Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ANKARA960
2009-07-07 04:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:
TURKEY: GETTING PAST "NO" ON NEW NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS
how-toVZCZCXYZ0000 PP RUEHWEB DE RUEHAK #0960 1880458 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 070458Z JUL 09 FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0120 INFO RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0208 RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3874 RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1607 RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000960
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO ISN/DAS ELIOT KANG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2019
TAGS: PREL ENRG KNUC TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: GETTING PAST "NO" ON NEW NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS
GROUP ENRICHMENT GUIDELINES
REF: STATE 53878
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Jeffrey for reason 1.4 (b, d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 000960
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO ISN/DAS ELIOT KANG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2019
TAGS: PREL ENRG KNUC TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: GETTING PAST "NO" ON NEW NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS
GROUP ENRICHMENT GUIDELINES
REF: STATE 53878
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Jeffrey for reason 1.4 (b, d)
1. (C) Summary: Our effort to persuade Turkey to change its
view on supporting a "clean text" of guidelines on enrichment
has continued after the Budapest NSG meeting in early June.
Action Request: See Para. 7. End Summary
2. (C) DCM met with PM Erdogan's foreign policy advisor and
IAEA Board Governor Hakan Fidan on June 23. ISN DAS Eliot
Kang met with MFA Director General (and Turkey's future
permrep to UNVIE) Tomur Bayer on June 30. Pol Mil Counselor
met with MFA Deputy Director General Ahmet Gun on June 29.
All pressed for Turkey to reconsider its stance at the NSG.
3. (C) Turkey's refusal thus far to accept new guidelines at
the Nuclear Suppliers Group on enrichment technology is
shaped largely by three factors:
- its resentment, based largely on nationalist sentiment,
that other states (i.e. India, Argentina and Brazil) which
have not been loyal NATO allies and NPT members for decades
are being granted an exception or an exemption to
prohibitions on transfer of enrichment technology;
- its incomplete policy on how Turkey plans to approach
nuclear energy and whether it would be wise to close any
doors before it develops a coherent policy; and
- lack of leadership at Turkey's Atomic Energy Agency (TAEK).
4. (C) No amount of diplomatic arm-twisting will change
Turkey's stance in the short run (it's been tried). We
suggest that for us to influence Turkey's policy and get
Turkey's support for our goal of new restrictions on the
transfer of enrichment technology, we need to take each of
these factors into account.
5. (C) All of our Turkish interlocutors acknowledged that
Turkey does not yet have a comprehensive policy for how it
will develop nuclear energy generation capacity. Fidan told
DCM that because TAEK Chairman Okay Cakiroglu had wielded
broad authority on this issue before his very recent
retirement, no Turkish officials at the senior policy levels
had even educated themselves on the topic prior to NSA Jones'
call to FM Davutoglu. As MFA Undersecretary Ertugrul Apakan
told the Ambassador, a policy-level visit from Washington to
discuss NSG issues could serve as an action-forcing event to
prompt the inter-agency discussion within the GOT which would
be required before any change in policy could take place.
6. (C) We would welcome a visit by Washington experts
familiar with both the technical and political aspects of
this issue. DDG Ahmet Gun warned, however, that if such a
visit were to take place before the policy review was
complete, the delegation would receive the same fixed answer
Turkey delivered in Budapest: no to articles six and seven.
Gun hoped that the USG would be able to offer Turkey some
sort of political recognition, a way that Turkey could keep a
door open to seek some sort of special status, as it believes
India, Brazil and Argentina now have. Fidan told DCM that
perhaps it would be helpful to weave in some sort of
guarantee that Turkey could be assured of acquiring nuclear
fuel, even if Turkey should forego the right to seek
enrichment technology, perhaps along the lines of the nuclear
fuel bank proposal. All warned that any policy review would
be difficult before the new leadership of TAEK is appointed.
