONS 1.4 D AND E

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANTANANARIVO 000261

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/08/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR MA UN
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: POLITICAL PROCESS MOVING HALTINGLY
FORWARD, AS FAULT LINES EMERGE AMONG PARTNERS

REF: A. ANTAN 258

B. PARIS 505

ANTANANARI 00000261 001.2 OF 003


Classified By: AMBASSADOR NIELS MARQUARDT FOR REASONS 1.4 D AND E


1. (C) Summary: Malagasy political and civil society
actors are moving haltingly forward toward a grand national
dialogue, using separate but somewhat parallel processes that
all attempt to address the same major questions before
Madagascar: political reconciliation, constitutional reform,
electoral reform, a new political parties law, a statute for
former heads of state, resolution of the status of exilees
from the 2001-2002 crisis, and -- most importantly -- a
timetable for new elections, on every level, to bring
Madagascar back to constitutional order. The UN and AU
special envoys are leading separate but -- so far -- poorly
coordinated efforts to bring the various Malagasy processes
into some harmony; this disconnect, due primarily to
free-lancing on the AU Envoy's part, is an increasing source
of concern both to the Malagasy and to partners. Menawhile,
the French are leading their own effort -- bilaterally, in
their acting role here as rotating EU President, and through
their two proxies, the Francophonie (OIF) and the Commission
on the Indian Ocean (COI) -- which is a second source of
confusion and concern, both to the Malagasy and partners.
Nonetheless, this nascent internationally-led process ---
which may soon feature a formal contact group led by the AU
-- is the best way forward, and the USG should continue to
support and shape it. End Summary

2, (C) The idea of a "national dialogue" of some sort as a
way out of the political crisis here has been on the table
here since early February. It is still seen by both most
Malagasy and most partners as the best and only way forward.
With that in mind, the HAT transition government held a
national meeting ("assise nationale") April 2 - 3 at the
International Conference Center in Ivato to lauch this
process. They organized and held this meeting in direct
defiance of a letter dated March 27 from U/UNSYG Lynn Pascoe
to HAT "foreign Minister" Ny Hasina Andrianamanjato, in which
the UN called for all actions to be undertaken not in a

unilateral manner and only by a neutral party (i.e. not the
HAT),and for all actions to be consensual among the various
Malagasy parties. As the meeting was organized by the HAT
with no input from the opposition, UN Senior Mediator Tiebile
Drame boycotted it, as well as most local embassies.
However, AU Envoy Ablasse Ouedraogo attended the HAT meeting,
as well as most resident AU ambassadors and the Moroccan
ambassador; reportedly Ouedraogo strongly encouraged AU
embassies to be represented. In total, some 800 persons
attended, including a number of serious political players
with no attachment to the HAT. (Septel will report its main
conclusions/recommendations). The TIM party organized its
own "assise" at the Carlton Hotel on April 3, attended mostly
by TIM partisans, as well as Ouedraogo and the Senegalese
ambassador. A number of significant political actors, such
as former president Albert Zafy and his CRN group, attended
neither meeting, and are involved in their own parallel
processes of refelctions, meetings and draft-writing.


3. (C) The ambassadors from the US, EU, France, Germany,
and South Africa, plus the local UN rep, met with Drame for
three hours on April 2 to discuss the way forward. Drame,
who had just returned from two weeks in New York, proposed
formalizing the de facto "contact group" that already exists
here. This group would include the aforementioned, plus
Russia, China, the local Dean (Vatican) and Vice-Dean
(Algeria),Japan and Libya (as current non-permanent UNSC
members),and representatives of the AU, COI, SADC, and OIF.
There was general agreement that this formulation made sense
and would be a useful coordination mechanism going forward.
The absence of AU Envoy Ouedraogo from this meeting (who
regretted at the last minute) -- as well as his much-noted
presence at the HAT assises and his encouragement of AU
members to attend as well -- raised concerns about the
current AU role and the increasing appearance of divisions
within the international community.


4. (C) On April 7, these actors met again, this time with
Ouedraogo present (as well as the Libyan, Russian, and
Chinese ambassadors),to discuss coordination going forward,
and the contact group proposal. There was clear tension

ANTANANARI 00000261 002.2 OF 003


visible between Ouedraogo and Drame as they took turns
describing their separate efforts over recent days to bring
the Malagasy parties together. Ouedraogo seemed to describe
a process intended to bring only the TIM and HAT together,
and Ouedraogo said both parties are prepared to meet and work
together (albeit initially only secretly). For his part,
Drame described a much broader process, and a far greater
range of political actors who need to be included. Drame
reported progress in getting five or six different political
parties engaged (including TIM),noting also that he had met
in Paris on April 1 with former president Ratsiraka to obtain
his -- and Arema political party -- buy-in; other
participants would be civil society, private sector, the
churches, and the military. He noted an increasing (though
still grudging) acceptance among political opponents of the
HAT and of Rajoelina's role as its president -- conditioned,
however, on a credible process leading to free and fair
elections in which the HAT and Rajeolina, as guarantors of
the transition and organizors of the elections, would have to
agree not to participate as candidates. Neither the HAT nor
Rajoelina have yet agreed to this restriction. The French
ambassador stressed the importance of this point, and Drame
read aloud from an AU "charter" document describing this
separation between organizer of and participant in elections
as an important principle within the AU. There was no clear
understanding on when the presidential election could occur,
only agreement that 19 months is too long. The U.S.
ambassador proposed six months as our shared talking point
going forward, but there was no agreement reached.


