Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ANTANANARIVO166
2009-03-12 10:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Antananarivo
Cable title:  

MADAGASCAR: RAVALOMANANA HANGING ON BY A THREAD

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR MA UN 
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O 121045Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2188
INFO AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
CJTF HOA PRIORITY
DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 
NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANTANANARIVO 000166 


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MA UN
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: RAVALOMANANA HANGING ON BY A THREAD

Classified By: Ambassador Niels Marquardt for reasons 1.4 d and e

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANTANANARIVO 000166


E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MA UN
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: RAVALOMANANA HANGING ON BY A THREAD

Classified By: Ambassador Niels Marquardt for reasons 1.4 d and e


1. (C) Summary. The political situation in Madagascar is
more fuild than ever after the Wednesday take-over of the
military command structure by "the Colonels", but the
crumbling security situation appears to have settled down in
Tana -- at least for now -- as a result of their move. I
have met in the past 24 hours separately with the President,
Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, TGV and his team, the
President of the National Assembly, UN mediator Drame,
various other ministers, and today with the Colonels
themselves. The Colonels swore they took over the military
command only to restore order and the cohesion of the
military, and to help the country find a political solution
to its crisis; they blamed the President for giving
"political orders" but said they still owe their allegiance
to the President and the Constitution. At the same time,
there is currently huge momentum against the President, who
is increasingly desperate and who many think will have to
resign if he wants to stay alive, in Madagascar, and/or in
possession of his business and personal empire. The GOM may
be about to fracture with ministers weary of ongoing
death-threats again saying privately that they will resign;
this time it looks credible. The NCC (now called "assises
nationales" here) were postponed from their scheduled launch
today but the Colonels say they want this dialogue to take
place and that they will issue a declaration to that effect
later today after meeting with their brethren from the police
and gendarmerie. The elements may soon be present for the
NCC to start within the next few days, but there is also
great urgency to do it before other dynamics (including the
possibility of other military elements) kick in. End Summary.


2. (C) "The Colonels": I met today with the new Armed
Forces Chief of Staff Col. Andre, his deputy Col Noel, and
two other colonels, in company of five other chiefs of
mission. We requested the meeting to make three points, on
the importance of respecting the constitution, of resoring
order (including protecting foreigners),and of assuring that
the NCC gets launched as soon as possible to begin the
process of finding a consensus political solution. Col.

Andre was reassuring on all points. He explained that they
had ousted the general officers who were too ready to take
"political orders" from the President and thus had caused
them to kill civilians, and created untenable tensions within
the corps itself. Their priorities were to restore public
order and cohesion within the ranks. Andre said that "the
military has no role in politics." I asked him about the
concept of civilian control of the military in the current
odd situation, with no Defense Minister in place following
the (forced) resignation on Tuesday of the previous
incumbent. Col. Noel responded that the President, whose
portrait remains hanging above Andre's desk, is still in
charge and that they respect the constitution; he said "we
are not here to make a coup d'etat." Andre said they would
meet immediately after the ambassadors with the top brass in
the police and gendarmerie to ensure that all three forces
were cohesive and effective in their shared mission. They
said "we are not for or against any politician; that is not
our affair;" they specifically denied being "pro-TGV."
Regarding the NCC they said they have two roles: one, to
ensure sufficient security for it to take place (one reason
for its postponement yesterday was threats that the hotel in
which it would take place would be burned, causing it to
close and be barricaded); and two, to play a coinstructive
role at the table themselves (there was always envisaged
places for the army, police, and gendarmerie).


3. (C) The President: Ravalomanana was pleasantly desperate
in our half-hour meeting yesterday. He suggested forming a
new government, with Jacques Sylla at its head. I said that
would work only it that was the consensus of the NCC, but not
as a unilateral gesture; he seemed to agree. He asked for US
help and I told him, in any case, that the entire dipcorps
was about to issue a statement highly supportive of the NCCC
(and implicitly critical of any who would boycott or delay
it). He welcomed this; the statement was issued several
hours later. I told him he has a serious trust problem
vis-a-vis his own population: his newly conciliatory Tuesday
speech was a great first step and struck the right tone, but
people would be looking for follow-through to be convinced he
is sincere. Ravalomanana disparaged TGV, asking me -- when I
said I had just come from a meeting with TGV -- "is he still
on drugs?" He bemoaned TGV's unreliability (and had a
point),but I said both sides have been hard to deal with.

