Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ANKARA1537
2009-10-23 14:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TIES THAT BIND: AZERI INFLUENCE OVER TURKEY

Tags:  PGOV PREL ECON AR AJ TU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8382
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHAK #1537/01 2961430
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231430Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1050
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU 1624
RUEHSI/AMEMBASSY TBILISI 3212
RUEHYE/AMEMBASSY YEREVAN 1385
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001537 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON AR AJ TU
SUBJECT: TIES THAT BIND: AZERI INFLUENCE OVER TURKEY

REF: A. ANKARA 1487

B. BAKU 829

C. BAKU 201

Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey, for reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 001537

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL ECON AR AJ TU
SUBJECT: TIES THAT BIND: AZERI INFLUENCE OVER TURKEY

REF: A. ANKARA 1487

B. BAKU 829

C. BAKU 201

Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey, for reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: As the Turkey-Armenia protocols begin to
percolate in the Turkish Parliament (SEPTEL),Azerbaijan's
influence on Turkish public opinion will be pivotal. Given
the close cultural, historical and linguistic ties between
the Turks and Azerbaijanis, the Turkish public appears
unwilling to countenance any negative fallout for Azerbaijan
-- a stance that plays to Baku's advantage. The emotional
connection seems to resonate more than Baku's attempted
threats in the energy field. Many Turks seemed offended by
Baku's recent decision to take down the Turkish flag at a
martyrs' monument, and this move drew a scold from PM Erdogan
and even a reproach from MHP Leader Bahceli. Still, we see
no real shift in Turkey's "brotherly" attitude toward an ally
considered even closer than the "TRNC." This does not bode
well for speedy ratification of the Turkey-Armenia protocols,
since Turkish MPs will feel obliged to heed Azerbaijan's
insistence on Nagorno-Karabakh progress first. Even so,
there is a widespread expectation that the Turkey-Armenia
border will be opened and relations normalized. Azerbaijan's
influence may be felt more in the timing than in the result.
END SUMMARY.

How It All Began
--------------


2. (C) Any consideration of the Turkey-Azerbaijan
relationship must start with Turkey's position and actions in
the early 1990's during the Nagorno-Karabakh war that
culminated in Turkey breaking relations with Yerevan and
closing the border. In 1993 as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
continued and intensified, Turkey closed the border in
solidarity with Azerbaijan. Following the border closure,
direct land communications with Armenia were cut, and
diplomatic relations were never established. Since this
time, Turkey has maintained that opening of the border and
normalization of relations rest on a solution to the
Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Even as the most recent round of
talks began, GOT officials have repeatedly assured the

Turkish people and Baku that they have not forgotten why they
closed the border.

"They Are Our Brothers"
--------------


3. (C) Turkish public opinion is naturally inclined toward
Azerbaijan, a Turkic country with whom it has close cultural,
linguistic, and historical ties. Religion is trickier;
Azeris are Shia, Turks are "officially" mainly Sunni.
Furthermore, the Aliyev regime is not just formally, but
violently secular, and distrusts PM Erdogan's, his party's,
and his sometime "ally" Fethullah Gulen's plans for
Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan and Turkey participate together in
numerous Turkic Summits, councils and cultural events -- all
of which do not include Armenia. Streets and public areas in
Turkey are often found bearing the name "Azerbaijan" or
"Baku." As a Turkish official working at a border gate
between Turkey and Azerbaijan told us, "They are our
brothers. They speak the same language. We are the same."


4. (C) Public opinion on Azerbaijan has also been something
of Turkey's own making. Its more active foreign policy under
FM Davutoglu has led the GOT to promote deeper and more
diverse relations with Azerbaijan and the other Turkic
countries. The slogan "two states, one nation" is often used
by GOT leaders when referring to Azerbaijan, and according to
Sinan Ogan at the Caucasus-focused think tank TURKSAM, is
considered as a core element of Turkish policy toward
Azerbaijan -- supported, he said, by the vast majority of
Turks.


