Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ANKARA1644
2009-11-17 08:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

A/S GORDON'S NOVEMBER 12 MEETING WITH U/S

Tags:  PREL PARM MNUC MASS IR TU 
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1236
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
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RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 001644 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2019
TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC MASS IR TU
SUBJECT: A/S GORDON'S NOVEMBER 12 MEETING WITH U/S
SINIRLIOGLU

REF: ANKARA 1626

Classified By: AMB James F. Jeffrey, for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 001644

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2019
TAGS: PREL PARM MNUC MASS IR TU
SUBJECT: A/S GORDON'S NOVEMBER 12 MEETING WITH U/S
SINIRLIOGLU

REF: ANKARA 1626

Classified By: AMB James F. Jeffrey, for reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: MFA Undersecretary Sinirlioglu opened his
November 12 meeting with EUR A/S Gordon by attempting to
recast Erdogan's recent public efforts to deflect
international community criticism of Iran's nuclear program
as an idiosyncratic reaffirmation of NPT principles. Gordon
cautioned that perceptions generated by those statements
could impede Administration efforts to support Turkish
requests in other areas. Sinirlioglu said Armenian
withdrawal from the five occupied Azeri regions (rayon) could
ease Turkish parliamentary ratification of the protocols. He
offered to guarantee to Armenia that Turkey would prevent
Azerbaijan from exploiting a withdrawal. Sinirliogu
confirmed the GoT's willingness to proceed quickly with a
historical commission inquiry into the events of 1915. He
renewed the GoT request for the appointment of a USG Cyprus
special representative. He reaffirmed Turkey's continued
commitment to the Annan Plan's scheduled reduction of
guarantors' troops on the island and implied flexibility on
Turkey's security guarantee to Turkish Cypriots. He said
Turkey would not implement the Ankara Additional Protocol
until the EU implemented the Direct Trade Regulation with
northern Cyprus. Deputy Undersecretary Cevikoz reiterated
Turkey would not accept separate negotiation of the CFE Flank
Regime. Gordon requested Sinirlioglu urge the Bosniaks to
accept the Bildt-Steinberg package. Sinirlioglu identified
France as the major obstacle to Turkey's EU aspiration. He
cautioned that an excessive international focus on corruption
in Afghanistan could undermine Karzai. He said Turkey is
engaging Iraqi Kurds more fully than ever. End Summary.

Iran
--------------


2. (C) MFA Undersecretary Feridun Sinirlioglu opened his
November 12 meeting with EUR A/S Gordon by attempting to
recast PM Erdogan's recent public efforts to deflect
international community criticism of Iran's nuclear program
as an idiosyncratic reaffirmation of NPT principles.

Sinirlioglu regretted any "confusion" engendered by Erdogan's
statements, emphasizing: "We don't want a nuclear Iran;
we're doing everything we can to prevent that." At the same
time, Sinirlioglu said, the GoT does not support a military
solution to the Iranian problem. "We support P5-plus-1." In
his own style, Sinirlioglu elaborated, the prime minister is
reinforcing key NPT principles. He is credibly advocating a
nuclear-free world and a nuclear-free Middle East to the
Muslim street, thereby undercutting popular sympathy for
Iran. Gordon confirmed Erdogan's statements had aroused
concern in Washington. He emphasized world leaders'
responsibility to communicate clearly to Tehran that its
current course would lead inevitably to negative consequences
for Iran.

Armenia Protocols
--------------


3. (C) Sinirlioglu said simultaneous progress in the Minsk
Group process is key to securing Turkish parliamentary
ratification of the Armenia protocols. He regretted
Armenia's insistence on "a package deal," that would resolve
the Nagorno-Karabakh and Lachin Corridor issues
simultaneously. He argued, if Yerevan began acting now on
its agreement in principle to withdraw from the five rayon,
Azerbaijan could be persuaded to initiate its own
normalization process with Armenia: "This would help us pass
the protocols." He said he objected to the Minsk Group
Co-Chairs' pessimism: "They are creating obstacles that had
not been there previously." Gordon agreed that the co-chairs
were not optimistic, but that is because the Azeri and

ANKARA 00001644 002 OF 004


Armenian leadership seem unready. He said Armenia would be
reluctant to withdraw early from the five rayon for fear of
losing leverage. That said, we should start thinking bigger.
Sinirlioglu responded: "We have ideas and we will share
them with you." If Sargsian fears withdrawal from the five
rayon would make Armenia vulnerable militarily, he said, we
could guarantee that we would not let Azerbaijan take any
advantage.


