TURKEY: SWEDES VIEW INCREASING AEGEAN TENSIONS AS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 001145

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/05/2019
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL EUN TU SW
SUBJECT: TURKEY: SWEDES VIEW INCREASING AEGEAN TENSIONS AS
CONTRARY TO EU ASPIRATIONS

REF: A. STOCKHOLM 467

B. STATE 77681

Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey for reasons 1.4 (b,c)


1. (C) Summary: Ambassador discussed reftels joint efforts
with Swedish Ambassador Christer Asp August 5 and noted, in
particular, that rising Turkish-Greek tensions over recent
Aegean events could inadvertently impact Turkey's EU
accession bid. Asp commented that Greece and Cyprus already
have attempted to raise the issue in the July GAERC meeting.
As EU President, Stockholm has pushed Ankara to take steps
that would ease stresses with Athens and Nicosia, namely
opening the Halki Seminary and backing down on objections to
Cypriot oil explorations. Despite a general feeling that
heavy lifting on Cyprus would have to wait until MFA U/S
Apakan (a hardliner on Cyprus/Greek issues) left for his new
assignment in September, Asp reported that he has already
seen signs of flexibility, including some from Apakan
himself. The most promising is a possible GOT declaration of
non-aggression and peaceful resolution regarding the
continental shelf. End Summary.


2. (C) In an August 5 meeting, the Ambassador reiterated to
Swedish Ambassador Christer Asp that the USG intentions to
work in tandem with Stockholm on issues related to Turkey's
EU accession bid as earlier discussed by EUR DAS Matt Bryza
and Swedish MFA Director Lars Wahlund in a July 19 DVC (ref
A). The Ambassador noted a disappointing turn from warming
Turkish-Greek relations punctuated by recent Turkish military
flights over the Greek-populated Agathonisi and Farmakonisi
islands. Such events could adversely impact the upcoming
Ankara Protocol review in November should Athens decided to
drag Brussels into a bilateral dispute over the Aegean.


3. (C) Asp commented that Brussels has traditionally chosen
to "stay out" of Turkish-Greek disputes. However, given the
importance of this year's Ankara Protocol review, he has
articulated similar concerns to the GOT. Both Greece and
Cyprus raised territorial complains against Turkey at the
July EU General Affairs and External Relations Council
(GAERC) meeting, reported Asp. As EU President, Sweden
managed to kill the discussion by convincing other members
not to intervene. Nevertheless, Cyprus will likely revive
the issue again before November. Asp agreed to echo the
Ambassadors concerns over Agathonisi and Farmakonisi with the
GOT.


4. (C) Under its EU Presidency, Stockholm has pushed Ankara
to open Halki Seminary as it would gain Turkey good will with
the Greek Orthodox community and benefit Istanbul as a 2010
European Capitol of Culture. Asp said that Swedish MFA U/S
Frank Belfrage pushed U/S Apakan hard on this issue during an
August 3 Brussels meeting. Asp had also encouraged lead GOT
EU negotiator Egemen Bagis to do the same and to show more
flexibility toward Cyprus. Bagis reportedly responded that
he was working on Halki, but that it would ultimately require
a reciprocal act in Northern Thrace. (NOTE: In contrast to a
month ago, we are hearing this linkage every time Halki comes
up. This is significant step backward. END NOTE) Cyprus,
however, would have to wait until September, when Apakan
assumes his new position as Turkish UN Permanent
Representative in New York.


5. (C) Asp reported, however, that Apakan has show signs of
softening his traditionally incalcitrant position on Cyprus.
During his meeting with Belfrage, Apakan reportedly said that
he would consider allowing Cypriots to attend one of the
three OECD education and cultural programs that Turkey had
previously blocked. Belfrage also encouraged Apakan to show
more flexibility on energy issues, namely Cypriot oil
exploration, as current Turkish objections will just prolong
Nicosia's efforts to block the opening of additional EU
chapters (namely energy) and to contemplate issuing a
declaration of non-aggression and peaceful resolution on the
matter. Asp reported he had been told since that the GOT was
working on such a resolution and would consult with the
Swedes regarding content and timing. (NOTE: Asp opined that
the EU has shot itself in the foot over the energy chapter by
allowing Nicosia to block its opening. Momentum is growing
amongst members to increase pressure on Cyprus to step down;
Nabucco has helped with this. END NOTE) Nevertheless, he
expressed concern to the Ambassador that the Turks may ask
the GOC for a guarantee of equal rights on the continental

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shelf in return. On the Ankara Protocol, Apakan reportedly
said that Turkey may consider a variation of the Finnish
Proposal of opening one airport and one port in exchange for
Famagusta.


6. (C) Comment: Asp is willing to give the Turks the benefit
of the doubt on issues such as the Aegean. As we have noted
previously, Athens' reluctance to explain why overflights of
Agathonisi and Farmakonisi are different (i.e. real
violations of sovereignty) has even the Swedes confused.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

JEFFREY