SIX YEARS AFTER SADDAM, NEW HOPE IN JORDAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 000668

SIPDIS

FOR NEA/ELA AND NEA/I

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ IR JO
SUBJECT: SIX YEARS AFTER SADDAM, NEW HOPE IN JORDAN

REF: A. 08 AMMAN 2457

B. 08 AMMAN 2381

C. 08 AMMAN 1658

Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Six years after Operation Iraqi Freedom
began in March 2003, our Jordanian contacts - among the
analysts and officials - are evincing greater optimism about
Iraq than the strained, highly-qualified hopes we were
hearing just a few months ago (Refs A-C). The sustained
security improvement coupled with the results of Iraq's late
January provincial elections have been difficult for even the
perennial skeptics to dismiss, though some gamely tried.
Additionally, we have heard far less talk about how Iraq's
leaders were merely feigning a shift away from Iran or from
sectarianism. That said, concern persists that violent
sectarianism and an Iranian resurgence may follow a U.S.
troop withdrawal. Some Jordanians also voiced disappointment
that Jordan has yet to reap substantive rewards from its
increased bilateral engagement with Iraq. End Summary.

Provincial Elections, Stronger Central Government Lauded
-------------- --------------


2. (C) The January 31 provincial elections were to many of
our Jordanian contacts the first unequivocally positive sign
that Iraq was moving in the "right" direction, politically.
With little to no prodding, some justified their optimism in
terms that echoed U.S. talking points: it was a vote for
national unity and a strong central government; a repudiation
of Iran; a rejection of sectarianism. Some described these
developments as a timely gift to a new U.S. President seen as
bent on pulling out of Iraq. Former MP Husni Shiab, an
international relations professor at Al-Isra' University, was
uncharacteristically upbeat (in previous conversations he has
accused the U.S. of deliberately empowering an untrustworthy
Shia religious alliance). A one-time Iraq-allied Ba'thist
himself, Shiab was encouraged by the perceived secular and
nationalist outcome of the provincial vote. He attributed
the results to anti-occupation trends that united Iraqis
around an apparently serious U.S. intent to pull out.


3. (C) The host of a weekly current affairs program on
Jordan television, Muhammad Al-Momani, lauded former
Commanding General David Petraeus for having helped bring
security, a smoother political process, and a retreat of
Iranian influence. That paved the way for what he saw as
newfound and healthy Iraqi assertiveness, even when it came
to relations with Jordan: "In the past we viewed them as
puppets - of the U.S. or Iran." He cited a purported verbal
exchange between Iraqi Interior Minister Jawad Al-Bulani and
GOJ officials, in which the Iraqi yelled at them for not
letting Iraqis with Shia names into Jordan. Yasar Qatarneh
of the Jordan Institute of Diplomacy was similarly bullish on
Iraq's future, reading the election results as a statement
that Iraqis are willing to trust Maliki. From his
perspective, Iraq was best served by Shia leaders - even
those with history of Iran ties and Islamist leanings -
because they were more authentic and representative, and
therefore more legitimate. Qatarneh hoped Iraq would resume
its status as a regional power able to balance Iran and
compete with others like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and thereby
allow Jordan to operate according to its own interests in the
space between.


4. (C) Beyond noting that a relatively free and fair vote
was marked by increased Sunni participation and decreased
violence, there were a handful of additional positive
implications, according to Al-Quds Center for Political
Studies Director Oraib Rantawi. Maliki was "the greatest
winner," having tapped into an Iraqi desire for stability and
unity through his State of Law coalition. While Iraqis had
not lost interest in decentralization, they rejected
partition and a weak central state. At its core the
elections signaled that Iraq's division of power would not
also mean a division of the state itself. He cast the
returns as Iraqis asserting their Iraqi identity and refusing
to subscribe to Iranian-style religious rule or otherwise
succumb to Iranian influence. Finally, Rantawi saw the vote
as a repudiation of the Kurds, who had "behaved after the war
like a superpower in Iraq, like they did not have to listen
to others." Rantawi saw signs that Iraqi democracy might be
workable, that a nation could emerge with a new social
contract on how Iraqis would self-govern, and that modern
institutions and groups (political parties, civil society
organizations, etc.) might complement or even supplant the
"mosque and the tribe." He added, "Iraq could be a model for
the region."
Officials Jump on the Bandwagon
--------------


