SCENESETTER FOR YOUR TRIP TO TURKEY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001608

SIPDIS

FROM AMBASSADOR JIM JEFFREY FOR U/S ELLEN TAUSCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2019
TAGS: PARM PREL NATO TU
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR YOUR TRIP TO TURKEY

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Jeffrey for reason 1.4 (b, d)


1. (S) I look forward to welcoming you. Missile Defense is
at the top of our crowded agenda with Turkey and the Turks
are fully engaged. They will look for you to advance the
discussions which were well begun by Sandy Vershbow and
others both here in Ankara and at NATO. They will be looking
for specifics both on technical aspects of the Phased
Adaptive Approach (PAA) and on how this system will be part
of NATO's defense. They also will need detailed information
on the ballistic missile threat Turkey will face in the
coming years. I believe your visit would be most effective
if you focus exclusively on bringing the Turks along on our
MD proposals.


2. (S) Key issues that the Turks will be expecting you to
address are:

- PAA Command and Control relationship with NATO (para 4);

- How other countries will participate in the PAA (para 5);

- The capabilities of proposed THAAD fire units and how they
may overlap with other air defense assets Turkey may seek to
obtain (para 6);

- A detailed briefing of the ballistic missile threat to
Turkey and Europe and how we expect that threat to develop in
the coming years (para 8).

- What we hope to achieve related to NATO endorsement of the
PAA at the December NATO Ministerial Meeting (para 9);


3. (C) The domestic and regional political context in which
Turkey's leaders will make decisions regarding the PAA is
complex, including:

- A difficult, changing relationship between Turkey's
military and civilian leaders (para 10);

- A desire to broaden Turkey's influence as a regional power,
particularly in the Middle East and South Asia including with
potential missile threats Iran and Syria (para 11); and

- Its need to balance responsibilities to NATO and the
international community with its energy dependence on Russia
and Iran (para 12).

Turks Want A NATO Finger On The MD Trigger
--------------


4. (S) The only way to gain Turkish support for a robust
Turkish role in PAA would be to ensure that it was under NATO
command and control. That would ensure that Turkey would get
a vote on whether to execute a system launch from, or an
intercept over Turkish territory. The Turks will remind us
that the most likely place where an Iranian ballistic missile
would be intercepted by a missile launched either from an
ally in Eastern Europe or from an Aegis platform in the
eastern Mediterranean will be over Turkish territory. It
would be difficult at best for Turkey to allow a decision
which could produce collateral damage among the Turkish
civilian population to be taken without Turkish involvement.
NATO command and control would also dampen criticism from
Turkey's neighbors. Finally, there is a long and neuralgic
history of unilateral U.S. military steps in or related to
Turkey -- Jupiter pull-out, arms embargo, 2003 Iraq northern
front -- that make selling major unilateral U.S. military
activity very difficult here. Explaining how this U.S.
national contribution to NATO's overall defense is a
necessary first step, with other national systems and NATO
systems to be integrated into this netowrk will help, but the
Turks are going to want to know answers to detailed tactical
command and control questions -- how we would fight this
system -- before saying yes. Turks will want to know, for
example, is it our goal to have an integrated NATO command
and control system built around our and other national
contributions such as with the Air Defense network previously
in the AFCENT area, or like with the Pershing/Cruise,
integration into the NATO nuclear strike program. If so, how
do we plan to reach that goal and, again, how would the PAA
work in an emergency before that goal is reached?

Burden Sharing
--------------


5. (C) The Turks have asked how other countries will
participate in the PAA. Our responses thus far have, of

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necessity, been vague. The more we can show the Turks that
other Allies are playing an active role, the more we will
diminish the regional political risk -- and particularly
domestic opposition -- which they associate with a system
that appears hostile to Turkey's neighbors, with whom Turkey
seeks to improve relations and influence. While they have
sent no signal that they plan to turn this into a rug deal,
if the Turks are given to understand that this project will
fail without their participation, they will drive a very hard
bargain. Turkey has consistently said that Allies should
share equally in the benefits, risks and burdens of European
ballistic missile defense. They will want to know how other
Allies will share the costs of the system. We also want them
to know that Turkey is a key, but not indispensible, part of
the NATO MD system.

Interaction With National Systems
--------------


6. (S) GEN Ilker Basbug, Chief of Turkey's General Staff,
asked ASD Vershbow about the role any THAAD fire units which
may be deployed to the region might play in Turkey. He
sought specific information about how these units would
interact with any national air defense capability which
Turkey may acquire. Turkey is still in the initial phases of
deciding what system it will seek; the Congressional
Notification made in September 2009 was to make it possible
for Raytheon to share technical data regarding their system
so that the Patriot system could compete with a Russian and a
Chinese system in a tender which may take months (if not
years) to complete. Basbug also asked sharp questions about
whether THAAD fire units would make such a system redundant.
You should explain that if/if a THAAD unit would be deployed
to Turkey as part of this system, it would complement any
national system. Should Turkey choose to acquire a
NATO-interoperable air defense capability, that capability
would be made stronger by and could contribute to the PAA.


