FRAUD SUMMARY - JORDAN

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 AMMAN 002260

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR CA/FPP AND NEA/ELA

DEPT ALSO PASS TO KCC; POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS; ATHENS
FOR DHS/ICE AND DHS/CIS; ROME FOR DHS/ICE, DHS/CIS, AND DHS/CBP;
NEA/ELA FOR M. GREGONIS; CA/FPP FOR S. SEXTON


E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC JO
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - JORDAN

REF: Amman 001508

--------------
COUNTRY CONDITIONS
--------------


1. (U) Jordan is a developing country with a GDP per capita of
$5,100 and a population of over 6.3 million. Over 78% of the people
live in urban areas and one third of all Jordanians are younger than

14. The service sector comprises over 66 percent of the economy,
industry covers about 30 percent, and 2.4 percent is
agriculture-based. Although Jordan's official unemployment rate is
nearing 13 percent, unofficial estimates put this figure
substantially higher at 30 percent. Scarce natural resources,
poverty, inflation and unemployment are significant problems in
Jordan, but over the past several years, the government has enacted
broad economic reforms to improve the standard of living.


2. (U) Jordan is host to a significant number of Iraqis who have
fled Iraq over the last several years for security and economic
reasons. In May of 2008, the Government of Jordan imposed a visa
regime for Iraqis which limited the number of Iraqis arriving in
Jordan, although Iraqi business people and investors can now travel
more easily to Jordan. The continually-improving security situation
in Iraq, coupled with the wider availability of consular services at
the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, has resulted in a slight decrease in
Amman's Iraqi workload. Over the past six months of this reporting
period, April through September 2009, Iraqis still comprise 7
percent of Amman's visa workload.


3. (U) Jordanian-related civil document fraud is minimal as the
documents contain many fraud-resistant features and adjudicators
appreciate the reliability of both the civil-issuing authorities and
integrity of the process. Together, these factors permit an easy
verification.


4. (U) Post continues to detect a significantly higher rate of
document fraud for Iraqi cases. Iraqi documents lack Jordan's high
standards of quality control governing both issuance and
verification. This situation, coupled by issues relating to
security and infrastructure, results in a higher incidence of fraud
stemming from Iraqi documents rather than Jordanian. Iraqi document
fraud also involves widespread counterfeiting of primary
identification documents, namely passports, national IDs, and other
civil papers.

--------------
NIV FRAUD
--------------


5. (U) During this reporting period of April 1 through September
30, 2009, Amman adjudicated 14,672 nonimmigrant visas (NIV),five
percent of which were Iraqi. Of the 128 cases referred to the Fraud
Prevention Unit, 43 contained at least one counterfeit, altered or
fraudulently-obtained document. Most Jordanian cases of document
fraud are limited to poor-quality bank statements, employment
letters and family registration books. But post occasionally
interviews sports teams or entertainment groups who attempt to
include "stowaways" for immigration purposes only and who are not
bona fide members of the group.


6. (U) The FPU confirmed fraud in approximately fifteen percent of
the nonimmigrant Iraqi cases referred to the unit for review. The
fraud is a mixture of altered, counterfeit, and
fraudulently-obtained documents.


7. (U) The K1 fianc visa category, particularly among Iraqis, is
problematic because of the low bar for adjudication. Cultural norms
permit couples to become engaged after the families meet a single
time. In addition, tradition favors the selection of a spouse from
the extended family because a blood and property alliance already
exists. The K1 program provides an easy way for a family to sponsor
a relative or neighbor to emigrate to the United States.


8. (U) Post has received feedback through unofficial U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) channels regarding the
high number of Iraqi visitors who apply for asylum within one year
of entering the United States. Specific groups in question include
K1s and F1s. Post is currently evaluating last year's Iraqi B1/B2
issuances to validate their travel and has taken immediate action to
address adjudication standards.