5. (C) Optimism about Iraq was beginning to spread among
Jordanian elites, according to Rantawi. Officials saw the
positives of increased Sunni participation and the security
gains, he said. Citing King Abdullah's initiative to ease
the entry of Iraqis into Jordan and decreased public rhetoric
about Iraqis being a drain on Jordanian resources, Rantawi
judged that the GOJ was more relaxed about the threat of
terrorism from Iraq. Momani observed that it was a measure
of the improvements that the Iraq issue had dropped
considerably lower on Jordan's radar. Indeed, our own
conversations with GOJ figures revealed increased comfort
with Iraq's progress and a noticeable decline in the
frequency with which the subject is even raised with U.S.
officials.


6. (C) The solid performance of PM Nuri Al-Maliki's
affiliates in Baghdad and the South had diminished Shia
advocates of a weak central government, according to Khaled
Al-Qadi, Director of the Prime Minister's Political Office
and a former Iraq hand at the MFA. He specifically cited the
poor performance of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq,
whose leaders were "nurtured and bred in Iran, and were part
of the policy of exporting the Revolution." Maliki had come
to talk as though he were an Iraqi before a Shia, whereas the
best one could say about ISCI's Abd Al-Aziz Al-Hakim was that
he talks as though he were a Shia before an Iranian. Qadi
was particularly pleased by the victory of former Ba'thist
Yusif Majid Al-Habboubi in Karbala, where he outperformed the
various Islamist factions. Highlighting the significance of
a secularist winning in the holy Shia city, Qadi said, "there
are nationalistic trends we can capitalize on." (Bio Note:
Qadi is a 14-year career diplomat who, before starting at the
Prime Ministry, worked Iraq issues at the MFA. He has
recently also been seconded two days a week to the National
Center for Security and Crisis Management where represents he
the PM. His father - newly-appointed Interior Minister Nayef
Al-Qadi - is of East Bank Bedouin stock; his mother is Iraqi
Sunni. He speaks excellent English. End Bio Note.)


7. (C) Increased Sunni participation was heartening to
Muhammad Al-Qara'an, Deputy Director of Arab and Middle
Eastern Affairs at the MFA, though he was not convinced the
elections demonstrated an identifiable new Iraqi sense of
common purpose. Still, in the parochial concerns and
candidates that he felt dominated the results, he saw
indications of a diminished Iranian ability to manipulate
outcomes. Iraqis, in his view, "were not for any
intervention of any other country." Whereas the Shia in the
past had been somewhat unified over their opposition to
Saddam, each party was now increasingly focused on its own
interests. In his estimation, this had forced Iran to direct
its attempts to influence at individuals rather than at
parties or the Shia as a whole.


8. (C) Nawaf Al-Tel, who handles multilateral Iraq issues at
the MFA, remained among our most pessimistic interlocutors,
but even he grudgingly acknowledged progress. The provincial
results gave him some hope that the parliamentary elections
in December might reshape national politics along less
sectarian lines, and he characterized Maliki as the first
post-Saddam leader to accrue legitimacy and popularity. On
bilateral Iraqi-Jordan issues, Tel saw little movement at
all, lamenting that while Jordan had done its part in making
a series of political overtures, Iraq had failed to
reciprocate with fulfilling its economic promises. "We have
done all we need to do. The Prime Minister is going to Iraq
this month. My view is that there is a lack of Iraqi
interest in taking relations with Jordan a step further."

Does Trouble Loom Beyond the U.S. Drawdown?
--------------


9. (C) Pleased as most of our contacts were about Iraq's
current trajectory, some were reluctant to extrapolate the
good news beyond the U.S. withdrawal. Would the positive
momentum continue, or would Iran and sectarianism regain
their footholds? Indeed, Isra' University's Husni Shiab
argued that far from a repudiation of Iran, the new
centralizing tendencies of Iraq's Shia reflected Tehran's
efforts to consolidate its gains. Qadi considered it a
mistake to believe the Iranians were "licking their wounds,"
and portrayed Iraq's eastern neighbor as the region's
"smartest after the Israelis... they know where they are
going and what they are doing." Qatarneh simply cautioned
that Jordan must not "take its eye off the ball."


