JORDAN'S PM TELLS PARLIAMENT GOJ MAY "RECONSIDER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 AMMAN 000041

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA AND NEA/IPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/06/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPAL IS JO
SUBJECT: JORDAN'S PM TELLS PARLIAMENT GOJ MAY "RECONSIDER
RELATIONS" WITH ISRAEL

REF: A. 08 AMMAN 3389 AND PREVIOUS

B. 08 AMMAN 2414

C. 08 AMMAN 2292

D. 08 AMMAN 3164

E. 08 AMMAN 2424

Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d).


1. (C) Summary: Speaking before Parliament on January 4,
Prime Minister Nader Al-Dahabi sharply criticized Israel's
escalation of hostilities in Gaza, outlined Jordan's response
so far, and capped off his remarks by laying down a marker
that Jordan reserved the right to take whatever measures
deemed necessary, including reconsidering its relations with
Israel. The Prime Minister's address came on the same day as
King Abdullah separately expressed anger to a group of
government and parliamentary leaders over the "Israeli-led
aggression." Our contacts doubted the Kingdom was gearing up
to break ties with Israel but pointed to the mounting public
pressure on the minds of the country's leaders. A year of
friction between Israel and Jordan over a variety of
political issues may raise the potential for Jordan to take
some limited steps impacting its relations with Israel. End
Summary.

Dahabi's Address: Key Points
--------------


2. (U) PM Dahabi said Jordan was working hard to stop "the
treacherous Israeli aggression." He highlighted Jordanian
efforts before Israel's ground invasion and described how
Jordan's focus continues on two tracks: intensive diplomacy
to push for an immediate halt to the "aggression;" and
humanitarian efforts to ease Palestinian suffering by
providing medical and food aid and working to set up a field
military hospital on Palestinian territory. Dahabi asserted
that Jordan would continue along this path and would not
remain silent. Finally, the PM said that "the government
reserves all available options for any measure to assess and
reconsider relations with any side, particularly Israel, out
of our concern about serving the homeland's higher interests."


3. (U) PM Dahabi's speech was widely covered in the local
media, which billed his remarks on relations with Israel as a
response to calls by some MPs to recall Jordan's Ambassador
to Israel and expel the Israeli Ambassador in Amman. The
Independent daily Al-Ghad's headline read "Jordan Hints At
Severing Relations with Israel." The paper also noted that
Jordan's Ambassador to Israel had yet to return to Tel Aviv
after taking part in an annual Jordanian Ambassadorial-level
conference at the end of December in Amman.


4. (U) The Prime Minister's address came on the same day
that King Abdullah separately publicly expressed his anger to
a group of government and parliamentary leaders over the
"Israeli-led aggression" and asserted that "diverse
capabilities are at (our) disposal to alleviate repercussions
and outcomes of Tel Aviv's offensive acts."

GOJ Bends But Does Not (Yet) Bow to Public Pressure
-------------- --------------


5. (C) While the media has characterized Dahabi's statement
as capitulation to public outrage, some of our contacts
suggested that Dahabi's comment was an acknowledgement of
public sentiment. In January 5 conversations, contacts
downplayed the likelihood of any change in the Jordan-Israel
relationship, while speculating that if the conflict drags on
and public anger continues along its present trajectory,
Jordan might indeed take some kind of action impacting its
relations with Israel.


6. (C) On the margins of a January 5 meeting between
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Jordan Armed
Forces General Khaled Sarayreh and DAO, Sarayreh responded to
a query by PolMilOff by saying that on such occasions the
"masses get very enthusiastic" and "governments need to speak
to those concerns before they turn into a national security
issue." There had been no change in his standing orders
toward Israel, said Sarayreh, who added that Israel's actions
are damaging its moderate allies and they should "listen to
their friends." On the margins of the same meeting,
Brigadier General Mohammad Farghal, Chief of Strategic
Planning, noted the large Palestinian population in Jordan
and specifically cited Gaza-origin Palestinians in a refugee
camp outside Jerash. "We have sensitive demographics, and of
course people are going to empathize with Gaza," he said.


