Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09AMMAN198
2009-01-23 12:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Amman
Cable title:  

GEN. DAYTON TALKS JAF TRAINING FOR PALESTINIANS IN

Tags:  KPAL KWBG PTER MAS PREL IS JO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAM #0198/01 0231211
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231211Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4266
INFO RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 1497
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 5316
C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 000198 

SIPDIS

FOR NEA/ELA AND NEA/IPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2019
TAGS: KPAL KWBG PTER MAS PREL IS JO
SUBJECT: GEN. DAYTON TALKS JAF TRAINING FOR PALESTINIANS IN
JORDAN

REF: 08 AMMAN 3164

Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L AMMAN 000198

SIPDIS

FOR NEA/ELA AND NEA/IPA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/23/2019
TAGS: KPAL KWBG PTER MAS PREL IS JO
SUBJECT: GEN. DAYTON TALKS JAF TRAINING FOR PALESTINIANS IN
JORDAN

REF: 08 AMMAN 3164

Classified By: Ambassador R. Stephen Beecroft for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d)


1. (C) Summary: U.S. Security Coordinator Lieutenant General
Keith Dayton met on January 19 with Special Advisor to the
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces HRH Lieutenant General
Prince Faisal bin Al-Hussein, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff General Khaled Sarayreh, and Commander of the Joint
Special Operations Command Brigadier General Ali Jeradat to
describe the successful training of Palestinian security
forces at the Jordan International Police Training Center
(JIPTC). This was Dayton's first visit with the Jordanian
Armed Forces (JAF) senior leadership because previous efforts
were focused on the Public Security Directorate (PSD). He
introduced the possibility of providing specialized training
to the Palestinian Presidential Guard under JAF auspices.
The Jordanians were receptive to the idea and took on board
the message that this training needed to be coordinated
through USSC to make sure all sides - Israelis, Jordanians,
and Palestinians - bought in fully. End Summary.


2. (C) General Dayton separately reviewed for his three
interlocutors the role of USSC in facilitating the training
so far at JIPTC of 1500 Palestinian security forces from the
PA's National Security Forces and the Presidential Guard, and
their subsequent deployment in various regions of the West
Bank. He cited their superb performance as one of the
brighter spots in terms of improving security and stability
in the West Bank over the past year, and observed that the
success has been lauded even by Israeli officials who are
enthusiastic about continuing the program. (Note: Dayton
privately told the Ambassador that Israeli military officials
had informed him they were able to draw some of the IDF
troops necessary for the recent Gaza operation from the West
Bank because its stability was made possible in part by the
presence of the JIPTC-trained Palestinians.) Dayton said 500
trainees (the 3rd NSF Battalion) would graduate on January
28, and that a fourth class of 500 (the 4th NSF Battalion)

would begin in February. He cited the strong support from
Congress - amounting to USD 160 million so far to fund PA
security sector reform - for JIPTC training, senior leader
training, and helping to create a functioning Palestinian
Ministry of Interior.


3. (C) Dayton expressed strong appreciation for the support
the PSD had provided in running the JIPTC program, and raised
the possibility that the JAF might also be able to play a
similar role for the Presidential Guard in particular - even
as he stressed that the idea was still in the concept stage.
He pointed out that a key element of the success of the JIPTC
training program was that it had the strong backing of
Jordan, Israel and the Palestinian Authority. This was
essential, as efforts by the PG to independently negotiate a
training regimen with the Jordanian Special Operations
Command had been stymied because Israel refused to let the
trainees leave Israel without their program having been
vetted and supported by USSC.


4. (C) Dayton cited great potential to do more specialized
training for the PG, but urged that it be done in a
professional and orderly manner and that it be marked by
openness and transparency. General Jeradat confirmed that
indeed the Presidential Guard had privately arranged during
2008 with JSOCOM for training, but that they never showed up.
He agreed that any future training - if approved by the
Jordanian leadership - should be coordinated in a similar
fashion to the JIPTC program. Jeradat urged General Dayton
to engage directly with the PA to urge them not to allow the
PG to make private arrangements with Jordan. Dayton noted
that "old habits are hard to break," and that the PG had
grown accustomed to engaging in such private arrangements,
but doubted this problem would happen again. Jeradat said
the PG could be trained in VIP personal protection and could
receive SWAT-type training from the Jordanian Special Forces.
However, he said, the issue of counter-terrorism training
was sensitive and would not be done at the Yajouz facility
but rather out in a Zarqa facility.


5. (C) At a subsequent meeting with General Sarayreh, Dayton
provided a similar brief and reiterated that he had not
received instructions to expand training by JAF, as
additional funding had not yet been approved, but that
Washington remains keen on expanding the training of
Palestinians in Jordan. He highlighted the possibility of
JAF training for Palestinian border guards - an idea raised
by the PA itself. Dayton also raised the issue of possible
CT training for the PG, but noted that it was a sensitive

issue in Washington and the decision to proceed would require
further coordination between the USG and the Jordanian
military leadership. Sarayreh was positive about the
prospect of providing JAF training to the Palestinian PG -
though he said it was a matter of political will and required
approval at the highest levels in Jordan. He promised to
raise the idea with King Abdullah. Sarayreh expressed some
concern that Israel might balk, but General Dayton assured
him that this was not the case. "Israel is anxious for more
Palestinian capability and respect the Jordanians," he
concluded.


6. (C) In Dayton's meeting with HRH Faisal, the Prince
suggested Jordan could form a joint cadre for PG training
from Jordan's PSD, JAF, the new Jordanian Gendarmerie, and
the General Intelligence Department. The Prince was more
explicit than Sarayreh on the possibility of training
Palestinian border guards, saying "we can help." However,
Faisal warned that the Palestinian forces must not be seen as
collaborating with the Israelis, which would backfire on PA
President Mahmoud Abbas. He acknowledged that institution
building with the PA Ministry of Interior would take time,
and could not be rushed. Echoing comments Post has heard
frequently from other senior Jordanian officials, Faisal
expressed alarm at former U.S. Ambassador to the UN John
Bolton's proposal - published on January 5 in the Washington
Post - that Gaza be placed under Egyptian control and that
Jordan take over the West Bank in some capacity (reftel).
The Prince strenuously rejected the idea.


7. (U) General Dayton cleared on this cable.

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