10. (C) MFA Policy Planner Omar Nahar described the mood at
MFA on Iraq as generally good, but said he did not "favor a
speedy withdrawal that will shake improving security." Qadi
was more colorful, anticipating a "political tsunami" if U.S.
forces left for the "wrong" reasons, and "political paradise"
if they packed out for the "right" ones. He hoped that the
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) would prove the foundation
for a lasting bilateral relationship on the security,
economic and diplomatic levels. Maliki needed to take
further strides toward national reconciliation (arguing that
continued absorption of the Sunni tribal Sahwa Al-Iraq into
government and the security forces was key),and he said
Jordan is eager to assist in any way it can. For Momani, the
U.S. had an obligation to leave behind a strong central
government that was "partly democratic," respected human
rights, and that would not become the backyard of Iran."
(Note: Momani incorrectly believed that the President's
recent announcement that 35,000-50,000 troops would remain in
Iraq meant they would be there in those numbers beyond the
terms of the SOFA - and was pleased by this. He appeared a
bit taken aback when PolOff clarified that the U.S. was
committed to withdrawing troops from Iraq by the end of 2011,
and that the troop levels the President cited were the
interim target for August 31, 2010. End Note.)


11. (C) Even as he acknowledged security improvements, Tel
fretted that "the current status quo is as good as it gets."
He saw a situation similar to conditions that prevailed in
Lebanon from 1979-81, when the confessional groups were
fortified in their areas, there was a semi-functioning
political process, and the government gave the appearance of
working - only for that to break down soon after. Referring
obliquely to the disputes immediately following the
provincial vote in Al-Anbar over purported irregularities,
Tel posited that "after the elections there were 48 hours
where Sahwa Al-Iraq was going to turn into Al-Qaida." He
predicted that the next big political battle would be between
Maliki and the Kurds. On Maliki specifically, Tel worried
that he was accumulating power in much the way Saddam did:
"He's still playing everyone against everyone... He's got a
divide and rule approach."


12. (C) Rantawi, among the more unabashedly optimistic on
Iraq, emphasized that none of the positive developments he
identified were irreversible. Speaking of the "many mines in
the Iraqi field," he raised potential backlash from Shia
groups that fared poorly in the recent balloting and raised
the prospect of intensified Arab-Kurdish struggle,
particularly over Kirkuk. Rantawi further said that the
Iraqi state's ability to provide services for its people
would be an important metric for gauging its success.


13. (C) University of Jordan Political Science Department
Chairman Faisal Rfouh granted that "Maliki of today is better
than Maliki of six months ago, and Maliki of six months ago
was better than the Maliki of six months before that," but he
insisted the U.S. stay until it rebuilt the Iraqi army as a
secular institution, purged of sectarianism and free of
Iranian influence. "The U.S. will one day leave, but Iran
will never." Asked whether he envisioned Iraq again serving
as the pointy end of the Arab spear against Iran - as it did
during the 1980s when upwards of a million lives were lost in
the Iran-Iraq War - Rfouh replied: "Yes, a million died, but
at least you saved 300 million."

Comment: What a Difference a Year Makes
--------------


14. (C) Whereas last year our contacts typically would at
best grudgingly accept that Jordan had to engage with a
difficult and untrustworthy Iraqi Shia leadership, many today
point to genuine good news. They noted that Baghdad had
shown a sustained ability to project power outside the
International Zone and cited growing evidence that the Iraqi
public was shedding some of the destructive sectarian
instincts that had wracked Iraq since 2003. Some were even
open to the possibility that Iran's tentacles were not so
numerous, long, or powerful as had been feared in terms of
its ability to finely tune Iraq's destiny. For our
interlocutors - and while we did not plumb the opinions of
Jordan's senior-most officials, we spoke to many at the
working level from a variety of institutions - there is now a
foundation upon which to build in Iraq. The question on most
people's minds appears to be whether this can last,
especially as the U.S. draws down its forces. That said, the
present optimism should provide domestic cover for Jordan to
broaden the engagement with the Iraqi government that it
began in earnest last year with the King's visit to Baghdad
and Maliki's visit to Amman. End Comment.


Visit Amman's Classified Website at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman
Beecroft