4. (C) Gordon asked Sinirlioglu for ideas on securing Azeri
tolerance for the protocols: If Turkey reached a natural gas
transit agreement with Azerbaijan, would the Azeris tolerate
movement on the protocols? Sinirlioglu predicted a gas
transit agreement would be signed within a few weeks: "We
are converging on price." Nevertheless, he added, the
Turkish parliament's antipathy to the protocols comes from
within, not from Azerbaijan.


5. (C) Gordon noted failure to ratify the protocols could
increase the likelihood of a Congressional genocide
resolution. Sinirlioglu repeated his opening assertion: The
Turkish parliament must see Minsk Group process progress
before it will ratify. He described Turkey and Armenia's
signing of the protocols as history-making. "It wasn't easy
for us or for Sargsian." Your people need to understand how
difficult this is for us, he said.


6. (C) Gordon inquired about the composition of the
historical fact-finding commission. Turkish Deputy
Undersecretary Unal Cevikoz said the commission would consist
of historians and academics. He said the GoT had given the
Swiss a draft terms of reference. Sinirlioglu said: "We can
make it happen soon." Cevikoz inquired about the
desirability of a Minsk Group meeting on the margins of the
Athens OSCE Summit. Gordon counter-proposed a co-chairs
ministerial. Sinirlioglu suggested this could include
bilaterals.

Cyprus
--------------

7. (C) Sinirlioglu renewed the GoT's request for the USG's
appointment of a Cyprus special representative. A prominent
US role, he argued, would attract the attention of the
international community and make the Cyprus talks more
transparent. He regretted Chrystofias' perceived inclination
to depart from the parameters of the long-established UN
process by attempting to recast the inter-communal dispute as
the internal problem of an EU member. "He is trying to make
us forget 2004." He also strongly rejected Greek Cypriot
assertions that Talat is guided by or takes orders from
Ankara. Nevertheless, Sinirlioglu claimed, on power-sharing,
the most difficult issue, "we are almost there." Likewise,
"on property disputes, we are almost there." Gordon replied
the USG did not rule out appointing a special representative,
but noted the Greek tendency to see that more prominent US
role as favoring the Turkish side.


8. (C) On the issue of security guarantees, Gordon said,
Ankara can be either part of the problem or part of the
solution. Ankara's insistence on a troop presence and
guarantees is seen by Greek Cypriots as obstructive.
Sinirlioglu replied: "The Annan Plan dealt with this."
Annan provided for a decrease in troop levels in tranches
over the course of 19 years down to, with Turkey's EU
membership, 650 Turks and 950 Greeks. Gordon asked if the
GoT would accept a reduction of its right to intervene from
the whole island to just the Turkish Cypriot area.
Sinirlioglu argued no one on the Turkish Cypriot side would
accept a deal without guarantees. "Guarantees are meant for
the whole island." He immediately qualified that statement
by saying guarantees would depend on the parameters of a
deal. "We have in mind the Annan formula" and guarantees
would be "within that framework." We are prepared to discuss

ANKARA 00001644 003 OF 004


guarantees, first, in a trilateral (UK-Turkey-Greece) format
and, then, in a quadrilateral format, as we proposed in the
letter to Papandreou. "I do not rule out creativity."


9. (C) Gordon said we also need creativity on the Ankara
Additional Protocol. Sinirlioglu replied: "You should
expect nothing unilateral from us. It is not politically
feasible." He added December is a date for an EU assessment,
not a deadline. Once the EU implements the Direct Trade
Regulation with northern Cyprus, he said, we will implement
the additional protocol. Sinirlioglu registered continued
GoT interest in the 2006 Finnish EU Presidency proposal of a
one-for-one opening of Turkish and Greek Cypriot ports.

CFE Treaty
--------------


10. (C) Noting Turkey's stake in the CFE Treaty, Gordon
recalled Russia had suspended its participation and stopped
transferring data two years ago. Russian wants to revisit
the Flank Regime, he said. How critical is this to Turkey?
Cevikoz confirmed the GoT "attaches utmost importance to the
Flank; however, "CFE and the Flank are integral. We cannot
accept separate negotiation of a Flank Regime." "Russia is
dragging its feet," he said, "That's why we can't move on the
adapted CFE Treaty." Gordon argued that failure to adapt the
treaty could leave Europe without conventional arms control.
Cevikoz insisted Turkey did not want to be isolated in
discussions with Russia on the Flank; the whole Alliance
would have to be engaged. Gordon suggested the Allies should
assemble on the issue and be prepared to think creatively.

