TURKEY: ROJ-TV STILL A THORN IN DENMARK'S SIDE

S E C R E T ANKARA 000374

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2029
TAGS: PTER PREL DA TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY: ROJ-TV STILL A THORN IN DENMARK'S SIDE

REF: A. 08 ANKARA 1306

B. 07 ANKARA 2992

Classified By: POL Counselor Daniel O'Grady. Reasons: 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary. Turkey's March 9 response to a long-standing
Danish request for concrete, "actionable" information on the
link between PKK and ROJ-TV was inadequate, Danish Ambassador
Vahr complained to us March 11. Turkey has not yet responded
to Denmark's December proposal of formal bilateral
counterterrorism (CT) "action plan." Vahr wonders whether
Ankara's slowness in responding to Danish requests could be
intentional, to keep Denmark as a convenient whipping boy,
and fears closure of the current window of opportunity to
engage high-level Danish law enforcement officials. We agree
that another roundtable bringing Turkish and Danish legal
experts together to examine actual cases could help bridge
the communication gap. End summary.

ROJ-TV: The Thorn in the Side
--------------


2. (C) Danish Ambassador Jesper Vahr described to us March 11
recent Danish counterterrorism (CT) cooperation with Turkey,
including Danish efforts to address the ROJ-TV issue. Turkey
asserts ROJ-TV is affiliated with and supports the PKK (KGK),
but it has not been able to provide Danish authorities with
concrete evidence of the tie between the two that would hold
up in a court of law, Vahr stated. Denmark's inability to
find legal mechanisms to shut-down Kurdish-language
broadcasts from Denmark by ROJ-TV remains the major issue in
the bilateral relationship and the one which occupies more of
his time than any other, Vahr stated.


3. (C) Six months after Denmark's formal request for more
concrete information to support Turkey's allegations that
ROJ-TV is linked to the PKK (and over 10 months after its
initial informal request),Turkey's Ministry of Justice on
March 9 finally provided an 11-page document purporting to
document the connection. Clearly frustrated, Vahr complained
the Turks response was still inadequate; the information
provided would not hold up in a court of law. Despite
several sessions between Turkish and Danish experts, Turkey
still does not seem to "get it." Turkey continues to focus
primarily on ROJ-TV messages, whereas Denmark had explained
it needs to be able to demonstrate that ROJ-TV is either
laundering money that ends up at foundations clearly
affiliated with the PKK or that it has an institutional link
with the terrorist group. Vahr hoped for an opportunity for
Turkish and European legal experts to go over actual cases,
as suggested at the June 2008 roundtable for Turkish and
European prosecutors (Ref a).


4. (S) Vahr reviewed Danish efforts to demonstrate its
good-faith to strengthen bilateral CT cooperation. These
included Danish assistance in investigating a 2006 bombing on
Turkey's southern coast with links to Denmark; provision of
passenger name lists for Copenhagen-Erbil flights involving
Kurdish cash couriers; September 2007 VIP security detail
training of Turkish National Police; an April 2008 visit to
Turkey by Danish State Prosecutors Office and Copenhagen
police officials directly involved with the ROJ-TV case;
January 2009 assistance to Turkey's new witness protection
system; and ongoing cooperation on al Qaeda plots in Denmark
with links to Turkey. Noting that Turkey is in the midst of
restructuring its CT mechanisms, Vahr said he had recently
offered Interior Minister Atalay to share Denmark's
experience establishing a counterterrorism analysis center
two years ago. The Minister was very interested, Vahr
reported.


5. (C) Denmark had also become more forthcoming on formal CT
cooperation, Amb. Vahr stated. When Turkey first proposed a
bilateral CT agreement in December 2007, during inaugural CT
consultations, Denmark was reluctant to sign a "stand alone"
agreement, proposing an MOU instead (Ref b). In December
2008, however, Denmark presented a draft bilateral CT "Action
Plan." MFA Undersecretary Tezcan would be the likely
negotiator on the Turkish side, Vahr opined. To Vahr's
frustration, however, Ankara has not yet responded to the
Danish proposal.

Political Games?
--------------


6. (C) Vahr speculated aloud whether Turkey's slowness in
responding to Denmark's requests, and the thinness of the
material provided, might be part of a deliberate effort to
drag out the ROJ-TV matter, thus retaining Denmark as a
"whipping boy" to be produced and criticized when politically
expedient. As an example, he pointed to a critical letter
sent by PM Erdogan to Danish PM Rasmussen following the
October 2008 PKK attack on a Turkish military outpost in
which 15 soldiers were reported killed. He also wondered how
the ROJ-TV issue would affect Turkey's attitude toward the
NATO Secretary General candidacy of Danish PM Rasmussen.
Vahr was anxious to persuade the Turks to move more quickly
and to maintain the momentum in CT relations begun with the
December 2007 CT consultations and bolstered by the April
2008 Chief Prosecutor's visit. MFA U/S Apakan had visited
Copenhagen February 24 and of course raised ROJ-TV. Now,
Vahr stressed, the two sides had a window of opportunity,
with high-level Danish interest among law enforcement
authorities. He feared Danish interest would wane if Turkey
is not more forthcoming with concrete information. Denmark
has pressing competing priorities, including a growing
domestic gang war. He understood that Turkey had been able
to provide the UK with the information needed to close
PKK-affiliated MED-TV in London in 1999 and did not
understand why they could not do the same for ROJ-TV.

Comment
--------------

7. (C) ROJ-TV continues to dominate Denmark-Turkey
relations. While we understand Danish frustration, Turkey's
"thin" responses may be a matter of inadequate understanding
of Danish legal requirements rather than of deliberately
dragging the issue out. We agree that providing Turkish and
European prosecutors and other legal experts the opportunity
to go over actual cases could prove to be a valuable
mechanism for bridging the gaps in understanding. S/CT PDAS
Schlicher's upcoming visit to Ankara, Copenhagen and other
European capitals could also help facilitate closer
cooperation against the PKK and other terrorist groups.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

Jeffrey