Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09AMMAN2580
2009-11-28 06:09:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Amman
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER FOR JORDAN VISIT OF UNDER SECRETARY

Tags:  ECON ENRG PARM PREL KNNP JO 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHAM #2580/01 3320609
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 280609Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6370
INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 1359
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 3130
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 0258
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 4195
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 0125
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 4280
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1287
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0241
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0279
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1594
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 2242
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0098
RUEHSF/AMEMBASSY SOFIA 0011
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1950
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 1065
RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH 0931
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 5713
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
S E C R E T AMMAN 002580 

NOFORN
SIPDIS

FOR T AND NEA/ELA; TUNIS FOR FSI STUDENT WONG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2019
TAGS: ECON ENRG PARM PREL KNNP JO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR JORDAN VISIT OF UNDER SECRETARY
TAUSCHER

REF: A. AMMAN 2498

B. AMMAN 2290

C. AMMAN 1690 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft for reasons 1.4(b) and (d
)

S E C R E T AMMAN 002580

NOFORN
SIPDIS

FOR T AND NEA/ELA; TUNIS FOR FSI STUDENT WONG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2019
TAGS: ECON ENRG PARM PREL KNNP JO
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR JORDAN VISIT OF UNDER SECRETARY
TAUSCHER

REF: A. AMMAN 2498

B. AMMAN 2290

C. AMMAN 1690 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft for reasons 1.4(b) and (d
)


1. (S/NF) Embassy Amman welcomes your December 2 visit which
provides an opportunity to articulate the Administration's
views on nuclear energy and nonproliferation at a time when
Jordan seems to be intensifying its efforts to conclude
development, investment, and cooperation agreements in the
field of nuclear energy with a range of countries and
companies. While little has materialized from these
agreements, some officials wrongly interpret their conclusion
as evidence that a Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA) with
the U.S. is not really needed and that USG concerns about
regional proliferation and uranium enrichment are overstated.
Your visit is an opportunity to reassert to Jordan's
political leadership that a successful nuclear energy program
encompasses more than simply building a reactor.


2. (S/NF) The senior policy makers that you will meet -
Prime Minister Nader Al-Dahabi and Chief of the Royal Court
Nasser Lozi - generally understand U.S. concerns and
objectives, but have problems reconciling nonproliferation
policy objectives with the reality of Jordan's future energy
needs and with technical arguments from leaders in the
scientific community. Your audience would benefit from a
clear presentation of the Administration's policy, including
how the desired, stricter assurances would not be detrimental
to Jordan's economic growth, and would have a positive
long-term regional impact. The meetings also provide an
opportunity to share U.S. views on Iran's nuclear program and
to review initiatives to boost international cooperation,
such as the proposed April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, the
International Nuclear Energy Framework, and efforts to ensure
a reliable fuel supply.


3. (S/NF) The U.S.-Jordan Nuclear Cooperation Agreement,
agreed ad ref in 2008, remains unsigned due to some

objections to assurances sought by the U.S. that Jordan not
pursue domestic enrichment and reprocessing capabilities,
similar to provisions accepted by the United Arab Emirates.
The opposition to such language is led by Jordan Atomic
Energy Commission (JAEC) Commissioner Dr. Khaled Toukan.
(Note: Toukan is expected to take part in at least one of
your meetings. JAEC Commissioner for International
Cooperation Dr. Kamal Araj and Jordan Nuclear Regulatory
Commission Director General Dr. Jamal Sharaf will be in Tokyo
to attend the sherpa and sous-sherpa preparatory meetings for
the Nuclear Security Summit. End note.) Not only has Toukan
seemingly convinced Jordan's leadership that such terms would
encroach on Jordan's sovereignty and undermine the principles
of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, but he has also, by
his own admission, encouraged other countries in the region
to reject such language if proposed to them. Toukan's
arguments have so far been convincing because he has focused
on technical issues, where his knowledge and experience are
unparalleled, and has successfully concluded multiple
bilateral, commercial, and technical agreements, lending
surface credibility to his position that U.S. requests are
excessive. The commercial and technical agreements, however,
have obscured the need for Jordan to bolster its policy
framework to limit proliferation risks.


4. (C) Based on the argument that Jordan's nuclear energy
program should not be held hostage by one country, the GOJ in
the past two years has signed varied bilateral agreements and

memoranda of cooperation with the U.S., Argentina, Australia,
Canada, China, the Czech Republic, France, Japan, Romania,
Russia, South Korea, Spain, and the U.K. Jordan has also
signed NCAs with Canada, China, France, Russia, South Korea,
and the UK. Few agreements have resulted in tangible
benefits and several countries have indicated to Post that
they are waiting for the 123 Agreement before actively
pursuing activities in Jordan, a subtlety lost on many within
the GOJ. As a result of its multiple agreements, the GOJ's
approach to developing a peaceful nuclear energy program is
literally all over the map: a combination of French,
British, Australian, and Chinese firms are involved in
uranium mining; an Australian company is working on
technology selection and a financial feasibility study; and a
Belgian organization is conducting a site selection survey.


5. (S) Jordan may have achieved its goal of many partners
and international engagement, but the approach lacks focus
and financing, little has been accomplished, and each new
agreement brings a change in both the number of reactors to
be built and the timeline for their construction and
operation. Jordan maintains that it will sell energy within
the region, but only after Post insistence did it engage its
neighbors. Jordan's political leaders need to hear from
Washington that assurances sought with regard to uranium
enrichment and reprocessing will enhance Jordan's regional
leadership role on nuclear energy and that concluding the 123
Agreement will boost U.S. congressional confidence in, and
help to attract the investment needed to realize, Jordan's
nuclear energy plans.

Visit Amman's Classified Website at:
http://diplopedia.state.sgov.gov/index.php?ti tle=Embassy Amman

Beecroft