MADAGASCAR: UN, AU, AND SADC ROLES, GOING FORWARD

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANTANANARIVO 000217


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/26/2014
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MA UN
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: UN, AU, AND SADC ROLES, GOING FORWARD

Classified By: AMBASSADOR NIELS MARQUARDT FOR REASONS 1.4 D AND E


1. (C) Summary: The UN, SADC, and AU are working to
coordinate and harmonize next steps in resolving the
Madagascar crisis. Elections within six months are their
shared goal. SADC says it will not seat Ravalomanana at the
upcoming SADC Summit, but TGV -- perceiving SADC bias in
favor of his predecessor -- may be contemplating a formal
withdrawal from SADC. The High Court (HCC) told SADC that it
deliberately took a political decision "in the supreme
interest of the nation" when it falsely declared the March 17
decrees to be constitutional, asserting that it did so under
no/no duress. The AU distinguishes between the cases of
Mauritania and Madagascar, seeing no "taking of power by
force" here. The AU has "suggested" that Madagascar withdraw
its offer to host the July Summit here. End Summary.


2. (C) Ambassadors/DCMs met for two hours on Thursday
morning for briefings by AU Special Envoy Ablasse Ouedraogo
(former Burkinabe foreign minister) and South African
ambassador and remaining members of SADC delegation whose
leadership (SADC ExecSec Tomas Salamao and the Swazi and
Mozambiquan foreign ministers) departed Wednesday. Dipcorps
attendence is waning both in level and number, as crisis
fatigue (and a certain annoyance in certain quarters with the
AU and SADC roles) apparently is setting in. Ambassador
Marquardt was present throughout, many ambassadors (including
the French) were represented by their DCMs, and the Germans,
Algerians, Senegalese, and Moroccans were absent. The
purpose was to report on the AU mission, which is now in its
third week, and the SADC mission that came this week.


3. (C) The UN systems coordinator (UNDP Rep Xavier Leus) was
present and circulated a copy of a March 25 dipnote
adddressed to UNSYG Ban Ki-Moon from the new foreign minister
informing the UN of the April 2-3 national meeting ("assise
nationale") at which decisions will be reached on the
following issues: 1) a calendar for elaborating a new
constitution, electoral reform, political parties law,
opposition statute, statute on former heads of state, and a
law on communications; 2) defining how this work will be
accomplished and launching a national reconciliation; 3)
setting dates for a large national conference to do the work
listed in (1) above; and 4) a calendar for presidential,
senatorial, legislative, regional, and local elections. Dr.
Leus told the embassador that he had advised the new foreign
minister to consider a second dipnote explicitly requesting
UNSYG involvement in these matters, if so desired; otherwise
the UN would not step forward, he said. Senior Mediator
Tiebile Drame appears willing to return as soon as possible,
if invited, he said.


4. (C) The readout from the SADC mission consisted of
reports on their meetings with HAT President Andry TGV
Rajoelina, parliamentarians, the entire High Constitutional
Court (HCC),and foreign minister Ny Hasina Andriamanjato.
Rajoelina received them in presence of Andriamanjato and
legal advisor Norbert Lala Ratsirihonona, but unlike
diplomats' last meeting with TGV on March 19, only TGV spoke
-- albeit reading from a prepared text. TGV said his task is
to lead the country to elections within 24 months, less time
if possible. SADC wants this done within six months -- but
the South African hinted without elaboration that SADC may
accept that this may not be feasible. TGV warned that "SADC
should not complicate things here" and said that "we will
announce an important decision vis-a-vis SADC" on Thursday
afternoon. The South African ambassador suggested this might
portend that TGV will announce Madagascar's intention to
withdraw from SADC, as a blocking move against the perception
here that Ravalomanana is cozying up to SADC (and/or vice
versa) and that he may even be seated or otherwise
accommodated at the upcoming Summit in Swaziland. (Note:
The pro-TGV press is having a field-day assailing King
Mswati's democratic credentials and, through this tack,
SADC's credibility as a guarantor of anything but protection
for those in power, including Mugabe.)


5. (C) TGV explained to the SADC delegation that
Madagascar's entry into SADC five years ago was motivated by
Ravalomanana's personal desire for commercial advantage for
his company Tiko, which was unfair to other Malagasy
companies. Dr. Leus commented that some of the "old" (read
French) companies in Madagascar had enjoyed their
long-standing market positions before Ravalomanana arrived
and thus recently had supported TGV and were probably
advising the new team to revert to the status quo ante of
high tariff walls and other protections that favored them.
The South African noted that SADC withdrawal would, in any
case, only become effective one year after notification.
There was also an open question whether SADC would act on a
withdrawal notice coming from a government not recognized by
SADC. The scenario of Ravalomanana appearing at the upcoming
summit was discussed; Ouedraogo said that Salamao had told
him privately that it was "out of the question" for
Ravalomanana, who in SADC eyes voluntarily resigned, to be
seated.


6. (C) The HCC, for their parts, told SADC that they had
"consciously taken a political rather than a legal decision"
in ruling that both of last week's decrees -- one signed by
Ravalomanana, the other by the ephemeral military directorate
-- were constitutional. The HCC acknowledged that in no way
were these decrees constitutional, frankly described the
dilemma they faced in making a legal vs. a practical
decision, and said that in the end they opted for the course
that best protected "the supreme interest of the nation."
They advised SADC, for the good of Madagascar, not to
challenge these decisions. They also said that they had
not/not made their decisions under duress, but repeated their
deep conviction that their actions were in the best interest
of peace and reconciliation for the nation's people. They
asked for understanding that they had been given a situation
they they did not feel competent to handle. "Fire is easier
to start than to extinguish," they reportedly concluded.


7. (C) The AU's Ouedraogo said he had explained the AU
position to a similar set of audiences (after coordination
with Salamou). He advised the foreign minister to send a
formal note to Addis withdrawing Madagascar's offer to host
the next Summit in July; "this will save us all a lot of
trouble," he said, and allow the AU to select "an alternate
location" (the Libyan ambassador managed not to salivate
visibly at this point). Ouedraogo made reference to press
reports on Qaddhafi's alleged recent phone calls to both TGV
and Ny Hasina but said he was not privy to their content
(again, silence from the Libyan). Ouedraogo said he
explained to his interlocutors recent AU actions vis-a-vis
Mauritania in the wake of the "taking of power by force" that
occurred there. Asked whether the AU sees the two cases in
the same light, Ouedraogo said, "No, while both involved a
clearly unconstitutional transfer of power contrary to the
2000 Lome Declaration and thus triggering similar
consequences, in Madagascar -- unlike in Mauritania -- the AU
is not asserting that power was taken by force." He said
Ravalomanana has alleged in a phone call to Jean Ping that he
had signed his decree on March 17 "with a gun to my head."
However, Ouedraogo said that he simply did not believe this
version of events, and that he was unaware of any evidence of
direct force used to unseat Ravalomanana. He said from his
conversation with the generals on the erstwhile military
directorate before the explosive March 17 meeting at the
Episcopat (which Ouedraogo also attended) that the generals
had made it clear to him that they did not wish to retain
power and were prepared to pass it immediately "to whomever";
force therefore had not been part of their decision to do so
several hours later, he concluded.

MARQUARDT