7. (S) Finally, while describing THAAD fire units as
necessary to protect U.S. forces is a strong argument within
the United States, it does not necessarily help us in Turkey.
We suggest that instead you point out that the likely
location of a THAAD fire unit would help protect essential
Turkish infrastructure, including the economically vital
ports of Mersin and Ceyhan. That said, Ambassador's
assesment is that the THAAD deployment will be a much harder
sell than the radar. Turks will understand the need for the
radar and the need for it to be in TUrkey. THAAD is more
complicated as it is a "weapons system" that, unlike the
SM-3, we plan on deploying early and only in Turkey. They
may also question the rationale. Protecting the radar might
make sense, but protecting Incirlik will be a hard sell.
Turks are aware that we have hundres of thousands of troops
closer to Iran in Iraq and Afghanistan than at Incirlik who
presumably do not have Missile Defense protection. Seeking
to protect Incirlik will raise up the never-distant spectre
here of nefarious U.S. plans to launch attacks out of
Incirlik.

Define The Threat From Iran, But Quietly, Please
-------------- ---


8. (C) Although in public statements, Turkey's political
leaders continue to state that they see Iran as a close
neighbor with whom they seek friendly relations, behind
closed doors, the more pragmatic of these leaders recognize
the threat posed to Turkey's territory and to Turkey's status
as the pre-eminent regional power by Iran's nuclear program.
PM Erdogan's senior foreign policy advisor, Hakan Fidan,
after our initial briefing on the PAA, asked for specific
information on the ballistic missle threat posed by Iran.
Fidan, who also serves as Turkey's governor on the IAEA,
sought also our projections as to how we expected this
program to develop. We hope that your delegation will
include a representative from the intelligence community who
will be able to brief on this subject and to respond to
questions.

Missile Defense At The December NATO Ministerial
-------------- ---


9. (C) The Turks seek more information about the nature of
the NATO endorsement for the PAA which the US will seek at
the December Ministerial. Specifically, what form does the
U.S. see for the "alliance declaration" at NATO? Will such a
statement be part of the Ministerial Communique? Would it be
a separate statement? Will this be a political declaration
or would we look to have these forces identified as

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"available" for NATO, but still under national control?

Civ - Mil Tensions
--------------


10. (C) As Turkey's democracy has become more evolved over
the past decade, the authority of non-elected secularist
elites has diminished in comparison with that of the elected,
mildly Islamist government. This trend has been encouraged
by Turkey's uneven progress toward qualification for
membership in the European Union. Civilian-military
relations remain complex. Chief of Staff General Basbug has
worked out a modus vivendi with PM Erdogan, but the
long-running struggle between Turkey's secularists (with the
Army as its champion) and Islamists (represented by the
government) naturally puts them at odds. Erdogan has the
clear upper hand, a fact with which Basbug has seemingly
learned to live. Alleged past military involvement in coup
contingency planning or even deliberate generation of
internal chaos remains political theme number one and
preoccupies both Erdogan and Basbug and their respective
underlings. This issue should not affect your discussions
directly, but it complicates things. We have a realpolitik
TGS and MFA that will find aspects of Missile Defense
problematic, but will be willing to compromise with NATO
imprimateur, "quids" for Turkey, etc. And we have an
Islamic-oriented PM and political base that will be hard to
convince for regional and other reasons discussed below.

Turkey Seeks To Be A Greater Regional Power
--------------


11. (C) Turkey, particularly the group around the PM, seeks
to assert itself as a regional power. In support of this,
Turkey's foreign policy has become extraordinarily activist.
U.S. policy goals generally benefit from this activism:
Turkey's leadership role in Afghanistan, its rapprochement
with Armenia (a bold move given Azerbaijan's high profile
here) and its readiness to work positively with Iraq are
clear examples. But Turkey's recent engagement with Iran and
Syria - both neighbors and important trading partners - is
more problematic. The instinct of FM Davutoglu and PM
Erdogan seems to be to develop Turkey's short-term populist
appeal to Islamist countries, in the apparent hope that
Turkey's strategic partnerships with Israel and the U.S. will
weather the storm. Thus for the purposes of our discussions
with Turkey on Missile Defense - and the program's political
acceptability to PNM Erdogan - it is important in our public
discussions here not to single out Iran as the threat against
which Missile Defense is being developed.

Russia
--------------


12. (C) Turkey in general has good relations with Russia and
does not perceive Russia as a threat to the same extent that
other Black Sea nations do (in part because Turkey is further
away and much stronger militarily than Russia's other
neighbors). Its trade relations with Russia are dominated by
energy imports, however, and Russia and Iran provide the
overwhelming majority of Turkey's energy. Shifting the
infrastructure of European ballistic missile defense away
from Russia made support for the PAA more palatable for
Turkey, and the Turks would welcome a discussion of our
consultations with RUssia on MD and indications of Russian
tacit or explicit acceptance of the concept.

JEFFREY

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