5. (C) Given the affection that Turks feel toward Azerbaijan,
it should be no surprise that Azerbaijan can use these
"brotherly" feelings to its advantage in pressing its
interests on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Both Azerbaijan
officials in Baku and the Azerbaijani Embassy and Consulates
within Turkey have been active in promoting their cause and
discouraging Turkey-Armenia normalization before the
Nagorno-Karabakh issue is solved. According to Kaan Soyak,
head of the Turkish Armenian Business Development Council,
the Azerbaijani Consulate in Kars has vigorously worked
against his efforts to develop business links between Turkey
and Armenia -- and has lobbied against him personally. An

ANKARA 00001537 002 OF 003


example of Azeri outreach came during this year's Ramadan,
where a festival in an Ankara district featured "Azerbaijani
night." A central display presented photos of the
"Nagorno-Karabakh Genocide" which included graphic depictions
of dead Azerbaijani women and children, allegedly at the
hands of Armenians. The hundreds of Turkish festival
attendees took note.

Bid to Diffuse Tensions
--------------


6. (C) A glimpse of Azeri sway over Turkish public opinion
was seen after the April 22 joint announcement between Turkey
and Armenia. Despite then MFA U/S Apakan's assurances that
the GOT kept Aliyev informed about the protocols, Baku
disagreed. The angry reaction from Azerbaijan forced Turkey
to issue numerous reassuring statements that it would never
do anything against Azerbaijan's interests. The GOT seemed
to learn from this and worked more closely to prepare Baku
for the October 10 signing. The result was an initially
contained reaction from Aliyev and the GOAJ. However, this
calm rests on a sensitive foundation, and the slightest
incident can set off a new "crisis" in the relationship. The
outcry from Azerbaijan following Turkey's ban on Azeri flags
at the Turkey-Armenia soccer degenerated into a retaliatory
removal of Turkish flags from sites in Azerbaijan. The GOT
rushed to calm Baku and assure the GOAJ that Nagorno-Karabakh
is still a priority. Many analysts, including TOBB
International Relations professor Mithat Celikpala, believe
that Azerbaijan has such unusual leverage on Turkish public
opinion that the Turkish Government felt compelled to act.
He suggested that without any significant N-K progress,
Azerbaijan might intensify its propaganda campaign. In his
view, that would make it nearly impossible for any Turkish MP
to support the protocols.

Election Concerns
--------------


7. (C) Another factor is the looming prospect of early
elections in Turkey. These Parliamentary elections must take
place before July 2011 but are rumored to be planned for
2010, perhaps even as early as the spring. The ruling
Justice and Development Party faces two difficult and
sensitive issues: rapprochement with Armenia and the
Democratic (Kurdish) Opening. As elections approach, without
visible progress on Nagorno-Karabakh, it will be increasingly
difficult for AK Party MPs to support the protocols, and the
opposition would certainly exploit Azerbaijani criticism of
the ruling party's actions. Suat Kiniklioglu, an MP and one
of the Prime Minister's foreign policy advisors, told us
recently that without positive movement on Nagorno-Karabakh,
it would not be in the Prime Minister's interest to bring the
protocols to the Parliament floor.

Limits ... Don't Insult the Flag
--------------


8. (C) Still, Azerbaijani influence over Turkish public
opinion is not unlimited. As Azerbaijani rhetoric against
Turkey continued after the April 22 announcement, a backlash
in Turkey began to emerge. Some resentment surfaced against
Azerbaijani interference in Turkish affairs. Columnists
began to question why Turkey was bowing to Azerbaijan when
Azerbaijan is not supporting Turkey in Cyprus. Prime
Minister Erdogan also came out with several harsh statements
to visiting Azerbaijani politicians for questioning Turkish
sincerity. This tiring of Azerbaijani interference may be
returning. After the October 15 removal of the Turkish flags
from a martyr's monument in Baku, PM Erdogan cautioned
Azerbaijan that "the Martyrdom Mosque in Azerbaijani...is
what really hurt us. I believe that our Azerbaijani brothers
will very well assess what hauling down of the Turkish flag
in the martyrdom meant." He also toughened his words on
Turkish support for Azerbaijan, saying that GOT has told Baku
many times that it will not act against Azerbaijani
interests, and that Turkey's "Azerbaijani brothers" should
not allow any "instigation to mislead the public with
slander." In a discussion with us, former Foreign Minister
Hikmet Cetin reaffirmed that Azerbaijan is Turkey's closest
"ally" but added that the Turkish flag removal incident would
not help the Azerbaijani cause. Even Devlet Bahceli, head of
the nationalist MHP party and staunch critic of
normalization, has warned Azerbaijan not to "mess with the
Turkish flag."