--------------

AMMAN 00002260 002 OF 005


IV AND DV FRAUD
--------------


9. (U) Amman adjudicated 2419 Immigrant Visa (IV) applications
during this reporting period, of which 176 cases, or 7 percent, were
Iraqi. FPU detected fraud in 60 IV cases, less than three percent
of the total. Most Jordanian IV fraud is either relationship fraud,
i.e., a marriage for immigration purposes, or some type of document
fraud. The latter type often involves IR-1 and CR-1 cases where the
Jordanian's alleged divorce from the first wife (which freed him up
to adjust to LPR status by marrying an Amcit) is either not
authentic or else not legally registered. Post also sees a similar
type of fraud involving IR-2 stepchildren, where the biological
parents are either not legally divorced, or else the marriage
permitting the step-parent relationship may have been entered into
solely for immigration purposes. Post notes that U.S. immigration
laws that permit visitors to adjust to LPR status in the United
States, in lieu of applying for immigrant visas overseas,
contributes significantly to fraudulent immigrant visa cases.


10. (U) Post transmitted a spot-reporting cable in July (Reftel)
regarding an internet-based financial scam where enterprising crooks
duped a Jordanian accountant into paying over $1100 to secure a U.S.
employment visa and job in New York. Orchestrated entirely via
internet and communicated by e-mail, the package included many
features of the U.S. immigration visa process, including fees,
forms, fingerprints, and even administrative processing. The
perpetrators request payment in three different currencies,
suggesting a global cooperative effort was underway to mastermind
such a scheme. Post referred the case to law enforcement officials
at post and suggested to the victim that he apply for the Diversity
Visa program in order to legally emigrate to the United States.


11. (U) Post has identified a series of K3 cases where the Iraqi
beneficiaries presented fraudulent Greek Orthodox marriage
certificates, officiated by a priest in Amman defrocked by the
Patriarchate for allegedly accepting bribes to perform illicit
ceremonies. Although the marriage certificates clearly exhibit
multiple fraud indicators, the FPU confirmed the authenticity of the
Jordanian Foreign Ministry and Governorate wet seals. Post has
notified the host government of this fraud trend.


12. (U) Post is increasingly concerned with the mounting
sophistication of Iraqi document fraud. FPU confirmed fraud in
fifteen percent of the IV cases referred to the unit and they range
from high-quality counterfeit ID cards, to citizenship certificates,
school transcripts, and civil documents - all of Iraqi origin. One
recent example involves an Iraqi male K1 where the applicant first
presented an ID card, produced using an outdated technology. When
post refused to accept the document, he submitted a second ID card,
which adhered to current technological norms, but other
irregularities revealed it was a forgery. Post returned the
petition to the National Visa Center and recommended revocation.


13. (U) Post notes cases where an Amcit IV petitioner may have
obtained U.S. citizenship through a marriage undertaken ostensibly
for immigration purposes. The Department, in consultation with
USCIS General Counsel, has advised post not to pursue any possible
denaturalization cases unless the person naturalized recently, i.e.,
within the past year or two. Post continues to bring cases to
CA/FPP's attention where the petitioner appears to have obtained
immigration benefits through fraudulent means, even though the
matter may not rise to the level of USCIS General Counsel's
acceptance of the case for possible denaturalization proceedings or
review of the person's permanent resident status.



14. (U) Regarding diversity visas, fraud among Jordanian applicants
is low. As Embassy Baghdad now handles its own Immigrant Visas,
Embassy Amman did not process any Iraqi DVs during this reporting
period.

--------------
ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD
--------------


15. (U) Citizenship-based fraud in Amman appears to be very low and
post has no cases to report this period. Because Jordan is a
relatively easy country to access in the region, post accepts CRBA
applications on behalf of other posts, to forward them to the
correct post for adjudication. As a result, post handles West Bank
and Gaza civil documents as well as Syrian civil documents on a
regular basis.