Bosnia
--------------


11. (C) Sinirlioglu portrayed Turkey as a contributing
constructively to reconciliation in Bosnia. He said Turkey
is trying to bring the Serbs "to a more acceptable position."
He reported a Serbian request for Turkish assistance in
finding a way to help the Bosnian Serbs and Bosniaks live
together again. The Bosniaks, he maintained, "are comforted
by our presence." He added, the Serbs want four mediators:
the US, EU, Russia and Turkey. "We don't understand why the
Europeans don't want us." We want you involved, Gordon
replied. He requested Turkey tell Haris Siladjdzic that in
an ideal world the USG would like to do away with entity
voting; unfortunately, for the moment, that is not
politically possible in Bosnia. Our goal now is enough
constitutional change to establish a functional state that
can stand by itself at the starting lines for NATO and EU
membership. He urged Turkey to underscore to the Bosniaks
that we cannot get more change than this now. If Bosnia
progresses towards the EU, he added, more constitutional
change will come. Sinirlioglu said Turkey will work together
with the USG. He underscored the importance of keeping
Turkey at the table: "The EU can't deliver the Bosniaks."


12. (C) Referring to the expected December MAP offer to
Montenegro, Sinirlioglu argued that failure to make a
simultaneous offer to Bosnia would be a mistake: "We want
them in the same package." He added a MAP offer to Bosnia
would help the stabilization process. Gordon replied
Montenegro is ready for MAP and Bosnia isn't, a view the US
shares with several Allies. He said Bosnia's agreement to
the Bildt-Steinberg package would make it a better MAP
candidate.

Turkey's EU Candidacy
--------------


13. (C) Sinirlioglu admitted to frustration over the progress
of Turkey's EU candidacy; however, he said, the government
and the majority of the people are dedicated to the goal.

ANKARA 00001644 004 OF 004


Turkey's EU membership, he continued, would resonate
throughout the Muslim world and contribute to stabilization
efforts in the Balkans, Caucasus and South Asia. We can work
with the Germans, he said. "The problem is France." Gordon
assured Sinirliolgu: "We advocate for you at every
opportunity."

Afghanistan
--------------


14. (C) Emphasizing the GoT's commitment to working closely
with the United States on Afghan stabilization and
development, Sinirlioglu said he expected an SRAP-led USG
team for meetings here December 1 and 2. He cautioned
against focusing excessively on Afghan government corruption
to Karzai's detriment. He described Gordon Brown's recent
public statement on Afghan corruption as particularly
unhelpful. Gordon said the USG planned to brief the
President's decision on changes to our military commitment to
Afghanistan to Allies at NATO.

Iraq
--------------


15. (C) Sinirlioglu described the October 30 visit by FM
Davutoglu and Minister of Trade and Industry Caglayan to
Erbil as historic. "We are engaging the Iraqi Kurds in a
much deeper way." We want to work with Barzani, he said, to
bring the PKK down from the mountains, disband and disarm
them and reintegrate the majority of their members back into
Turkish society. To do this, we need a credible deterrent
against terrorism, he added. "We need your support on our
requests for attack helicopters and UAVs." Gordon expressed
appreciation for what Turkey is doing overall in Iraq. He
emphasized the administration wants to be as supportive as
possible of Turkey's arms transfer requests. This would be
easier except for the recent perception that Turkey was
diverging from the international community's position on
Iran's nuclear ambitions. Sinirlioglu acknowledged "a
perception problem," but reiterated his contention that Prime
Minister Erdogan's recent public statements had advanced the
international community's shared goals on Iran.

Look East, but Use Discretion
--------------


16. (C) Referring to recent newspaper columns speculating
about Turkey's reorientation to the east, Sinirlioglu
asserted Turkey's European geography and political identity.
He said the GoT's new neighborhood policy is eastward
looking, but it will allow Turkey to become a model of
European standards for the region. Gordon reminded
Sinirlioglu the EU conditions its outreach on democratization
and good behavior.


17. (U) A/S Gordon has cleared this cable.

JEFFREY

"Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s
gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"