Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ANKARA1653
2009-11-17 17:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

"DEMOCRATIC OPENING" DEBATE UNDERSCORES RIFTS IN

Tags:  PGOV PINR TU 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001653 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINR TU
SUBJECT: "DEMOCRATIC OPENING" DEBATE UNDERSCORES RIFTS IN
PARLIAMENT

REF: A. ANKARA 1604

B. ANKARA 1514

Classified By: POL Counselor Daniel O'Grady, for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001653

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/17/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINR TU
SUBJECT: "DEMOCRATIC OPENING" DEBATE UNDERSCORES RIFTS IN
PARLIAMENT

REF: A. ANKARA 1604

B. ANKARA 1514

Classified By: POL Counselor Daniel O'Grady, for reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: The Turkish public was captivated by the
unprecedented November 13 Parliamentary debate over the
Justice and Development Party (AKP) government's "Democratic
Opening" initiative. This is the initiative loosely defined
as a set of government policies designed to broaden the scope
of Turkish democracy with an understood goal of reconciling
Turkey's disaffected Kurds with the state, thereby
neutralizing domestic supporters of the terrorist Kurdistan
Worker's Party (PKK). Though stronger on details than
previous announcements, the initiative as presented by MoI
Atalay remains a collection of concrete short-term and vague
long-term aspirations with no firm structure or timeline.
The main opposition parties predictably lambasted the
government for its handling of the issue, and predicted
apocalypse for Turkey if it were to be enacted as the
government envisions. The Kurdish Democratic Society Party
(DTP) offered its support in as moderate a voice as it could
conjure. In contrast to the acrimonious debates on November
10 (held to discuss the agenda for discussing the
Initiative),this round of debates was notable for the air of
solemnity and respect that befits a mature democracy -- at
least until the Prime Minister took the podium. End summary.

At Last, Something Resembling a Plan
--------------


2. (U) Interior Minister Besir Atalay presented the
government's Democratic Opening initiative to Parliament on
November 13, opening official debate on an issue that has
been percolating in the news since the summer. He presented
the initiative as a method of both raising the standards of
democracy in Turkey and eliminating terrorism. He outlined a
number of steps that the AKP has made over its seven-year
tenure, from the lifting of martial law over Turkey's
southeastern provinces and the elimination of state security
courts to ratifying UN conventions on equal rights (such as
for the disabled and for migrants) and the increasing of
punishments for those convicted of committing torture.
Describing the initiative as a "dynamic process with an open

end," he described some of the short-, medium-, and long-term
steps the AKP hopes to accomplish. He highlighted the two
most recent short-term goals: an amendment to an
anti-terrorism law to ensure that children under 18 are tried
in juvenile courts and are not given harsh sentences under
anti-terrorism legislation, and an amended regulation under
Turkey's broadcast laws that would allow 24-hour broadcasts
on television and radio in languages other than Turkish. He
also promised similar changes to come, such as allowing
politicians to conduct election campaigns in languages other
than Turkish.


3. (U) In the medium-term, Atalay proposed two new
administrative bodies. The legislation for founding the
first -- an independent Anti-Discrimination Committee -- is
already underway. The second would remove the Human Rights
Directorate from the Prime Ministry to create an independent
human rights watchdog, a development the government has been
promising for a while. These two organizations would consist
of representatives from universities, bar associations, human
rights organizations, and civil society organizations.
Atalay envisions liaison offices in every district of Turkey
holding roundtables and consultations with citizens to
identify and help resolve cases of discrimination. Atalay
said the government would also ratify the additional protocol
to the UN Convention Against Torture, which would allow
inspection of police detention areas by international
observers. He also claimed that the government would improve
implementation of legislation against hate-crimes and
discrimination, stopping short of calling for hate crime
legislation. Finally, he announced that the government would
create an independent body to handle complaints against law
enforcement officials.


4. (U) In the long-term, Atalay repeated the government's
position in favor of creating a fully democratic civilian
constitution. He noted the sensitivities of the opposition,

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and argued that in so doing, the basic characteristics of the
country would not be touched in revamping the constitution.

Those in Favor...
--------------


5. (SBU) The opposition's reaction to the initiative
proposals was predictable. The DTP and, to a lesser extent,
the small parties in Parliament, pledged support to the
initiative. The Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and
Republican People's Party (CHP) -- who together could
probably block any attempt to amend the constitution, but not
laws or regulations -- were stridently against it, though for
different reasons. DTP Chairman Ahmet Turk described the
initiative as a project of peace that would solidify, rather
than divide, the Turkish nation. He argued that previous
Turkish governments ignored the fact of ethnicity in trying
to solve Turkey's social, economic, and security problems,
which invariably led to failure. Citing historical examples
of state-sanctioned prejudice against Kurds, he claimed that
only a program that works to eliminate such sentiments could
succeed.