AMMAN 00002260 003 OF 005



--------------
ADOPTION FRAUD
--------------


16. (U) Jordan is a Muslim country where Sharia courts have
jurisdiction over family law. To legally adopt a child in Jordan,
both parents must be practicing Muslims. Post did not detect any
fraud in the one adoption visa issued during the last six months.


--------------
USE OF DNA TESTING
--------------


17. (U) Post did not process any immigrant visa case where
applicants submitted DNA evidence during the past six months.

--------------
ASYLUM AND DHS BENEFIT FRAUD
--------------


18. (U) USCIS opened a Field Office in Amman in 2008 and they can
be reached directly at uscis.amman@dhs.gov. USCIS (Fraud Detection
and National Security) officials frequently request assistance from
their field office in Amman for help confirming civil status on a
variety of cases. During this reporting period, USCIS confirmed
fraud in 7 of the 28 cases referred to Amman.

-------------- --------------
ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME,
TERRORIST TRAVEL
-------------- --------------


19. (U) Jordan is a major transit point in the Middle East for
passengers heading to Europe and North America. Passengers from
around the world can select from 15 weekly direct flights to the
United States. Royal Jordanian Airlines flies directly to Chicago,
Detroit, and New York. Delta Airlines began non-stop service from
Amman to New York in June 2008.


20. (U) Jordan is a major transit country for narcotics in the
region. Heroin and amphetamine trafficking occurs overland from both
Israel and Lebanon destined for the Gulf States. Local officials
estimate that only 15% of all narcotics trafficking is locally
consumed. Cocaine trafficking occurs primarily via air passengers
arriving at Queen Alia International Airport. GOJ officials report
that the majority of narcotics couriers interdicted at the airport
are internal body carriers from poor disenfranchised areas of South
America.


21. (U) Jordan recently passed an Anti-Human-Trafficking law that
officially criminalizes the act in a manner similar to U.S.
standards. Security forces have received little training in
combating this crime and current enforcement efforts are hampered by
factional disagreements between the responsible agencies. There is
limited local reporting on Human Smuggling and Trafficking in
Jordan, specifically as it relates to the United States.


22. (U) Organized crime has begun to explore the feasibility of
expanding their operations into Jordan, as evidenced by the arrest
of 14 Romanian nationals in August 2009. The persons in question
were part of an automatic teller machine (ATM) fraud scheme that
stole credit/debit card information from victims through the use of
a card reader affixed to the ATM. Jordanian officials deny the
existence of organized crime, while also acknowledging that about 15
identified groups perpetuate most human and contraband smuggling in
Jordan.


23. (U) Airline and immigration authorities at Amman's Queen Alia
International Airport have intercepted altered, counterfeit and
stolen blank passports from several European countries, as well as
from Turkey, South Africa, Mexico, Chile, Venezuela, Lesotho,
Singapore, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, and India. Officials
regularly detect fraudulent European residency permits and Schengen
visas. Travelers presenting questionable documents hail from
countries as diverse as Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Somalia, Syria,
Egypt, Lebanon, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, China, Turkey, India, Pakistan,
Bangladesh, and Peru.

--------------
DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS
--------------

AMMAN 00002260 004 OF 005




24. (U) Post conducted no criminal fraud investigations during this
reporting period. Post has recently welcomed the arrival of an
Assistant Regional Security Officer for Investigations (A/RSO-I).
Consequently, the FPU is currently updating its procedures and work
flow to reflect the new staffing pattern.

-------------- --------------
HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, AND CIVIL REGISTRY
-------------- --------------


25. (U) In July 2008, Jordan introduced a new K-series passport,
similar to the J-series launched in May 2007. Previous passport
versions remain valid until they expire. The 2008 version is
machine-readable with enhanced technical specifications, but lacks
biometric features. The new passport uses the same security film as
the J-series, but with enhanced UV features. The new document
cannot be extended when it expires. Although there are no reports
of fraud involving counterfeit K-series passports, FPU has notified
the Jordanian authorities regarding defects in the security film and
photo security features. They are addressing the issue.


