MADAGASCAR: ELECTIONS WITHIN SIX MONTHS?

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANTANANARIVO 000201


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MA UN
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: ELECTIONS WITHIN SIX MONTHS?

REF: ANTANANARIVO 195 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: AMBASSADOR NIELS MARQUARDT FOR REASONS 1.4 D AND E.


1. (C) Summary: The St. Paddy's Day coup here ended the
initial phase of Madagascar's political crisis, but the
crisis itself is far from over; months of instability, often
mascarading as normalcy, probably lie ahead for the
long-suffering people of this extremely poor nation. In the
wake of the coup, Madagascar now has a young, untested, and
naive leader who enjoys unreliable support from those who
pushed him forward, and almost no support or even familiarity
beyond the capital; his ability to retain the reins of power
is uncertain, especially as his odds of success are low. The
military is now fractured horizontally and especially
vertically, with virtually all flag officers removed from
power under extreme intimidation from armed enlisted men,
often literally at the point of a gun; colonels remain in
tenuous charge of those benaeth them. The media is being
intimidated by the same armed men not to report accurately on
current reality. The Malagasy opposition, never even
nominally united, can be expected to splinter further in line
with their various regional, ethnic, religious, economic
interests -- and the highly personalized interests of their
leaders. The economy is in free fall, unemployment is high
and rising, and the consequences of the global condemnation
of Madagascar will only worsen these trends. And, as if this
were not already enough, former President Ravalomanana and
his supporters appear to be regrouping for an attempted
reconquest of the power he dramatically lost one week ago --
already broadcasting via short wave, organizing rallies where
TGV did the same just days ago, and claiming that he did not
actually resign.

2, (C) However, the broad outlines of a resolution to the
crisis were already on the table before the coup: national
dialogue, followed by a referendum on constitutional
amendment, electoral reform, a new political parties law, new
statutes to cover the opposition and their access to media
(and perhaps a few other changes),culminating in elections.
This outline remains sound, and much of it was embraced in
positive terms by TGV in his "installment" address on
Saturday. To be sure, the new regime's insistence on a
24-month timetable to accomplish this agenda is unnecessarily
long -- six months ought to suffice, if there is true
political will -- and one can hope that they might accelerate
their pace as they start to understand the further negative
consequences of not doing so. The UN role going forward
remains uncertain -- the UN has not yet been invited back,
and the misperception of some sort of UN/international
complicity in Ravalomanana's own unconstitutional transfer of
power to a military directorate may not bode well for their
return. On the other hand, both SADC and the AU are still
engaged and might usefully pick up where the UN left off if
it comes to that. This still leaves the question: is there
any will on the part of the new leadership to move quickly to
elections that might not leave them in charge?


3. (C) Ravalomanana's final days were obviously a roller
coaster ride with extreme highs and lows. Poorly advised and
increasily isolated, he was consistently weeks behind in
perceiving accurately the state of affairs, and the extent of
his power, beyond his remote palace walls. Periodic weak
showings by TGV supporters at the public square were
translated to him as lost steam. Even after the military
mutinied on March 8 and its chain of command broke down
completely, Ravalomanana appeared to continue to harbor
illusions about surviving in power. By March 13 he was
asking me about refuge in my residence and asylum in the
U.S., only to change his mind hours later. The ill-advised
public defection of Jacques Sylla on March 14 deprived
Madagascar of the one unique figure who might have held
together a constitutional solution: Ravalomanana's fury at
Sylla's disloyalty -- combined with his stubborn refusal to
give TGV power or make life easy for him after he got it --
is likely a major reason for his opting for a patently
unconstitutional ordinance creating a military directorate.
(An unanswered question here is what Sylla was thinking when
he committed political suicide in this manner.)


4. (C) With his directorate, Ravalomanana lit a stink bomb
before slipping out the palace door; when we asked why this
approach, his reply -- "it's not my problem anymore" --
sounded a lot like "apres moi, le deluge." His
after-the-fact assertion that the military directly coerced
him into this course of option (Antan 195) does not hold up
to even simple scrutiny: there were no signs of military
having entered the palace on March 17 when I and others last
saw him there, and the palace gates at that point were
blocked by crowds of his supporters. Additionally, if it was
a coerced act, why would the coercers have permitted him to
sign a document that they angrily repudiated immediately
afterwards when diplomats informed them of his act? While of
course military pressure indirectly contributed to his
departure, it is far more likely that Ravalomanana signed his
ordinance intentionally to leave an unconstitutional,
ungovernable situation in his wake. Now he can watch TGV
flail, and eventually fail. His calls to me and others on
March 20 claiming "I did not resign" may set the stage for
him next to claim that he remains the legitimate President of
Madagascar, perhaps even showing up at the next SADC Summit.
Already, he and his partisans have begun rallies on the
public square here and have started short-wave political
broadcasts to Madagascar.


