Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ANKARA137
2009-01-27 16:05:00
SECRET
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

DAS BRYZA DISCUSSES SOUTH CAUCASUS WITH GOT

Tags:  PREL PGOV AJ AM GG RU TU XY 
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P 271605Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8596
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RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
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RUEUITH/ODC ANKARA TU PRIORITY
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000137 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR DAS BRYZA, EUR/SE, EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV AJ AM GG RU TU XY
SUBJECT: DAS BRYZA DISCUSSES SOUTH CAUCASUS WITH GOT

REF: A. TBILISI 57

B. 08 ANKARA 2118

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 000137

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EUR DAS BRYZA, EUR/SE, EUR/CARC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV AJ AM GG RU TU XY
SUBJECT: DAS BRYZA DISCUSSES SOUTH CAUCASUS WITH GOT

REF: A. TBILISI 57

B. 08 ANKARA 2118

Classified By: Ambassador James F. Jeffrey, reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: MFA Deputy U/S for Eastern Europe and South
Caucasus Unal Cevikoz emphasized to visiting DAS Bryza and
the Ambassador January 16 the importance Turkey attaches to
the continuation of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia
(UNOMIG). Cevikoz said Turkey would support a UNOMIG
extension at the UNSC and stressed that Western allies should
come together on the issue and discuss proposals with Russia
in advance. Bryza agreed, but said we should not take a step
that enhances the separation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia
from the rest of Georgia. Cevikoz informed Bryza that the
Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform (CSCP) would meet
in Istanbul for a second time January 26 at the Deputy
Minister-level; the Georgians have not yet confirmed their
participation, but the Turks believe they remain positive.
The CSCP, said Cevikoz, affords Tbilisi a forum in which to
engage Moscow as an equal, without participation by the
Abkhaz or South Ossetians. The Turks hope to finalize a
concept paper that will describe how the platform will
interact with other governments and international
organizations.


2. (S) SUMMARY CONT'D: Cevikoz and Bryza shared the view
that Armenian President Sargsian and Azerbaijani President
Aliyev are serious about resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh (N-K)
conflict; Cevikoz said Azerbaijani FM Mammadyarov is also
becoming constructive, reportedly telling the Turks that a
deal may be possible by June. Cevikoz underlined that there
is no N-K precondition for Turkey on normalizing relations
with Armenia, though the issues complement each other, and
Turkey needs clear endorsement of an historical commission to
discuss the events of 1915. END SUMMARY.

GEORGIA/CSCP
--------------

3. (C) Cevikoz emphasized the importance Turkey attaches to
the continuation of UNOMIG. We need an international
presence in Abkhazia, he said, and if the Russians behave
like they did at the OSCE, we have a problem. Turkey will

support a prolongation of the mission at the UNSC, but
Russia, which is unhappy with the mission's name, needs to be
persuaded. Bryza agreed we need a mission. But a red line
is that we do not want to take any step that enhances the
separation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia from the rest of
Georgia. The Russians are emboldened for not having paid a
serious diplomatic price for killing the OSCE mandate in
Georgia last December and not implementing their cease-fire
commitments. Rather than beginning UNOMIG renewal
negotiations by agreeing to compromise on UNOMIG's name,
Bryza recommended proposing a technical rollover of UNOMIG,
which the Russians might oppose because it includes a
reference to UNSCR 1808 affirming Georgia's territorial
integrity. If the Russians block the rollover idea, then we
can move to a compromise text, as proposed by Germany, which
would agree to drop the reference to "Georgia" in the name of
the mission, but without further undercutting Georgia's
territorial integrity.


4. (C) Cevikoz stressed that Western allies should come
together on this. Russia, which will seek to exploit any
divisions, should be consulted in advance; the U.S., he said,
is in the best position to do this. Bryza agreed, noting
that we had decided recently to pursue such an approach.
Cevikoz asked for Bryza's prognosis on the fourth round of
Geneva talks on Abkhazia. Bryza said the Geneva talks could
still usefully develop a dispute resolution mechanism,
facilitate IDP returns, and ensure humanitarian access to the
separatist regions, though the prospects for negotiating a
political solution were dim; while Abkhazia was not openly
obstructionist, South Ossetia was bombastic and Russia was
not actively helpful.


