EMBASSY AMMAN ASSESSMENT OF FMS REQUEST FOR NIGHT

UNCLAS AMMAN 002346

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

SECDEF FOR DSCA AND USD(P)
STATE FOR NEA/ELA AND PM/RSAT
HQ DA FOR USASAC

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: MCAP MASS PREL JO
SUBJECT: EMBASSY AMMAN ASSESSMENT OF FMS REQUEST FOR NIGHT
VISION DEVICES (NVD)

REF: AMMAN 1550


1. (SBU) This cable provides additional information
requested by Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)
related to the FMS sale of NVDs to Jordan. The Government of
Jordan has requested authorization to purchase several types
of Night Vision Devices (NVDs) through Foreign Military
Financing. Case # JO-B-WCJ has been staffed and offered to
Jordan. Jordan has requested some spare parts and technical
training related to this case.


2. (SBU) These defense articles will not affect JAF's
existing force structure.


3. (SBU) Jordan plays an instrumental role in supporting U.S.
efforts in the region and merits further U.S. assistance in
this key area of national defense. Approval of this CTA will
not only improve Jordan's ability to maintain and sustain
these NVDs, but will enable them to rapidly return them to
support internal national security and Jordan-US
interoperability while deployed overseas as coalition
partners.


4. (SBU) The total number and type of NVDs being requested is
justified in paragraph 14.


5. (SBU) CENTCOM Commander's concurrence will be provided
separately.


6. (SBU) The Embassy does not anticipate any negative
reaction from any of Jordan's regional neighbors. This
action is not a technological breakthrough that could affect
the regional balance of power. This type of purchase will
not have any impact on Jordan nor its neighboring countries'
existing regional foreign policies.


7. (SBU) Jordan already accounts for, safeguards, operates
and maintains similar and more sensitive items without
difficulty. We have already confirmed with the JAF its
intent to provide these NVD components with the same degree
of security and accountability the U.S. would provide.
Jordan is a trustworthy custodian of other sensitive U.S.
technologies and we believe they will continue to be so.


8. (SBU) Jordan has received these NVDs in the past and there
was no impact of U.S. presence while in country. Therefore,
we do no expect any negative impact of any in-country U.S.
presence that may be required in providing these articles or
technical training.


10. (SBU) Jordan is purchasing these components with Foreign
Military Financing (FMF).


11. (SBU) There are no human rights considerations relevant
to the proposed acquisition.


12. (SBU) The Military Assistance Program (MAP) in Jordan
currently has an active End-Use Monitoring (EUM) system in
place for the JAF. These NVDs are Enhanced-EUM items and
will require periodic inventories while in the possession of
the JAF. If deployed, US Forces deployed with them will
ensure the task force is conducting daily inventories.


13. (SBU) The Embassy recommends USG approval for transfer of
the NVD components for reasons listed above. This approval
represents no political or technological risk to the U.S.


14. (SBU) Item requested:

-- Jordan requests 10 percent spares of the Image
Intensifier tube, GEN III Auto-Gated (Pinnacle),for the
following NVD models(and include five of which are Generation
III): Army and Navy/Passive Vision Sight-4 (AN/PVS-4),
AN/PVS-7D, AN/AVS-9, AN/PVS-14, AN/PVS-23, AN/PVS-27,
AN/TVS-5 and Multi-use Minimonocular-14 (MUM-14).

-- The list of NVDs requested is described in the following
table. (Table format is Model, Quantity, Figure of Merit,
Spare Quantity)

1, AN/PVS-9, 100, 1600, 10
2, AN-PVS 7D, 130, 1600, 13
3, AN/PVS-27, 115, 1600, 12

4, AN/PVS-14, 980, 1600, 10
5, AN/PVS-22, 20, 1600, 2
6, AN/PVS-14, 3215, 1200, 32
7, AN-TVS-5, 558, 1200, 6
8, AN/PVS-23, 100, 1200, 10
9, AN/PVS-7D, 114, 1200, 11


15. (U) POC this action is MAJ Scott A. Hurley, USA, at
011-962-6-590-6538 or NIPR: shurley@san.osd.mil,
SIPR:hurleysa@centcom.jorsao.smil.mil.
Beecroft