MADAGASCAR: A FORK IN THE ROAD?

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANTANANARIVO 000103


E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2014
TAGS: MA PREL PINR PGOV
SUBJECT: MADAGASCAR: A FORK IN THE ROAD?

Classified By: Ambassador Niels Marquardt for reasons 1.4 d and e


1. (C) Summary: Madagascar may be approaching -- this
week, potentially -- a critical fork in the road to its
political future. One way leads through negotiation to a
compromise by which Ravalomanana stays at least nominally in
power, albeit much weakened, while avoiding further blodshed.
The other has the armed forces, convinced that politicians
will not find a way out by themselves, staging a gentle coup
to remove Ravalomanana from office, while also preventing
Andry Rajoelina from acceding to power. Either scenario will
require the enmergence of a respected third force, perhaps to
serve as an interim prime minister with extraordinary powers
delegated from the president. End summary.


2. (C) Monday was another extremely tense day in Tana.
Angry mobs downtown refused to be persuaded by Andry "TGV"
Rajoelina not to follow through on occupying ministries.
Security forces used tear gas, blanks, and rubber bullets to
keep them from doing so, and managed to kill no one in the
process; their clear priority was to avoid further blodshed
at all costs, and they did so masterfully. Security was
restored yesterday as night fell. Today TGV has again
directed his loyalists to sit-in at ministries, causing a
massive show of force which is keeping them at bay as this
message is written.


3. (C) Responding to an initiative from me and my EU
colleague, ambassadors were invited to meet with the
President this morning. Rather than receive a small group
(as we had proposed),Ravalomanana invited every local COM,
for what was no doubt a useful photo op. The ensuing
discussion, nonetheless, was far more open and frank than our
last such session on January 29. He listened carefully, cut
no one off, and declared himself open to dialogue and
concessions, specifically mentioning electoral law reform, a
constitutional revision, revision of the new political party
law, and/or a referendum on his performance. He alluded to
the ongoing negotiation between teams represnting himself and
the mayor -- which I understand would require a new
government led by an empowered prime minister, a
constitutional revision, and early elections -- without
specifically evoking any of these measures.


4. (C) Ravalomanana asked me to contact the mayor, arrange
urgently for a direct dialogue between the two of them, and,
at my request, promised to lift arrest warrants for TGV and
others if TGV would suspend his demonstrations.
Unfortunately, TGV was not at all interested in this
overture. He promised to call me back but never has, and
instead went to the Place du 13 Mai and asked his followers
to take ministries today. He asked them to do so peacefully,
but after yesterday it is unclear that he can still control
them. A TGV-led sit-in is in progress as I write this, and
much of the city center is cordoned off by security forces,
quiet but tense.


5. (C) Our senior contacts within the armed forces and with
many others in the know here suggest that the military is
within just a few days of putting an end to the political
stand-off by intervening itself. No doubt yesterday's tense
situation further persuaded them that the status quo is
untenable and extremely dangerous. The six most senior
officers met the President yesterday and reportedly told him
in blunt terms that their patience is nearly at its limit --
the same message we are hearing ourselves. Indeed, only the
automatic condemnation of the international community and
suspension of most foreign assistance -- which I and others
repeatedly have told all parties would indeed befall
Madagascar if the military takes action -- seem to be
preventing them from doing so already.


6. (C) I conclude that TGV -- who has proven to be
idealistic, emotional, and uncompromising -- may well have
decided that he will accept nothing less than Ravalomanana's
immediate departure. Knowing that he will never get it
through negotiation, he is going for broke with this
confrontational approach. He got a moral boost on February 7
when the President's forces fired on the crowd, and -- while
he vociferously denies this as an objective -- it is clear
that spilt blood strengthens his hand over the President's.
Hence his decision to spurn today's offer.


7. (C) I and the entire international community continue to
push negotiation as the only acceptable solution, stressing
the many advantages of remaining within a constitutional
framework. The military certainly understand those
advantages, and are very reluctant to come across as just
another bunch of African coup-plotters; indeed, rather than
seeking power, they seem to be avoiding it, but they also
feel a strong responsibility to prevent Malagasy from killing
Malagasy. Referring to their choice, AU Envoy Amara Essy
summed up: "Sometimes it's better to have a bad solution
than chaos."


8. (C) With the President apparently willing to negotiate
(within limits; he is certainly not ready to resign) but the
Mayor not, it is unclear what the international community can
do that we are not already doing. We have little leverage
over TGV, beyond these arguments and others we have used over
and over in our many meetings with him. His main advantage
over the President's side comes from his ability to mobilize
crowds, so it is not entirely illogical on his part to be
unwilling to desist. The other imponderable here is what the
President might do unilaterally if he concludes that
negotiations are leading nowhere: he might dissolve the
government, appoint a new one, give a concilliatory speech,
call a national round table, etc. All these steps would be
more effective if they came as part of a negotaited solution,
and they may come across as "too little, too late."
Nonetheless, they are all possibilities at his disposal if
the impasse persists.


9. (C) Looking over the horizon, the question looms as to
who will be running Madagascar in a few weeks (or months) if
not -- or indeed, in addition to -- Ravalomanana? It seems
highly unlikely that TGV will find himself in that role, so
the quest is open for a viable third party. National
Assembly President Sylla is one obvious option, and it seems
that he would be open to it. Another name now in circulation
here is former Vice Prime Minister Zaza Ramandimbiarison, a
World Bank economist who retains high respect. Finally, what
about the National Consultative Conference? The FFKM Church
Council continues to prepare for it, having developed a list
of some 150 essential invitees. Ravalomanana today told us
he was open to a broader dialogue, but including perhaps ten
or twelve parties, not dozens.


MARQUARDT