5. (C) Cevikoz noted that the CSCP would be meeting for a
second time January 26 in Istanbul at the Deputy
Minister-level. The Russians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis were
confirmed; Georgian participation was not yet confirmed, but
Cevikoz said he believes the Georgians -- who participated at
the first CSCP meeting in Helsinki -- remain positive on the
process and would attend. (NOTE: The Turkish delegation was
to be led by Cevikoz. Our contacts informed us that Russia

ANKARA 00000137 002 OF 003


would be represented by Deputy FM Titov, Azerbaijan by Deputy
FM Azimov, and Armenia by Deputy FM Shavarsh Kocharyan -- not
usual Turkey interlocutor Deputy FM Kirakossian. We will
report on the meeting septel. END NOTE.) Georgia, according
to Cevikoz, values the CSCP as a forum in which Tbilisi can
engage Moscow as an equal, without any participation by the
separatist regimes. Cevikoz said Turkey hoped to finalize a
concept paper in Istanbul on a strategic vision for the CSCP
and how it will interact with other governments and
international organizations. Cevikoz foresaw good
cooperation with the EU "Eastern Partnership," which has been
extended to the South Caucasus. He said the EU should move
quickly on enhancing its partnership and cooperation
agreement with Russia, lest Moscow view the "Eastern
Partnership" as anti-Russia. Bryza underscored that the U.S.
is not opposed to the CSCP and, despite earlier Turkish
misperceptions, is not discouraging Georgian participation.


6. (C) Bryza asked Cevikoz for his assessment of the
political situation in Tbilisi. Cevikoz described Irakli
Alasania as an interesting and important figure, if he
chooses to engage in domestic politics in a serious manner.
Cevikoz agreed with Bryza that Saakashvili's position will be
strengthened if Georgia can get through the winter without a
serious energy crisis. The Georgia-Azerbaijan gas agreement
is a significant development in this regard; Bryza pointed to
it as an example of how Turkish energy cooperation
contributes to regional stability. Cevikoz also pointed to
the recent MOU between Russian electricity firm RAO and
Georgia over management of the Enguri Dam (ref A) as another
stabilizing factor in Georgia. Bryza told Cevikoz that he
believes Alasania has now chosen a less confrontational
approach, focusing on Georgia's need for unity and patience
rather than early elections or street demonstrations. But
Alasania is worried he might "miss his moment."

N-K/TURKEY-ARMENIA
--------------

7. (S) Bryza and Cevikoz agreed that Presidents Aliyev and
Sargsian view each other as serious in desiring a resolution
of the N-K conflict, even as the ministers keep jabbing.
Cevikoz said Azerbaijani FM Mammadyarov is becoming
constructive, telling the Turks a deal on the Basic
Principles might be possible in June. This, in turn, could
help facilitate normalization of Turkey-Armenia relations.
Cevikoz suggested that the U.S. urge Azerbaijan to offer
Armenia a non-use of force pledge in exchange for Armenian
withdrawal from five of the occupied provinces of Azerbaijan.
Such a move would catalyze positive, reciprocal steps by
both sides and allow Turkey to move ahead in normalizing
relations with Armenia.


8. (S) Bryza said Azerbaijan viewed the Russian invasion of
Georgia as threatening Azerbaijan's corridor to the West,
leading the GOAJ to recognize privately the potential
benefits to Azerbaijan of an additional corridor that would
arise from normalized Turkey-Armenia relations. He asked if
Aliyev was insisting on Turkey opening the border with
Armenia only after Azerbaijan and Armenia concluded a full
agreement on N-K, agreed just on the Basic Principles, or
simply achieved momentum in negotiations. In an important
clarification, Cevikoz suggested that if Armenia made a
significant move, for example, pulling its troops out of five
of the Azerbaijani provinces it occupies, Ankara might be
able to finalize its agreement with Yerevan. Bryza welcomed
this step away from demanding a full-blown N-K agreement as a
precondition for normalized relations with Armenia, but
warned that Armenia was unlikely to withdraw troops outside
the context of a full agreement on the Basic Principles,
which provides a balanced package.


9. (S) Cevikoz stated that Armenia should understand that the
objectives of the Diaspora differ from those of Armenians and
their government. Bryza said GOAM leaders and the opposition
recognize that passage in the U.S. Congress of an Armenian
genocide resolution could make it difficult -- if not
impossible -- for Turkey to normalize relations and open its
border with Armenia. At the same time, the strategic
benefits to Turkey of normalized relations with Armenia are
huge, Bryza and the Ambassador emphasized. Turkey too will
lose if it is unable to persuade the Armenians on a
commission and the deal falls through.


10. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this message.

ANKARA 00000137 003 OF 003



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Jeffrey