26. (U) In order to obtain a passport, children under 16 need to
present a birth certificate and family book whereas an adult's
national ID card is sufficient evidence. Passport validity remains
5 years. Adults pay USD28.50 and children are half price.
Authorities can provide same-day issuance for in-country
applications. But outside of Jordan, the wait can exceed 45 days
and cost twice the amount.


27. (U) Jordan's Civil Status and Passport Department issues birth
certificates to Jordanians who are born abroad. However, the family
must first register the birth with the host country to obtain a
foreign birth certificate. This document is needed to obtain a
Jordanian birth certificate. All births within Jordan have to be
reported within one month to the civil authorities. If a Jordanian
is born overseas, the birth has to be reported within 90 days. A
birth certificate costs $1.40 (one dinar).

--------------
COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES
--------------


28. (U) FPU maintains a strong relationship with Jordanian
government and airport officials who routinely report fraud
incidents and vulnerabilities to the embassy. Similarly, Amman's
Fraud Control Group, comprised of North American and European fraud
prevention officials, shares information and trends formally on a
monthly basis, but informally through regular phone calls and
e-mails. The group focuses primarily on Iraqi-related fraud and
also holds joint training and informational sessions on Iraqi
adjudication and verification issues.

--------------
AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN
--------------


29. (U) Amman routinely screens all Iraqi civil documents (i.e.,
passport, national i.d. card, and certificate of citizenship) for
almost all IV and NIV cases. Post is concerned that Iraqi document
fraud is becoming increasingly more sophisticated. Since 2007, FPU
has noted certain Iraqi ID cards that appear to have been produced
fraudulently on a large scale and from a single source. Posts may
want to pay close attention to Iraqi ID cards. For more details,
please e-mail Amman FPU.


30. (U) On several occasions, post has received e-mails alerting the
U.S. Government that Middle Easterners working for the USG in Iraq
can easily purchase a full set of Iraqi civil documents in order to
apply for SIV or other immigration benefits. Among a myriad of
other fraud detection techniques, FPU has alerted Post's
locally-engaged staff to advise Consular Officers when any Iraqi
applies who lacks an Iraqi accent. During this reporting period,
FPU conducted additional screening to one SIV applicant to ascertain
his country of origin, which FPU confirmed as Iraqi.


31. (U) Amman informed DHS in 2008 that Iraqi citizens born abroad
who acquire Iraqi citizenship at birth have valid Iraqi passports
indicating their place of birth is Baghdad. (See CBP's Fraudulent
Document Analysis Unit Bulletin of August 2008 for more
information.) The applicant presents a valid birth certificate
showing birth outside of Iraq and a passport that reads Baghdad as
the place of birth. Consular officials adhere to the passport's

AMMAN 00002260 005 OF 005


POB, but annotate the visa to read: "Actual POB: City, Country."

--------------
STAFFING AND TRAINING
--------------


32. (U) The FPU is staffed by one Foreign Service Officer Fraud
Prevention Manager, one Assistant Regional Security Officer for
Investigations and one full-time LES Fraud Specialist. FPU works
closely with Post's Visa Security Unit (DHS/ICE). Please contact
AmmanFPU@state.gov for information or assistance.


33. (U) The LES Fraud Prevention Specialist has completed
Department of State fraud prevention training in Washington and
forensic document lab training sponsored by the Anti-Terrorism
Assistance program. He trains all incoming consular personnel and
shares his expertise with Jordanian and other fraud prevention
officials in Amman and the region. In addition, he regularly
provides training in examining Iraqi civil documents and overall
fraud detection techniques to Baghdad consular personnel transiting
through Amman.


34. (U) Both the Fraud Prevention Manager and Assistant Regional
Security Officer for Investigations have completed FSI's course for
Fraud Prevention Managers and the Advanced Namechecking Course.



BEECROFT