AMMAN FATHAWIS DISCUSS GAZA EFFECTS ON MOVEMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 000359

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA AND NEA/IPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/05/2019
TAGS: KPAL KWBG KISL IS JO
SUBJECT: AMMAN FATHAWIS DISCUSS GAZA EFFECTS ON MOVEMENT
AND NEXT STEPS

Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Fatah members resident in Amman agreed that
their movement was in dire straits following recent Israeli
operations in Gaza. Aside from the perennial plea for quick
movement on the peace process, our contacts varyingly saw
potential Fatah salvation in convening the long-delayed Sixth
Fatah Party Congress, holding parliamentary elections
throughout the Territories, and making sure any Gaza
reconstruction aid was not channeled through Hamas. Few saw
the need for a Palestinian unity government or any other
steps that tacitly or explicitly acknowledged Hamas political
gains. End Summary.

Fatah Upstaged and Weakened Here and In the Territories
-------------- --------------


2. (C) During and after the Israeli operation in Gaza,
PolOff met with a number of Fatah contacts to seek their
views on the state of the movement. Some felt that whatever
damage was done to Fatah by the Gaza crisis, it was only the
latest in a string of perceived failures and shortcomings.
Most vitriolic in this regard was Mahmoud Natour (Abu
Al-Tayyeb),a member of the Fatah Revolutionary Council and
commander of Force 17 under Yasir Arafat. He directed his
ire at Israel, but also at PA President and Fatah/PLO leader
Mahmoud Abbas. He argued that Fatah can only be helped if
the security forces are strengthened, checkpoints are lifted,
and settlements are stopped. As far as he was concerned,
however, Abbas was a lost cause with no popular support. He
compared the PA President unfavorably to PA Prime Minister
Salam Fayyad, whom he saw as less corrupt.


3. (C) Hamadeh Faraneh, a former Jordanian MP and a member
of the Palestine National Council (PNC),argued that Fatah
was always at a disadvantage in Jordan because it had agreed
to General Intelligence Department-mandated restrictions on
its political and administrative activities. As a result, it
lacked the resources to stage demonstrations in Jordan to
counter the anti-Abbas and anti-Egypt slogans that marked
many of the protests here. He and other Fatah colleagues
donated personal funds to defray some of the costs of the
limited number of demonstrations that took a different tone.
He linked Fatah's fate to the outcome of the Gaza crisis
saying it depended on whether Israel significantly damaged
Hamas and weakened its credibility.


4. (C) Faraneh doubted that was in the cards, however,
saying: "right now, the blow is against the Palestinian
people, not Hamas. If Hamas wins, Fatah will lose, Gaza will
be the capital of Palestine." If Hamas won, Faraneh
predicted, the PLO would have to go hat-in-hand to Hamas,
rather than the other way around, as it sought to maintain
primacy the Palestinian national movement. Issa Al-Shuaibi,
the Amman pointman for chief Palestinian negotiator Ahmad
Qurei (Abu Ala),spoke to PolOff as the fighting still raged.
"If Hamas wins," he warned, "it will all be over for Fatah."
Shuaibi defined a Hamas "defeat" as accepting the Egyptian
cease-fire initiative without conditions, and the killing of
significant numbers of the Hamas leadership.

After the Fighting, Some Cling to Hope
--------------


5. (C) Contacted two weeks after major Gaza operations ended
without a formal cease-fire, Shuaibi admitted that Hamas had
not suffered the defeat he had hoped for, but added that the
jury was still out on the ultimate political impact. Shuaibi
felt there was still time to turn the tide against Hamas by
preventing any reconstruction (but not the transit of
humanitarian aid) from happening in Gaza without being under
an international, Arab, or PA umbrella to ensure that Hamas
abides by the Quartet's conditions, and to make sure the
region's moderates continued to support the PLO and the PA.