5. (C) During the April 7 meeting, Ouedraogo announced the
presence of Ravalomanana in Addis and circulated a
"hot-off-the-presses" copy of the AU's April 7 Communique in
which the formation of a contact group was announced. There
was agreement among those present that the Communique was
generally helpful. Ouedraogo said that "Addis will decide"
on the membership of the contact group, which it now appears
the AU will lead. Drame endorsed this idea, saying it was
appropriate for the regional organization, rather than the
UN, to lead such a group. The Libyan ambassador said he
would have to wait for instructions. The French proposed
that the formulation described in para 3 be sent to the AU as
a proposal. As of this writing, there has been no further
word from Addis on its composition.


6. (C) Finally, there remains concern and confusion about
the evolving French role, on many levels, among partners as
well as the Malagasy themselves. The new French ambassador
and DCM are engaged in many direct ways with a government
which France does not (yet) recognize -- and to which he is
not yet formally accredited. He called formally on Prime
Minister Roindefa on Friday, generating much press attention
and the appearance of normal relations, and met today with
"FM" Andriamanjato. Apparently he is not operating under any
restriction vis-a-vis contact with the HAT. In group
discussions in which we or others call for solidarity
vis-a-vis the HAT on such issues as protesting the ongoing
intimidation or persecution of former government officials or
the unjustified and disquieting release of some of the most
notorious criminals (described by the HAT as "political
prisoners", to be subject of septel) in Malagasy prisons, the
French here have been openly skeptical, or simply silent; he
did, however, raise the issue of former officials' travel
restrictions with Andriamanjato today, who told him the list
was no longer valid. The French assistance posture (ref A)
is complacent, and they clearly will try to use their
influence within the EU to extend their policy to the broader
EU after the initial 120-day reflection period. Their
ongoing local leadership of the EU presidency gives them one
more opportunity to engage directly with the HAT; they
promise that the "political dialogue" that the EU will launch
next week with the HAT will be consistent with "contact
group" approach and principles, but it is unlikely to be
perceived that way in public opinion. Additionally, the
likely presence in the contact group of both the COI (which
just decided to send another fact-finding mission here) and
the OIF -- both French proxy organizations -- may
give France no less than three -- four, if you count the EU
-- separate seats at that table.


7. (C) The open question here is: What are the French
trying to do? In the historically anti-French atmosphere of

ANTANANARI 00000261 003.2 OF 003


Madagascar, there are always conspiracy theories and rumors
of dastardly French intentions; they are, indeed, the norm
here. Separating that ambient background noise from what is
really afoot here is therefore not simple. Added to that is
the fact that Ravlalomanana was often strongly anti-French,
as evidenced by his expulsion of their previous ambassador
and his refusal to grant agrement to his proposed successor.
Ravalomanana's famous embrace of the English language, the
U.S. and Germany, and his general opening-up of Madagascar to
the world, as evidenced by his joining SADC and contracts he
assured went anywhere but to France, were seen by many here
as anti-French moves, when in fact they probably were much
more pro-Malagasy, pro-globalization, pro-balance, and
pro-free-market initiatives. (Note that they were also offset
by his continuing interest in the OIF, including lobbying
hard -- and successfully -- to get the 2010 Francophonie
Summit to take place here.) Nonetheless, tongues are wagging
that Rajoelina and the HAT have been financed by French
interests from the start, that the announced departure from
SADC is intended to benefit historical French economic
interests with a return to historic monopolies and autarky,
that the Education Minister's abrupt cancellation of
Ravalomanana's education reform initiative was motivated by a
desire to return to French-language instruction (rather than
Malagasy),etc, etc. So, while much of this perception
surely goes too far, it does seem clear that France is quite
prepared to resume business-as-usual with the new authorities
as soon as possible, if indeed they are not already doing so.
It is also likely that many French economic interests will
be pleased to see their historic advantages and access
restored, and that many of them are reaching into thQr
pockets to support this outcome. (Note: local Karana --
Indo-Qtani -- economic interests are clearly doing the
same.) With over 20,000 citizens on the ground here, the
French can say with truth that they have important interests
to protect here and thus have to be "pragmatic." The danger
for the French -- and for any who follow their lead -- is
that the HAT and its president will probably prove
exceedingly ephemeral, and that whatever regime follows will
have a very long memory about how easily and quickly France
abandoned basic principles in the name of that pragmatism.

Comment on the way forward
--------------


8. (C) For the U.S., sticking to our principles, keeping
our distance from the unrecognized, illegitimate HAT, and
supporting an international process leading to early
elections (even one led -- peferably more steadily, once the
contact group is in place -- by the AU) is the only real way
forward toward elections. Unlike the French, we are
unencumbered by a multiplicity of conflicting interests that
might compromise our basic principles. When we have
opportunities to speak to the French, such as next week when
Bruno Joubert reportly will call in Washington, we should be
frank about where our approaches and analysis differ, and
why. Here in Tana, we are very skeptical about the HAT and
Rajoelina having any staying power, or significant prospects
for success; therefore putting too many eggs in the basket of
HAT success would seem to us an enormous longer-term risk for
any partner to be taking, let alone one with so much to lose.
(And helping the HAT too much, and thereby contributing --
deliberately or not -- to their future political success,
also strikes us as wrong-headed and improper.) The French
here argue that partners need to "help the Malagasy people,"
and that cutting aid programs will only contribute to
instability and disorder. From our perspective, it is
important to maintain as much as possible of our assistance,
in order not to contribute to instability, while sending a
clear mesage to the HAT that we can have no direct
involvement with or through them on the programs we will
continue until there are free and fair presidential
elections, as soon as possible. We should continue to insist
on six months for this to occur, recognizing among ourselves
that it might take until the end of 2009 for all the
practical steps prior to elections to be completed. The
French are already strong partners in sending that message,
even as they fail to imply any consequences whatsoever for
not complying. End comment.
MARQUARDT