TURKEY: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE/KEY RESOURCES

S E C R E T ANKARA 000406

SIPDIS

S/CT - SHARRI R. CLARK

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2029
TAGS: PTER PGOV ASEC EFIN ENRG KCIP TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE/KEY RESOURCES

REF: A. 08 ANKARA 332

B. STATE 15113

Classified By: POL Counselor Daniel O'Grady. Reasons: 1.4 (b,d)


1. (S) Ref B cites three items as critical infrastructure/key
resource (CI/KR) elements in Turkey:

-- Metal fabrication machines: small number of Turkish
companies (Durma, Baykal, Ermaksan)
-- Bosphorous Strait
-- Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline


2. (C) Post recommends the first item, "Metal fabrication
machines," be deleted. We are unaware of any metal
fabrication machine plant whose incapacitation would
significantly impact U.S. national security.


3. (S) Post recommends modification of the second item,
"Bosphorous Strait," to read:

"The Turkish Straits, comprised of the Strait of Canakkale
(Dardanelles),the Sea of Marmara and the Istanbul Strait
(Bosphorous Strait)."

Justification for modifying: The Turkish Straits are among
the most hazardous, crowded, difficult to navigate and
potentially dangerous natural waterways in the world. Ships
carrying 143 million metric tons of petroleum products,
including 96 million metric tons of crude oil, transit the
straits every year. The closure or disruption of any of
these critical infrastructures would impede the flow of
significant amounts of crude oil to world markets.


4. (S) Post recommends the third item "Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
pipeline" be modified to read "Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline
and Ceyhan port terminal."

Justification for modifying: Ceyhan port terminal is an
integral part of this critical infrastructure.

Post believes the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and Ceyhan
port terminal may be an active target of terrorist groups.
In August, 2008, a designated terrorist group, the Kurdish
Workers' Party (KGK/PKK),claimed responsibility for an
attack on the eastern section of the pipeline that
temporarily disrupted its flow. The government, however,
asserted the incident was the result of a technical failure.


5. (S) Post also recommends the addition of the following
item: Port of Mersin -- Habur Border Gate transportation
corridor.

Justification for addition: The majority of material
destined for coalition forces in Iraq arrives in Turkey at
the port of Mersin and transits overland to Harbor Border
Gate. Habur Border Gate is the primary Turkey-Iraq border
crossing point. Approximately 135 Operation Iraqi Freedom
sustainment supply trucks per day and 40 percent of the
sustainment fuel for coalition forces cross into Iraq through
Habur Border Gate. Incapacity or destruction of either the
Port of Mersin or Habur Border Gate would impact U.S.
national security interests by degrading our military and
humanitarian efforts in Iraq.


6. (S) The Government of Turkey does not have a specialized
agency responsible for CI/KR security. That task falls to
the Turkish military, law enforcement agencies and
enterprises' own security guards.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

Jeffrey