6. (C) In the West Bank, where Shuaibi travels regularly and
has contacts in the PA leadership, Fatah faced an angry and
emotional public that was not suffering the consequences of
the Israeli bombardment but was drawn to Hamas for having
stood up to the "occupier" in Gaza. But in Gaza, he said,
Hamas faced a potential public backlash. He recounted a
recent phone conversation between Abu Ala and the Mayor of
Gaza City in which the latter cursed Hamas. He also
portrayed Hamas's call for an alternative to the PLO as the
sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians and Hamas
leader Khaled Mish'al's praise for Iran as political blunders
that would likely undo some of Hamas's gains. Meanwhile,
Shuaibi noted that there was renewed enthusiasm in the Fatah
leadership to hold its long-delayed Sixth Party Congress, and

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that Abu Ala was in Amman for a preparatory meeting.


7. (C) PNC member and former Fathawi Ghazi Al-Sa'adi said he
had no doubt that Fatah was a big loser, having nothing to
show the Palestinian and Arab publics for its years of
negotiations with Israel. Like Shuaibi, however, he thought
that if elections were held in the Palestinian territories,
Fatah might actually do better than expected in Gaza (if also
potentially worse in the West Bank). Key for this, however,
would be movement on the peace process front that
demonstrated Fatah's moderation could pay dividends. Fathi
Alwan, Political Counselor at the PLO's Embassy in Amman,
would not bite on the question of how the Gaza events
impacted Fatah, arguing that Fatah and the PLO's legitimacy
transcended intra-Palestinian rivalry. He said Abbas favored
new elections in the Palestinian areas and anticipated that
Fatah would come out on top, particularly because a new 100
percent party list-style voting regime would be in place that
worked in its favor.

Must Fatah Reconcile With Hamas?
--------------


8. (C) Ibrahim Abu Ayyash, a Fatah-affiliated member of the
PNC offered his view that Hamas had "achieved nothing, stayed
in their holes, and only women and children suffered," and
added that "Hamas is worse than Israel, for the future."
Despite his harsh criticism of Hamas, however, he felt it had
been foolish for Fatah and PA leaders to publicly criticize
Hamas during the recent violence. "They should have kept the
focus on the 'occupier.'" For the moment, Hamas has gained
popular legitimacy with people on the Arab street - including
in the Territories and Amman - which sees Hamas has having
been granted a "god given victory." As a result of the
Israeli "massacres" and the PA stance during the fighting,
Fatah has grown weak and isolated. According to Abu Ayyash,
Abu Ala told him that "we are humiliated."


9. (C) Abu Ayyash prescribed two steps for Fatah to regain
its footing. The party, now more than ever, must get its own
house in order and hold the Sixth Fatah Party Congress to
elect new members and leaders. Abbas realizes this, having
earlier failed to take the planning process seriously.
Secondly, reconciliation must take place and Hamas needs to
be brought into the PA. "The only way out is a unity
government. Abbas cannot continue with peace negotiations
without Palestinian unity. It is a prerequisite," concluded
Abu Ayyash. This, he thought, would allow for holding
presidential and legislative elections, in which Fatah might
be able to reverse the Hamas victory in 2006.


10. (C) Comment: While some of our contacts expressed hope
that the tide can be turned in Fatah's favor, many evinced
palpable wishful thinking. Others were simply resigned to
Fatah's weakness. In the midst of the crisis, commentator
Oraib Rantawi told PolOff how his Fatah friends in Amman felt
marginalized by the conflict - the first in which neither
Fatah nor the PLO were leading the charge. "Look to the
demonstrations, you don't even find a picture of Arafat or
Abu Jihad, let alone Abbas." Per Rantawi, some Fathawis here
boycotted the demonstrations because they were marked by
anger at Abbas for his criticism of Hamas; others joined in,
arguing that Abbas no longer represented them. While Fatah
has been losing standing for some time, the latest
developments were a high-water mark for its unpopularity, he
concluded. End Comment.


Visit Amman's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman/
Beecroft