MADAGASCAR: NOW FOR THE HARD PART

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANTANANARIVO 000123

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2014
TAGS: MA PGOV PREL PINR
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: NOW FOR THE HARD PART

REF: ANTAN 113 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Niels Marquardt for reasons 1.4 d and e


1. (C) Summary/Action Request: Saturday's welcome meeting
between Ravalomanana and "TGV" provides the first light at
the end of the tunnel since this crisis became deadly one
month ago. The truly heavy lifting starts now, as
Ravalomanana will have to accept a difficult and personally
unpleasant transition from Madagascar's unquestioned top dog
to a figurehead presiding over a transition to a very
uncertain future for himself. The need for a dedicated UN
Envoy to guide this process -- and especially to keep
Ravalomanana on track -- is greater than ever, so I
appreciate everything the Department and USUN is doing to
support the UNSYG in naming and dispatching one here as soon
as possible. End Summary/Action Request.


2. (C) Saturday's welcome meeting under FFKM Church Council
auspices between President Ravalomanana and ex-Mayor Andry
"TGV" Rajoelina came just as hope was evaporating for any
dialogue. Key chiefs of mission, meeting late on Friday
afternoon, were unanimous in their assessments that dialogue
was dead, as the President's conditions and TGV's actions
remained entirely incompatible. (Predictions then were for a
clash of simultaneous TGV and TIM rallies on Saturday, a
TGV-led march on the Presidential Palace at Iavaloha, or
another attempt to take ministries -- all with potentially
disastrous consequences.) Leaving that meeting, I phoned TGV
and then National Assembly President Sylla (Ravalomanana's
lead negotiator) to press them both one last time to agree to
meet. I was particularly harsh on the President's side,
telling Sylla that, in my opinion, failure to meet would mean
that the President did not want to do so, as it was entirely
within his power to make the meeting happen if he really
wanted to. I said this was the last moment for the President
to show decisive leadership, or else be held responsible for
whatever followed. Sylla was taken aback by my bluntness but
said he respected my opinion.


3. (C) The Saturday meeting -- on-again, off-again until it
finally occurred early in the afternoon -- was short on
substance but full of significance, just for having taken
place. The FFKM Communique issued afterwards basically
declared a truce between the two camps to allow further
dialogue and negotiation to occur: no more rallies,
intimidation, provocative statements, speeches, etc. while
the dialogue continues. Ravalomanana and TGV are expected to
meet again today to start discussing transition arrangements,
on the basis of a draft document negotiated last week between
Sylla's and TGV's teams (draft text provided last week to
AF/E). Ravalomanana in particular will have difficulty
swallowing his much-diminished role under the agreement,
while TGV, for his part, may find it hard to sell anything
less than Ravalomanana's immediate resignation to his most
extreme supporters. In any case, the local mood is now quite
hopeful, on the basis of the initial encounter and the
promise of more dialogue.


4. (C) The need for a dedicated, high-level UN Envoy is now
greater than ever. We understand that UNSYG Ban is
considering a list of candidates, reportedly including Kofi
Annan, to come pick up the work started two weeks ago by
A/UNSYG Haile Menkerios. I feel strongly that sending such a
senior envoy remains necessary, especially to keep the
famously mercurial Ravalomanana from backtracking on or
wiggling out of the process now finally joined. The envoy
needs to be a world figure who can demand access to
Ravalomanana at any moment, and not be subject to his
periodic disappearances at critical moments. As the UN is
already engaged, sticking with them makes sense -- and USG
influence would remain strongest with a UN envoy.


5. (C) There may be initiatives from either the AU or SADC
(or France),but none of which would have the clout and
impartiality that the UN already enjoys here. I understand
in particular that Senegalese President Wade, allegedly on
invitation from "la Francophonie" (and perhaps supported by
the AU),may be willing to engage as mediator here. As his
engagement necessarily would be periodic and limited, I
consider it a distinctly less attractive option than that of
a senior UN Envoy. Indeed, Wade engaged here in 2002 and is
remembered best for two agreements -- "Dakar I" and "Dakar
II" -- which Ravalomanana never implemented. Preferring the
UN, few here want to see what "Dakar III" might look like.

MARQUARDT