Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ANKARA1607
2009-11-09 10:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR BROACHES ANTI-US RHETORIC WITH BAYKAL

Tags:  PGOV PINR TU 
pdf how-to read a cable
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001607 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINR TU
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR BROACHES ANTI-US RHETORIC WITH BAYKAL

Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey, for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001607

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2019
TAGS: PGOV PINR TU
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR BROACHES ANTI-US RHETORIC WITH BAYKAL

Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey, for reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (SBU) Summary: The Ambassador met with the Republican
People's Party (CHP) Chairman Deniz Baykal on November 5 to
confront him about his persistent use of anti-American
rhetoric in speeches on otherwise purely internal matters.
Baykal ducked and weaved, contending he is often misquoted.
Baykal seemed unduly focused on the South Stream pipeline
project. On the Democratic Opening, Baykal said CHP has long
advocated expanding cultural and personal rights to all
Turkish citizens, but is uncomfortable with the state taking
an active role in what the private sector should handle. End
Summary.


2. (C) The Ambassador's main agenda in his meeting with
Chairman Baykal was to raise concerns over the use by Turkish
politicians, particularly the CHP, of Anti-American rhetoric
in their political speeches. Noting that Turkish politicians
have every right to criticize American actions, particularly
in the field of foreign policy, the Ambassador lamented the
perpetuation of falsehoods about the US and persistent
criticism of U.S. faults without also occasional praise of
the positive aspects of the U.S.-Turkey relationship. His
primary example was the oft-repeated claim that the U.S.
supports the PKK, or that its actions reveal a tacit support
for the PKK, despite the fact that the US has engaged on
multiple fronts -- through military action, diplomacy, and
coordinating international legal processes -- to bring the
PKK to its weakest ever condition. He also noted the
tendency of opposition party members to reinforce the belief
among the electorate that the Justice and Development Party
(AKP) Government's "Democratic Initiative," designed to
address the grievances of Turkey's ethnic and religious
minorities by removing impediments to personal expression,
was crafted by the U.S. and forced upon an unwilling Turkish
government.


3. (C) Baykal's defense was predictably lame: he contested
our specific statements ("I never said that the US supports
the PKK; I said that the U.S. is not doing enough to
eliminate the PKK") without addressing the overall point that
the Turkish citizenry is not hearing enough about the
positive role the U.S. played and continues to play for
Turkey.


4. (C) The Ambassador and Baykal discussed a range of other
issues. Baykal was curious about the U.S. position on the
South Stream petroleum pipeline, expressing concern that the
Turkish government was coddling Russia and undermining
Ukraine. Ambassador explained that the U.S. does not believe
that South Stream is an economically viable alternative to
Nabucco, but that arguing strongly against South Stream would
only serve to reinforce Russia's political will to see it to
fruition and to coerce other countries to participate in it.
Absent a change in the economic situation, he said, the U.S.
will continue to watch it carefully.


5. (C) The Ambassador acknowledged that Turkey and the U.S.
are working together closely to convince Iran to cooperate
with the IAEA, even if not in full understanding with each
other. He pointed out to Baykal that the comments that PM
Erdogan is making today are milder than those he had been
making two weeks ago, and that both President Gul and FM
Davutoglu are much closer to the U.S. position in their
public statements than is Erdogan. The Ambassador also
expressed U.S. support for the concept of the government's
proposed Democratic Opening, noting that the U.S. has no
business in recommending or supporting individual elements of
such a project, but will be supportive of any approach that
can produce stronger democracy and greater harmony in Turkey.
Baykal noted the CHP has argued in favor of expanding
cultural and personal rights to all Turkish citizens for over
a decade, but his party is uncomfortable with the state
taking an active role in what should be handled by the
private sector. He argued, as an example, that the state
opening a Kurdish language TV station (TRT 6),only serves to
underline the differences among people; instead, private
institutions should have been given the right to broadcast in
Kurdish instead.


6. (C) Comment: We felt it necessary to remind the
opposition leader that his anti-US rhetoric is not without
cost to the US-Turkey relationship. Without countervailing

ANKARA 00001607 002 OF 002


positive reinforcement of the benefits of U.S. friendship,
our image among Turks tends to drift in a negative direction.
Baykal hears his own electoral drummer. And the current
crop of prominent Turkish leaders (President Gul excepted) is
too willing to mortgage long-term strategic interests in a
pursuit of short-term tactical gains. End comment.

JEFFREY

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