TURKISH MFA "FORWARD-LOOKING" ON CYPRUS

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001568

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2019
TAGS: PREL UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH MFA "FORWARD-LOOKING" ON CYPRUS

REF: A. ANKARA 1455

B. NICOSIA 656

Classified By: Political Counselor Daniel J. O'Grady for reasons 1.4(b,
d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. On October 23 the Turkish MFA hosted an
internal marathon session devoted to Cyprus that was
refreshingly critical of Turkish policy over the past decade,
reaffirmed that the status quo is unacceptable and resolved
that Ankara must "find ways to break the deadlocks" that
threaten the negotiations. The MFA cautioned us not to read
too much into the session, whose attendance was deliberately
packed to dilute the influence of UN Permanent Envoy Apakan,
who remains determined to have a voice in Cyprus policy.
Ankara still hopes to encourage greater USG involvement in
the talks. The MFA also is "cautiously optimistic" that the
European Court of Human Rights will rule November 16 that the
Turkish Cypriot Property Commission is an acceptable remedy
for Greek Cypriot property claims in the north. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) On October 27 MFA's Deputy Director General for Cyprus
and Greece, Kerim Uras, provided us a readout of the marathon
session focused on Cyprus that took place at the MFA October

23. Uras noted that almost a dozen ambassadors had been
brought back for the meeting, and that most of the upper
level of the MFA also had attended, essentially "paralyzing"
the MFA decision-making structure for almost 24 hours. FM
Davutoglu and Minister for EU Affairs Bagis joined the
meeting at 10 p.m., and it continued until 4 a.m. on October
24, Uras said. Despite the momentous trappings of this
event, he cautioned that we should not read too much into
this meeting. It had been scheduled at the behest of UN
Permanent Envoy Ertugrul Apakan, who is intent on keeping
involved in the Cyprus issue. To blunt Apakan's influence,
the MFA leadership packed the meeting with additional
attendees. The result was a logistical headache but a
surprisingly useful exchange of blunt views, according to
Uras.


3. (C) Highpoints of the session include:

-- an assessment that Ankara needs to encourage the USG to
take a closer interest in the Cyprus talks. The MFA has the
sense that the USG feels it got "burned" in 2004, so
therefore prefers to leave the negotiating to Cypriots alone.
However, this gives the Greek Cypriot side too much room to
maneuver. Closer interest from the USG would "make a huge
difference."

-- strong criticism of Turkish policy on Cyprus over last the
ten years, where it now finds Greek Cypriots inside the EU
and the Turkish Cypriots at a severe disadvantage. "How did
we get in this position?" was the dominant lament, Uras said,
noting that the clear implication was that hardliners such as
Apakan had steered the policy into the corner where Ankara
now finds itself.

-- a consensus that opening up the Green Line has had an
unfortunate, albeit revealing, effect. The Turkish Cypriot
community is convinced that most Greek Cypriots are "racist"
and loathe the Turkish Cypriots. Greek Cypriots have a
deliberate policy of never buying anything in the north, even
bringing their own lunches. According to "TRNC" records,
some 40 percent of G/Cs have never visited the north at all.

-- a recognition that too many Turkish Cypriot concessions
will make a deal too hard to sell in the north during a
referendum. Unlike 2004, Turkish Cypriots will be far more
skeptical about what is being offered, and a majority "yes"
vote cannot be taken for granted. Therefore, Ankara needs to
move carefully.

-- a major focus on November 16 when the European Court of
Human Rights will rule on whether the Turkish Cypriot
Property Commission is an acceptable remedy for Greek Cypriot
property claims. Uras projected that this court decision
will have a significant impact on the talks, and that this is
why the Greek Cypriot side has moved slowly on this issue.
He said Ankara is now "cautiously optimistic" that the court
will rule in Turkey's favor. The court has seen that this
Commission has been active since April 2006, already has
distributed 26 million pounds, and has settled 77 claims (out
of 422 that were submitted). Uras said the Commission
recently reached a settlement with a single Greek Cypriot
property owner for 12 million pounds, freeing up 45 pieces of
land in the north.


4. (C) Uras said the session's conclusion was that Ankara is
not happy with the status quo, and needs to be "flexible and
forward-looking," and that it must "find ways to break the
deadlocks" that threaten the talks. He said the meeting had
underscored that Turkey's EU bid serves as the context for
its interest in seeing the Cyprus Problem resolved. We
pressed him on whether the session had discussed options in
the event the talks fail. Uras said it had not.


5. (C) Uras had been far more downbeat the previous week,
complaining that ROC President Christofias's UNGA speech had
advocated "autonomous regions" instead of "constituent
states" -- a substantial weakening of the negotiating
premise. Uras also had suggested that Christofias no longer
appears serious about the talks, and may be looking ahead to
the April 2010 elections, which "PM" Eroglu is expected to
win. Eroglu does not even speak English. He is also on
record as favoring the status quo, so could not possibly be a
credible negotiator. Uras predicted the Greek Cypriots would
choose that moment to withdraw from the negotiations, blaming
the Turkish Cypriots.


6. (C) Uras suggested that the USG should inform the Greek
Cypriots that it will not oppose recognitions by other
countries of the "TRNC" in the event of the talks collapsing.
We were firm that would not happen. Uras continued that if
the talks fail Ankara "probably" would encourage its friends
to establish embassies in north Nicosia, but doubts that any
-- even Azerbaijan -- would have courage to do so. All
would fear the consequences of alienating the EU, he said.

JEFFREY

"Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s
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