Later last night, Ravalomanana called one of his ministers in
my presence (he knew we were meeting) to insist that the USG
issue an immediate statement endorsing the notion of the NCC
going forward even without the opposition if they chose not
to come; he said he would come alone if need be. I explained
that we ambassadors had just done a supportive statement with
many of the elements he wants, and that I had also given an
interview on leaving the palace that did the same; I was not
in favor of another statement, even if one could be generated
(which was not possible) in the short time before the
scheduled start this morning. (Ambassador Radifera has
called repeatedly from Washington this morning to insist
further on this point.) The minister also told me
Ravalomanana was "ready to make huge concessions," including
accepting TGV's "Prime Minister" Monja as the new prime
minister if that is what they wanted. All this took place in
the context of an unpleasant situation at the airport during
which the President's children were unable to leave the
country and even the President's aircraft was in uncertain
hands, which surely was also weighing on his mind. They
departed Madagascar this morning.


4. (C) Sylla and the UN: Several ambassadors met at the
CMR this morning with Sylla and UN mediator Drame, to compare
notes. Sylla had met the Colonels yesterday and found them
in a hurry and eager for the President to resign. (To us
today, only the former was evident.) He observed that the
momentum has shifted strongly in the opposition's favor, with
90 percent of the military now ill-disposed to Ravalomanana,
and evidently demanding his departure or resignation or both.
They were also unclear on what would happen if the President
were to depart and/or resign. Drame was most concerned about
the Colonels' attitude to the NCC, which was unclear when
they met yesterday night with him in a separate meeting.
Without Sylla present, ambassadors and Drame again asked
aloud whether there is any will on the TGV side to negotiate,
when they might get the whole enchilada without doing so (and
less of it if they do)? Nonetheless, there was agreement --
later confirmed by the Colonels -- that the NCC will be
necessary to put Madagascar back together again politically,
whatever else may or may not happen while waiting for it to
start.


5. (C) The Ministers: The GOM appears almost not to exist
at the moment. The Prime Minister and Foreign Minister
received ambassadors at our request on Tuesday and Wednesday
and were focused, appropriately, on restoring security and
hearing our security concerns. Beyond that, however, the two
retired generals were at pains to explain how the current
military structure would work, with a self-proclaimed colonel
now in charge of the armed forces, all generals sidelined,
reporting to a vacant defense minister position, not taking
orders from the President, etc. The Prime Minister
nonetheless seemed to accept the Colonels' presence and role
and showed little discomfort with the obvious success of
their mutiny; clearly this is not a coup from their
perspective either. Other ministers, meanwhile, are in
disarray. Many fear for their lives and sleep every night in
different locations, openly expressing their fear of being
killed. Today seems calmer than yesterday but the fear is
still palpable. Resignations are likely to start today
unless something changes fast.


6. (C) And TGV: TGV remains under French physical
protection on their compound, as well as under UN "moral"
protection. In any case, the President made public -- and
reaffirmed to me -- his intention not to arrest TGV or his
team while negotiations continue. TGV has moved somewhat
about Tana, always in diplomatic vehicles, to attend meetings
on neutral grounds. The French are providing a follow car
with bodyguards; his movement yesterday allowed the Quai to
say, truthfully, "at this moment he is not chez nous." TGV's
team explained to us yesterday that more work needs to be
done on NCC preparations before they will agree to attend,
providing a list of four or five points that need prior
resolution. Ambassadors are convinced these are mere
delaying tactics as they, too, seem to have their eyes on
Ravalomanana's resignation more than the NCC (or at least
beforehand). Nonetheless, through the UN and FFKM Church
Council and certain bilateral efforts, we continue to try to
address their stated conditions for starting the NCC.
Ravalomanana gave them media access and unjammed radio Viva
yesterday, meeting two of them; there are still open
questions about "mercenaries" on Malagasy soil, the Tana
mayor situation, and releasing certain "political prisoners."
Ravalomanna told me yesterday he would make further
concessions at the round table, but not before.


7. (C) Comment: We are still on a seesaw here: one minute
it looks like the NCC will begin and perhaps start to end
this crisis, and the next it appears quite otherwise. Today,
indications are that Ravalomanana's tenure could end within
days, or even hours, despite all our collective insistence on
a constitutional solution and reiteration of the consequences
if there isn't one. In fact, his resignation would solve
nothing in the short term as the next-in-line is a political
and business crony, Senator President Yvan, followed by the
current Prime Minister, who would be equally unacceptable.
However, Ravalomanana currently seems desperate enough to try
to save his skin by dissolving the government and
precipitously naming another: I passed the message back to
him again today that this also would not work as the solution
must be consensual, not unilateral. (This is especially true
if he were unilaterally to name Sylla, who already served as
his Prime Minister for five years and who would not be seen
as new or neutral; however, Sylla does still stand a chance
of being named as the consensus canditate, mainly because
there are so few "cotier" heavyweights among whom to choose.)
Somehow, the Malagasy still must find a constitutional way
through to the NCC. A strong statement from Washington along
the lines proposed on Tuesday could still be helpful.

MARQUARDT