The Energy Card
--------------

ANKARA 00001537 003 OF 003




9. (C) Although much has been made in the Turkish press
recently about Aliyev's veiled threats regarding energy
supplies to Turkey, Azerbaijan does not have the hold on
Turkish energy consumption that it would like people to
think. For oil, Turkey is mainly a transit country for BTC
pipeline oil originating in Azerbaijan. Turkey purchases
most of the oil it uses itself from Russia and OPEC
countries. Azerbaijan has a history of supplying oil to BTC
through its SOCAR state company as part of a consortium, and
BTC is Azerbaijan's main route of selling oil to the west.
Therefore, the likelihood that Azerbaijan would cut supplies
to BTC because of a dispute with Turkey is low, and the
effect on Turkey if it did so would be minimal.


10. (C) In gas, Turkey is much more vulnerable, but not to
the point depicted by Azerbaijan and the Turkish press.
Turkey's main gas supplier is Russia, from which it meets
around 62 percent of its gas needs, and Russia has also
supplied extra gas to Turkey in winter months when other
suppliers have not fulfilled their commitments. Azerbaijan
currently supplies only about 17 percent of Turkish gas needs
from Shah Deniz phase I, and is in negotiations over
additional gas from Shah Deniz phase II. Although Aliyev has
publicly questioned the "30% of world price" that Turkey pays
for phase I gas, the agreement that set this price actually
expired in April 2008. Turkey is currently in negotiations
with Azerbaijan over a new contract, and has already offered
a higher price.

Shah Deniz II
--------------


11. (C) Shah Deniz II may be Azerbaijan's trump card in
energy, and it has threatened to find other buyers for the
volumes currently under negotiation with Turkey. As Turkey
would not receive Shah Deniz II gas until 2014, at the
earliest, it would not face an immediate crisis should
Azerbaijan follow through on its threats. However, although
Turkey would have some time to develop other options for
additional supplies, such as from Russia, Qatar, or Iraq,
both Turkey and Azerbaijan realize Shah Deniz II gas is the
easiest and most readily available supply for Turkey.


12. (C) The stronger choke hold Azerbaijan has on Turkey, at
least initially, is the Nabucco project. Shah Deniz II gas
is the only gas available to be committed now for the
pipeline to be commercially viable and thus launch
construction. Turkey will be a major commercial
geostrategic-prestige beneficiary of Nabucco (not for nothing
was the Nabucco IGA signing done with great pomp in Ankara.)
Azerbaijan's refusing to commit gas to the project could
seriously harm Turkey. The most likely scenario is that
Azerbaijan will stall the negotiations on Shah Deniz I and II
as leverage to press Turkey for more support on
Nagorno-Karabakh.

Comment
--------------


13. (C) From our perspective, the Turkey-Azerbaijan
relationship appears somewhat one-sided. Turkey's view of
Azerbaijan as its closest ally (according to former FM Cetin,
even closer than the Turkish Cypriots) allows Azerbaijan to
exploit this sentiment to its advantage. It sometimes pushes
hard against Turkish tolerance, as with the Baku flag
incident, but it more often succeeds in pushing all the right
emotional buttons: portraying itself as the younger "brother"
whose friendship and historical links make it beyond reproach
and whose interests require defending by Ankara's greater
regional clout. The Azeris appear skillful at using both
Turkish media outlets and the opposition political parties.
Given this context, the GOT needs to move deftly and
delicately on the Turkey-Armenia protocols. Most of our
contacts, both in government and academia, seem convinced
that the border with Armenia will open -- eventually -- and
that relations will be fully normalized. Azerbaijan's
influence over the process is in how quickly this can be
accomplished.

JEFFREY

"Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at http://www.intelink.s
gov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turkey"