WHY THE AKP'S UNITY MESSAGE MISSES THE MARK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001835

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/27/2019
TAGS: PGOV TU
SUBJECT: WHY THE AKP'S UNITY MESSAGE MISSES THE MARK

REF: ANKARA 1791

Classified By: POL Counselor Daniel O'Grady, for reasons 1.4(b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: While the ruling Justice and Development
Party (AKP) has embarked on a project to seek a better
social, economic and cultural environment for Kurds and other
minorities, the initiative is being driven by the highest
levels of the Party, who seem disinterested in feedback from
the party's central committee, its regional directors or its
grassroots. While it is clear the AKP sees no turning back,
its forward movement is complicated by the lack of a
consultative process both within the party and in Parliament.
End summary.


2. (C) According to prominent members of the ruling Justice
and Development Party (AKP) as well as lower-level
functionaries, the decision to group a number of reforms
together and call them the "National Unity Project" was made
at the highest level of the party, most notably by Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Minister of the Interior
Besir Atalay. The Project was created to show that the GOT
was seeking ways to reach out to the Kurds to improve their
social, economic and cultural situation, while examining how
other minority groups could benefit from this outreach. Yet
although the GOT met with opposition and civil society groups
allegedly to shape its policy, the majority of AKP elected
representatives received no warning that the policy was being
developed, nor instructions on how to promote it.

Battleground Constituencies
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3. (C) This lack of guidance helps explain why the AKP is
struggling in the polls in general, and why this project in
particular has become the easy target of opposition parties
seeking to undermine the AKP. Since MPs and mayors were not
given advance warning that the Government was going to
announce its outreach program for Kurds, they could not
inform the highest levels of the Party about why --
especially in some battleground constituencies -- that might
have negative ramifications, nor could they help to shape the
message or its delivery. In a recent meeting with the
Ambassador, the heads of four polling companies agreed that
the AKP had bungled its messaging and delivery of the
Project. For months the Government had been saying first a
"Kurdish Opening" then a "Democratic Opening" then the
"National Unity Project" was coming, without clearly saying
what was in it, who it was for, or what it would achieve. In
addition, they said the choice of the label "National Unity
Project" was most unfortunate, because the group that
initiated the military coup in 1960 was called the "National
Unity Committee," and this would bring back unfortunate
memories.


4. (C) The Government's rollout of the liberalization of the
use of Kurdish was equally fumbled. Little regulation or
legislation has been passed to protect the use of Kurdish,
which in the past was prohibited in many cases. Rather,
there seems to be an agreement with Minister of Justice
Sadullah Ergin that cases about the use of Kurdish will not
be prosecuted. The possible temporary nature of the change
has unsettled Kurds to the point that they now publicly
reject it as insincere, although they continue to enjoy using
Kurdish.


5. (C) Both with the development and promotion of the
Project, as well as with relaxing the regulations on the use
of Kurdish, AKP MPs could have played a vital role in
informing the party leadership about the risks of taking
those steps, and could have recommended alternate solutions
to ensure the success of the Project. However, the AKP's
command structure does not permit policy formation to benefit
from open discussion. According to Bulent Akarcali, a former
MP (1983-2002) and Minister of Health (1987-1988),and a

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close confidant of PM Erdogan, policy decisions in the GOT
are made by Erdogan, with occasional input from his closest
advisors. According to AKP Vice Chairmen Ekrem Erdem, in
charge of Party Organization, and Reha Denemec, in charge of
Research and Development, the policy message is then passed
down through the AKP party groups at the provincial,
sub-provincial, and local levels. Feedback from these groups
is supposed to go back to headquarters for consideration.
The AKP's "Political Academy" also bases some of its seminars
on the policy prerogatives of the Party leadership, reaching
a limited audience who generally pay a fee to attend its
courses. But there is negligible direct dialogue on the
issues between MPs and the voting public, upon which the
AKP's future depends.

No Details, No Guidance
--------------


6. (C) In the run-up to the November 10-13 debates on the
National Unity Project in parliament, there was no national
effort by elected AKP officials (MPs or mayors) to promote
the project. With no speaking instructions -- indeed with no
guidance whatsoever on what the Project even entailed -- they
were compelled to keep a low profile and let PM Erdogan and
Minister Atalay's statements to the press determine the
reception of the project. Even if an elected official had
wanted to address such a sensitive issue, a public misstep
could have had repercussions from the PM, so it's not
surprising that no one wanted to take the risk. In the
aftermath of the debates, Erdogan summoned around 40 of his
most trusted speakers to visit all 81 provinces in Turkey to
explain the content of the Project and drum up support. But
this effort was too little, too late: public opinion had
already started a downward slide on the Project and the AKP.


7. (C) At the party's semiannual conclave on November 20-22 a
few deputies began to express their frustrations with both
the lack of planning and guidance they had received, and with
the objectives of the Project altogether. Alaattin
Buyukkaya, an MP from Istanbul, said that "while the point of
the opening is clear, where it is going is not obvious." Ali
Riza Alaboyun, an MP from Aksaray, complained that the public
is "getting angry with us." Murat Basesgioglu, a former
Interior Minister, Labor Minister, and five-term MP from
Istanbul, declared openly that "pursuing a policy on national
identity is a mistake." Perhaps if these concerns had been
addressed, the AKP would not be facing its lowest popularity
since 2002. According to Ozgur Guven, a senior staff member
for AKP MP Mevlut Cavugoglu, the situation for MPs in
battleground provinces is worsening: their spouses and
children are being harassed by an electorate that
increasingly sees the AKP as trying to ruin the unity of the
Turkish Republic by giving special treatment to minorities.


8. (C) COMMENT: As the GOT continues to develop its National
Unity Project, the effect on its poll numbers will hinge
largely on its ability to sell the program to the public as
something that is beneficial for Turkey's future. Many
minority groups in Turkey are eager for acceptance, and
challenge the concept that Turkishness means setting aside
cultural heritage. The potential to tap broad support for
addressing the Kurdish issue still exists, but the AKP's
top-down structure for developing and delivering policy
messages is not conducive to a productive dialogue. It bodes
ill for the party's ability to listen to the public to hone
its message into one of real unity.
SILLIMAN

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