Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ANKARA1791
2009-12-16 15:52:00
SECRET
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

AKP'S NATIONAL UNITY PROJECT: UNITING OR DIVIDING?

Tags:  PGOV TU 
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001791 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2019
TAGS: PGOV TU
SUBJECT: AKP'S NATIONAL UNITY PROJECT: UNITING OR DIVIDING?

REF: A. ANKARA 1782

B. ANKARA 1764

C. ANKARA 1755

D. ANKARA 1749

Classified By: POL Counselor Daniel O'Grady, for reasons 1.4(b,d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001791

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2019
TAGS: PGOV TU
SUBJECT: AKP'S NATIONAL UNITY PROJECT: UNITING OR DIVIDING?

REF: A. ANKARA 1782

B. ANKARA 1764

C. ANKARA 1755

D. ANKARA 1749

Classified By: POL Counselor Daniel O'Grady, for reasons 1.4(b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The ruling Justice and Development Party's
(AKP) National Unity Project has encountered many
difficulties, not the least of which is its own lack of
planning and coordination inside the Party for
implementation. As reforms continue to be accredited to the
Project or implemented anew, society is becoming polarized on
the nature of the Project and whether it will have any impact
on improving the situation of Kurds, or any other minority
group. While the AKP is committed to continuing the Project
at all costs, it needs to show that it is doing more than
improvisation, preferably by announcing, passing, and
implementing something related to the Project -- openly. END
SUMMARY.


2. (C) The GOT's journey to reach out to Kurds -- and in so
doing to provide better rights for all minorities -- has gone
down a bumpy road. Early encouragement to start using
Kurdish language openly in public and in political arenas
was popularly accepted by the Kurds, although they criticized
its implementation because it was not within a permanent,
legal framework. The AKP's agreement to receive a group of
Kurdish returnees from Northern Iraq similarly received a hot
and cold reception, with exuberant pro-PKK crowds greeting
the returnees, and incredulous reactions from Turks in the
West, whose anger was further stoked by the media portrayal
of the event. After three months of debate and criticism of
the Project by all sides in the press, with no clear
direction by the AKP to explain or promote it, its
introductory debate parliament degenerated into vitriol and
fisticuffs. A month later, the PKK -- with whom the GOT said
it would not negotiate -- and elements in the Democratic
Society Party (DTP) -- the AKP's most needed ally on the
Project -- put on the brakes and insisted that the AKP use
jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan as its interlocutor with
the Kurds. Subsequently, the Constitutional Court closed the
DTP, and the protests and riots that followed have hardened
nationalists to reject the outreach as treasonous and
separatist, and hardened the PKK to reject the outreach as
politically motivated and insincere.



3. (C) The last four months' roller-coaster of developments
in the Kurdish issue have provided ample reasons for the AKP
to abandon its rhetoric about the National Unity Project.
Despite considerable outreach by the AKP, neither the
opposition parties, civil society organizations, the Kurds,
nor the PKK have changed their misgivings. The DTP's former
members have uniformly turned away from the Project, citing
their need for the GOT to accept Ocalan as an interlocutor
for the Kurds, which the GOT cannot do. The DTP's apparent
successor party, the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) is
likely to carry the same message. If the AKP's falling
approval ratings are any indication, it also now risks losing
electoral support to CHP and MHP in battleground provinces in
parliamentary elections in 2011, because of the public's
unease about the course of the Project. The GOT nevertheless
insists that it will continue the Project at all costs,
because it is "the right thing to do." But the real
motivations behind the Project, and the path to keeping it
alive, do not appear to be taking center stage.


4. (C) Statements made by the GOT back in August about the
need for a non-military solution to the Kurdish problem
clearly show the distinction between wanting to meet the
needs of Kurdish citizens, and wanting to defeat the PKK.
Ocalan reportedly believes the Project was established to
bring about the demise of the PKK. Despite appeals from
Kurds, the PKK, and members of the DTP to stop or reduce
armed confrontation with the PKK while the Project is being

ANKARA 00001791 002 OF 002


implemented, Turkish General Staff Chief General Ilker Basbug
has repeatedly indicated that democratization is part of the
solution to finally defeating Kurdish separatists Basbug's
message is meant to reinforce the idea, in the minds of Kurds
and skeptical Turks alike, that strengthening society leads
to a stronger state. A large portion of the Kurdish
population, however, has been unable to internalize that
argument because many do not trust that the Project's reforms
will last, and see the legal basis for helping defecting PKK
members to gain moderate amnesty and reintegrate into Turkish
society as weak.


5. (C) In order to build a lasting trust with Kurds, and to
address the concerns of opposition supporters that it is
trying to splinter Turkey apart from the inside by
recognizing special rights for minorities, the AKP needs to
open debate on constitutional reform as soon as possible.
Without reforming the constitution to recognize that Turkey
has many minorities, and that the rights to freedom of
expression, religion and association for those minorities are
protected by the constitution, Kurds will not believe the GOT
intends to protect them from attacks because of their
identity. Anything taken as an interim measure will be seen
as an expression of good will, but nothing more. In
addition, laws should be passed that allow these freedoms to
be observed, at the provincial level -- for governors and
mayors' offices. As long as legal protection is not in
place, any gesture that is extended to allow space for the
use of Kurdish (or any other language) will create anxiety
that a future prosecution could still be coming.


6. (C) Finally, the AKP needs to muster the political will to
pass legal reforms that involve rights and protections,
quickly and carefully. At the moment most AKP deputies seem
to support the objectives of the Project, although many are
concerned about how best to proceed in convincing their
constituents to support it. However, as opposition parties
increase their criticism of how the Project is handled (or
mishandled) by the Government, AKP members could become
disenchanted and disinterested. Without appearing to rush
reforms through parliament unduly, the AKP needs to pick a
few good ones, and get started.
Silliman

"Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s
gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"