...And Those Opposed
--------------


6. (SBU) The MHP and CHP argued against the initiative: the
MHP opposing it on ideology, and the CHP on details of
implementation. MHP Chairman Devlet Bahceli described the
government's project as a "Disintegration Initiative." He
claimed that the government program would create new ethnic
minorities with collective rights, which would feed
separatist sentiments. He stressed that the Turks united
under the Turkish flag, language, and state system precisely
because they wanted to live one among another. Instead of
focusing on ethnic identity, Bahceli argued that the
government should solve Turkey's social problems by capturing
and trying PKK members and lifting the burden of poverty
across the country through development programs. Summing up
his speech, Bahceli argued that the initiative was actually a
plan concocted by "global actors" to lay hands on the water
and oil resources of the Greater Middle East (deliberately
referring to our Greater Middle East Project) using the Kurds
as a proxy.


7. (SBU) CHP's Deniz Baykal took a more balanced approach
before rejecting the initiative. He pointed out that the CHP
had issued a report twenty years ago characterizing Turkey's
Kurdish problem as arising from an insufficiency of
democracy. He enumerated a list of policies that CHP had
called for and noted their similarity to the AKP's
initiative. He argued, however, that the Government was
implementing its policies in cahoots with the PKK. He
pointed to the return of PKK members from Iraq as an example.
He stressed that not only did they return in an atmosphere
of triumph, but they had not laid down their arms as a
condition of returning. He argued that the government was
clearly negotiating with the PKK and, in effect, surrendering
to it, by giving it an apparent triumph without compensation.
Baykal questioned why jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan's
roadmap -- much anticipated during the summer -- has never
been revealed to the public, insinuating that the public
would see too many similarities between it and the initiative
for comfort. He also argued that the government was creating
a state that was not ethnically blind, claiming that though
private broadcasts should be allowed in languages other than
Turkish, the Turkish state had no business opening its own as
it did in January with TRT-6 in Kurdish.

Back to Business As Usual
--------------


8. (C) The final speaker was Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan. Reiterating many of Atalay's arguments, he
criticized the opposition for being out of touch with the
people. He accused them of having little empathy for
families whose villages had been evacuated, whose pastureland
had been appropriated by the state, and whose family members
had died in fighting. He argued that the initiative was not
primarily an anti-terrorism project, or even a project
concerning ethnic differences, but one that promoted

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individualism and democracy. The decorum and respect that
had previously governed in the chamber began to break down as
the PM spoke. As Erdogan increasingly addressed the
opposition directly, hecklers increasingly challenged his
assertions. Upon Erdogan's suggestion that there were
certain people who opposed the initiative because they are
benefiting politically from the unfair status quo, a group of
CHP members left the chamber in protest. (Note:
Surprisingly, MHP -- against whom the criticism was probably
leveled -- stayed until the end of the PM's speech.)

Comment
--------------


9. (C) The initiative -- as presented to Parliament --
reflects both the good and the bad of what we have been
hearing from our contacts since the summer. The plan appears
to be pragmatic, allowing for the government to put forward
new reform proposals as opportunities and the political
atmosphere allow. The short-term goals respond to some of
what the press, parties, and polls suggest the Kurds want.
The points Atalay presented as medium-term goals are actually
already underway. However, although these reforms may appear
positive in theory, Turkey's history is littered with the
creations of ineffective -- or even obstructive -- oversight
bodies. The key to success for the initiative will be
whether there is cooperative implementation with civil
society and independent lawyers to prevent abuse. The AKP's
long-term goal of changing the constitution would be
difficult to meet in the current political atmosphere, but if
the short- and medium-term goals are implemented effectively,
there could be less resistance to constitutional change in
the future.


10. (C) Comment (cont.): That proper Parliamentary decorum
was upheld until nearly the end of the debates is reassuring.
Had the jeering, name-calling, and fighting that dominated
the debate on November 10th continued on the 13th, it would
have presaged the equivalent of a permanent filibuster as the
parties competed to keep rational debate to a minimum. While
Baykal's speech was negative, it was reassuring that the CHP
could entertain good ideas presented well, and lent an air of
potential cooperation. However, the petulant exit from the
chamber by CHP members at a perceived provocation by the PM
suggests that CHP can decide to be disruptive of
parliamentary order when it sees fit. The AKP should not
expect any help from CHP (less so from MHP) on the
initiative, which will make its job of presenting it as a
unifying project and gaining legitimacy for its medium- and
long-term goals that much more difficult.

JEFFREY

"Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s
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