Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ANKARA1018
2009-07-16 10:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKISH MFA: CYPRUS SETTLEMENT MUST HAVE

Tags:  CY PREL TU UNFICYP US 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0007
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAK #1018/01 1971002
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 161002Z JUL 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0226
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY 0171
RUEHNC/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA PRIORITY 6740
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 3892
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001018 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2019
TAGS: CY PREL TU UNFICYP US
SUBJECT: TURKISH MFA: CYPRUS SETTLEMENT MUST HAVE
TRANSITION PERIOD

REF: NICOSIA 456

Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey for reasons: 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001018

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2019
TAGS: CY PREL TU UNFICYP US
SUBJECT: TURKISH MFA: CYPRUS SETTLEMENT MUST HAVE
TRANSITION PERIOD

REF: NICOSIA 456

Classified By: Ambassador James Jeffrey for reasons: 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY. MFA Undersecretary Apakan told DAS Bryza
and the Ambassador July 13 that Turkey:
-- continues to support the Cyprus negotiating process;
-- is committed to a solution if there is a referendum;
-- views the guarantee system as "vital";
-- insists on genuine bizonality;
-- believes any solution must entail a significant transition
government that could last as long as 36 months. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) In a July 13 meeting with DAS Bryza and the
Ambassador, MFA Undersecretary Apakan underscored that Turkey
continues to support the Cyprus negotiating process "to the
end of this year" and that this would be reiterated to
Turkish Cypriot leader Talat in bilateral discussions. Talat
had arrived in Ankara earlier that day. Apakan said that
Turkey would also support a solution if there is a
referendum. He added, however, that the "vital" system of
Treaties of Guarantee must remain in place. The MFA could
not bring a "wrong solution" to the GOT, let alone to the
Parliament. The guarantee system would be Turkey's only bond
to the island when both sides become an EU country. Apakan
then went into detail on the somewhat mumbo-jumbo but very
serious Turkish position of principle about maintaining the
Hellenic-Turkic balance in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the
guarantees being the final part of the "Lausanne System"
to secure Turkish rights, establish links to the Turkish
community, and protect Turkish rights (presumably to high sea
access).


3. (C) Apakan said that the post-settlement Cyprus must also
be "genuinely" bizonal, which means that the process by which
it emerges is important (reflecting Turkey's view that the
new constituent state will not be a continuation of the
Republic of Cyprus). Therefore, a transition period is
needed. This period would allow Turkey to withdraw its
troops and hand over territory. This transition government
would led jointly by ROC President Christofias and Turkish
Cypriot leader Talat. Ushering in a "real peace" requires
going step by step, he said, as laid out in the Annan Plan.
The economy needs to be balanced and harmonized. The

transition period could be 36 months or 20 months, as
proposed in Annan, but possibly shorter.


4. (C) Increasingly animated, Apakan asserted that he was
not trying to "create difficulties," but believed strongly
that a well-planned transition would smooth out potential
problems. It was not a new idea. We could check previous UN
documents. The island would need to find new homes for those
persons who would be required to move. If there were no new
residences, the resettlement could not take place. DAS Bryza
questioned whether sorting out these transitional
arrangements would take considerable time, and asked if this
means an additional new round of negotiations on a set of
governance issues for a new political entity, keeping in mind
that negotiations on governance issues for a new constituent
state had already proven lengthy and difficult. Negotiating
a whole new set of governance provisions seemed incompatible
with Apakan's expressed desire to secure a Cyprus agreement
by the end of 2009. Apakan replied flatly that "if there is
no transition, there is no settlement." This had been told
to Talat. If both sides say "yes" to a referendum on
December 10, then Talat and Christofias could govern the
settlement -- as Cypriots. But they need time.


5. (C) DAS Bryza said we understand that the Turkish Cypriot
goal remains a new constituent state with a distinct and new
international personality, and that Talat seems to have full
room to negotiate except for the guarantees. Apakan replied
that territory and guarantees must be considered at the very
end of the negotiations, so that the proposed power-sharing
arrangement could be seen. This has been true since the
1980s, he said. He added that a new EU Protocol is needed to
replace Protocol 10, to ensure the new constituent state will
enjoy derogations from EU law to protect Turkish Cypriot
interests in ensuring the new state is bizonal. We also need
a meaningful answer to the question of what happens if the
referendums fail, he noted. What would be the role of the
Turkish Cypriots? Bryza noted that the U.S. was working with
its European allies to plan for a successful outcome of the
negotiations. Apakan expressed Turkey desire for a reference
to UNSYG Kofi Annan's 28 May 2004 report on Cyprus, which
outlined the whole talks and the Annan Plan's fate -- which

the UNSC had failed to adopt. DAS Bryza pointed out that
this report had been vetoed by the Russians. He urged that
Ankara help change the Russian view. "They want a lot from
you," he said. Apakan emphasized that the Turkish Cypriots
felt cheated by the EU and must not be cheated by the U.N. as
well. The USG is a leading country, with the U.K., he said.
"You can find a way."


6. (C) DAS Bryza said he had asked Christofias to consider
not holding a referendum in the Greek Cypriot community,
because so many G/C's now seem inclined to vote "ohi" (no),
regardless of the actual content on the settlement agreement,
and instead allow himself to be judged by Cypriot voters in
the next election for the settlement that emerges.
Christofias did not support that idea, and said he was
confident of a "yes" vote. Apakan noted that if AKEL and
DESY both support the referendum, then it would pass.


7. (C) Apakan said he was in favor of a speeded up process.
He said Ankara supports arbitration and wants "a calendar."
Bryza said there may be a point at the end of negotiations
when some mechanism may be needed to bridge final
differences. Such a mechanism should not apply pressure, but
should instead provide creative ideas. During Bryza's visit,
DISY Leader Anastasiades had proposed the appointment of a US
envoy who could lead a team of wise people who could generate
such deadlock-breaking ideas. Apakan gave no comment but
said the ultimate settlement must entail genuine
power-sharing and equality. This is the reason there has not
been a settlement to date, he said: the Greek Cypriots "don't
like to share." Bryza said the Greek Cypriots are looking
to the Annan Plan more than they admit in public, and that
Christofias has been making an effort to ensure that Turkish
Cypriot interests are protected.


8. (C) Apakan asked if the USG would appoint a Cyprus
Coordinator. Bryza was noncommittal but commented that he
liked the idea of an envoy who could provide ideas to the
negotiators during the endgame. Bryza said he had found the
mood on Cyprus more positive during his visit the previous
week to the island, largely because of the opening of
Yesilirmak (Limnitis) crossing. In addition, the Greek
Cypriots feel an incentive to negotiate seriously, as they
look ahead to Talat's election next April.


9. (C) COMMENT: Apakan has been appointed as Turkey's
permanent representative to the United Nations, and is not
expected to remain in his current position past mid-August.
Accordingly, he may have seen this as his parting shot on the
Cyprus issue and felt compelled to emphasize that getting to
"yes" would not be as simple as agreement on the design of a
united Cyprus -- but must build in a transitional framework
as well. He also seemed intent on flagging for us that
Ankara believes the negotiations need to wrap up within this
calendar year, contrary to some projections that extent well
into 2010. Negotiating a transitional government and
wrapping up negotiations by 2009 are probably incompatible
goals.


10. (U) DAS Bryza has cleared this message.

Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey

JEFFREY