Action Request
--------------
7. (C) We suggest that Washington agencies consider forming a
group of policy and technical experts to visit Ankara. We
recognize that time is short before the next NSG meeting in
September, but caution against sending a group in July or
early August, when the review process will still be
incomplete. An early announcement of a visit to take place
later in August, however, could help force the GOT to begin
its policy review.
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey
JEFFREY
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO ISN/DAS ELIOT KANG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2019
TAGS: PREL ENRG KNUC TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: GETTING PAST "NO" ON NEW NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS
GROUP ENRICHMENT GUIDELINES
REF: STATE 53878
Classified By: Ambassador James F. Jeffrey for reason 1.4 (b, d)
1. (C) Summary: Our effort to persuade Turkey to change its
view on supporting a "clean text" of guidelines on enrichment
has continued after the Budapest NSG meeting in early June.
Action Request: See Para. 7. End Summary
2. (C) DCM met with PM Erdogan's foreign policy advisor and
IAEA Board Governor Hakan Fidan on June 23. ISN DAS Eliot
Kang met with MFA Director General (and Turkey's future
permrep to UNVIE) Tomur Bayer on June 30. Pol Mil Counselor
met with MFA Deputy Director General Ahmet Gun on June 29.
All pressed for Turkey to reconsider its stance at the NSG.
3. (C) Turkey's refusal thus far to accept new guidelines at
the Nuclear Suppliers Group on enrichment technology is
shaped largely by three factors:
- its resentment, based largely on nationalist sentiment,
that other states (i.e. India, Argentina and Brazil) which
have not been loyal NATO allies and NPT members for decades
are being granted an exception or an exemption to
prohibitions on transfer of enrichment technology;
- its incomplete policy on how Turkey plans to approach
nuclear energy and whether it would be wise to close any
doors before it develops a coherent policy; and
- lack of leadership at Turkey's Atomic Energy Agency (TAEK).
4. (C) No amount of diplomatic arm-twisting will change
Turkey's stance in the short run (it's been tried). We
suggest that for us to influence Turkey's policy and get
Turkey's support for our goal of new restrictions on the
transfer of enrichment technology, we need to take each of
these factors into account.
5. (C) All of our Turkish interlocutors acknowledged that
Turkey does not yet have a comprehensive policy for how it
will develop nuclear energy generation capacity. Fidan told
DCM that because TAEK Chairman Okay Cakiroglu had wielded
broad authority on this issue before his very recent
retirement, no Turkish officials at the senior policy levels
had even educated themselves on the topic prior to NSA Jones'
call to FM Davutoglu. As MFA Undersecretary Ertugrul Apakan
told the Ambassador, a policy-level visit from Washington to
discuss NSG issues could serve as an action-forcing event to
prompt the inter-agency discussion within the GOT which would
be required before any change in policy could take place.
6. (C) We would welcome a visit by Washington experts
familiar with both the technical and political aspects of
this issue. DDG Ahmet Gun warned, however, that if such a
visit were to take place before the policy review was
complete, the delegation would receive the same fixed answer
Turkey delivered in Budapest: no to articles six and seven.
Gun hoped that the USG would be able to offer Turkey some
sort of political recognition, a way that Turkey could keep a
door open to seek some sort of special status, as it believes
India, Brazil and Argentina now have. Fidan told DCM that
perhaps it would be helpful to weave in some sort of
guarantee that Turkey could be assured of acquiring nuclear
fuel, even if Turkey should forego the right to seek
enrichment technology, perhaps along the lines of the nuclear
fuel bank proposal. All warned that any policy review would
be difficult before the new leadership of TAEK is appointed.
Action Request
--------------
7. (C) We suggest that Washington agencies consider forming a
group of policy and technical experts to visit Ankara. We
recognize that time is short before the next NSG meeting in
September, but caution against sending a group in July or
early August, when the review process will still be
incomplete. An early announcement of a visit to take place
later in August, however, could help force the GOT to begin
its policy review.
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey
JEFFREY