7. (C) Deputy Director of the Foreign Ministry's

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International Organizations Bureau Khaled Takhayneh
apportioned blame on Israel and Hamas for the current crisis
but explained that unlike Egypt - which did not have Jordan's
large Palestinian population - the GOJ could not afford to be
more evenhanded in its public response. Takhayneh said the
GOJ cannot publicly criticize Hamas because it would seem to
the public as if it were giving Israel the okay to attack.
The Prime Minister's comments should be viewed through that
lens, he explained, noting that the level of discontent on
the street was becoming more dangerous to Jordanian
stability. "The police and other departments are getting
practically no sleep," he said, to emphasize the point.
While they have been instructed to allow the demonstrations
and to avoid the use of force, they themselves are being
stoned and attacked.


8. (C) Takhayneh doubted Jordan was preparing to sever ties
with Israel - and thought it would be a bad idea - but
speculated that if the domestic situation worsened, the
government might do so. He highlighted the Prime Minister's
words that Jordan would act in its national interest.
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak had placed himself at risk
of assassination or ouster, "maybe even from one of his own
men," because of his comments blaming Hamas, according to
Takhayneh, who implied that the King would never let public
discontent get so far as to threaten his rule. Asked what
might immediately help alleviate pressure on the King,
Takhayneh said short of ending its military operations,
Israel should allow Jordan to set up a field military
hospital in Gaza.


9. (C) Muhammad Al-Momani, who hosts a current affairs
program on Jordan's state-run television speculated to PolOff
that the Jordanian elite understood that "what Israel is
doing is indeed self-defense" in response to Hamas
provocations, even if it was excessive on a humanitarian
level. While the government had acted correctly in letting
the public vent through peaceful demonstrations, Jordan was
losing an opportunity to educate the public about Hamas's
negative role, and - in reference to Dahabi's comments -
needlessly getting itself in trouble with Israel. During
past crises, the government had rejected withdrawing its
Ambassador from Israel and expelling the Israeli Ambassador
in Amman, arguing publicly that such action would only harm
long-term Palestinian interests, but this time, no such
statements were forthcoming. "Telling people what they like
to hear is immature politically," Momani assesed. He
concluded that such pandering is generally unnecessary unless
Jordan were facing a genuine threat to its internal
stability, which is not the case now given the level of
public protest and parliamentary anger. (Note: Momani
described how when hostilities broke out initially he had
been interviewed by Jordan television and had said that
Hamas's behavior seemed to lack direction. Soon after his
comments were aired, Information Minister Nasser Joudeh
called him and urged that now was not the right time to
criticize Hamas. End Note.)


10. (C) Comment: The outrage expressed by the King and PM
Dahabi should not be viewed in isolation from all the
political friction over the past year with Israel, nor should
their cumulative effect be underestimated. Indeed, Momani
himself cited factors - "bad blood," he called it - that we
have reported on extensively: The ongoing dispute over plans
to rebuild an ascent to the Mughrabi Gate in the Old City of
Jerusalem (Ref A); Jordanian embarrassment over Israel's
release of terrorist Samir Quntar to Hizballah last summer at
a time when Jordan continued to incarcerate Jordanians
transferred from Israel after serving part of their sentences
for terror convictions (Refs B and C); and that Israel had
engaged in indirect talks with Hamas over the cease-fire even
as Jordan at the time continued to boycott the Hamas
leadership (Refs D and E). On all three issues Jordan has,
in effect, responded in ways that have or could negatively
affect relations with Israel. On Mughrabi Gate the GOJ has
repeatedly threatened to use all legal and political means to
block Israeli unilateralism. In response to Quntar's
release, Jordan decided to free the prisoners it was holding
on Israel's behalf several months earlier than had been
agreed. And soon after the Hamas-Israel cease-fire went into
effect, Jordan announced it had resumed a dialogue with the
Hamas political leadership. That being said, while Jordan
and Israel are at odds on political issues, economic
cooperation continues with strong coordination on a proposal
seeking USG approval of new satellite Qualifying Industrial
Zone garment factories, with no hint from the involved
parties of strained bilateral relations.


11. (C) Comment continued: Our contacts offered their
political observations - which were more measured than the

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media's reception of Dahabi's comments - very shortly after
the PM's remarks to Parliament. GOJ decision-making on
addressing its relations with Israel remains in flux and
there are a variety of intermediate steps that could be taken
before an extreme measure like "severing" ties. For one,
Jordan's Ambassador to Israel, who is still in Amman
following a diplomatic conference, could simply remain here.
End Comment.

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Beecroft