5. (C) For his part, TGV saw the chance to seize power, and
no further need to negotiate a solution, share power, be
patient, inclusive, or peaceful. The dramatic meeting at the
Episcopat on the afternoon of March 17, when UN mediator read
aloud Ravalomanana's ordinance, could have been the occasion
for a negotiated solution of some sort. Instead, TGV angrily
ordered the generals hauled off and detained while the
opportunistic former Prime Minister Norbert Lala
Ratsirihonona drafted a second unconstitutional ordinance for
their signatures, transferring power to TGV. The hapless
generals and admiral would gladly have signed anything
passing the hot potato of power away from themselves; force
clearly was not necessary, but it massively evident as all
this occurred. Even Ravalomanana's pastor, president of the
FJKM Church, was hauled away from the Episcopat by force,
beaten, forced to drink his own urine, and released the
following day.


6. (C) TGV's first acts as President of the High Authority
of the Transition (HAT) suspended the parliament, confirmed
his previously-named government in power (rather than
creating any pretense of opening or inclusion),and announced
a long, 24-month timetable before elections (septel). His
Saturday "installation" speech struck a more conciliatory
tone, especially vis-a-vis the invited but absent diplomatic
corps, but TGV has demonstrated all along an inability to
follow his words with consistent actions. He, like many
Malagasy, seems to think that the world will conform to
Madagascar's peculiarities and lack of attachment to
principles, rather than Madagascar conforming to universal
principles or the rules of the AU, SADC, or the UN which
Madagascar has voluntarily accepted.


7. (C) The way out for Madagascar is nonetheless clear:
move quickly to elections. The weeks of FFKM- and
UN-faciliated mediation that preceded the coup left some
consensus on the table about the possibility of doing this on
an accelerated timetable of perhaps six months. There was
already apparent agreement that national daigloue, a
referendum amending the constitution, a change in the
electoral code, a new political parties law, one new statute
for the opposition and another assuring equitable access to
media were necessary pre-conditions to elections, but all
that was still seen as possible within a packed six-month
period -- if the political will were present. The suspension
of parliament raises new questions about how all that could
be accomplished, and therefore was a distinctly negative
move. The UN may or may not be invited back -- the March 17
events gave some the false impression that the UN and/or
international community had some role in lighting
Ravalomanana's stink bomb. Nonetheless, the AU and SADC are
both still present and engaged here and could carry forth the
process with or without support from the UN.


8. (C) Tana, meanwhile, shows many outward signs of
returning to normalcy. Traffic is worse than ever, some
looted stores are re-opening, the curfew was lifted on
Saturday, and there have been no major insecurity events in
the city since the transfer of power. However, this outward
calm is offset by many disconcerting indications that it is
but a facade. Heavily-armed soldiers are omnipresent. The
military command structure is broken. Flag officers,
sometimes literally at gunpoint, have been sent packing and
do not know what will come nextm while those that remain in
nominal charge have no power. There are already reports of
looting by uniformed military, kidnappings, extortion, and
other forms of opportunistic exploitation of their arms.
Journalists say they are being threatened not to run stories
unfavorable to the regime. Intimidation is being widely
practiced to keep people quiet, under control, and/or
on-message. Especially former officials in the Ravalomanana
government continue to report threats against them. A truck
full of soldiers drove by the pro-Ravalomanana rally on
Monday and fired warning shots. Local officials affiliated
with the TIM party are being replaced, forcibly as needed.
The release of "political prisoners" announced last weekend
included some notorious criminals, now under house arrest but
perhaps soon to be liberated entirely. This climate of
violence and intimidation is a major concern to the entire
international community going forward.


9. (C) Finally, the French. Following Sarkozy's words on
Friday calling the coup a coup, the French here seem
determined to minimize the consequences of what has happened.
While agreeing with us on the need to move quickly to
elections, their brand-new ambassador Jean-Marc Chataigner
appealed yesterday to the SADC Troika delegation not to move
toward sanctions, calling them "part of the problem not the
solution." (The SADC ministers, for their parts, stressed
that sanctions are a last resort, not something they hope to
employ.) Chataigner is making clear here that the French
have no intention to suspend any aid or other program here;
he implied privately that they will seek to delay and/or
mitigate any EU actions in this regard. A French embassy
security meeting today characterized things as "settling
down" and "returning to normal". In this regard, the French
are outliers, as most of the resident diplomatic community
sees this crisis, as we do, as far from over.


MARQUARDT