GUNS IN THE DESERT: ROOTS OF SAHEL INSTABILITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ALGIERS 000463

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2024
TAGS: PTER PGOV PINR PREL PINS ECON ASEC ML NG AG
SUBJECT: GUNS IN THE DESERT: ROOTS OF SAHEL INSTABILITY

Classified By: DCM Thomas F. Daughton; reasons 1.4 (b),(d).


1. (S) SUMMARY: The stability of the vast Sahara region of
southern Algeria, northern Mali and northern Niger has become
a major source of concern to Algerian officials and local
leaders we met during a March 23-30 trip to Tamanrasset and
Djanet. They tell us a concerted development program and a
complex network of managed tribal relationships are
responsible for a relative level of calm on the Algerian side
of the border. In contrast, they say, traditional Tuareg
trade routes across modern state borders mostly to the south
of Algeria have been exploited by newly-arrived terrorists to
create a market for kidnapping, drugs and smuggling. They
blame the deterioration of the security situation on a lack
of Malian and Nigerien government control in their northern
regions, an absence of economic development, and the
destabilizing role of Libya's Muammar Qadhafi, whom they
accuse of arming militias throughout the Sahara and of
disrespecting Sahel neighbor states by encouraging the vague
idea of a Trans-Sahara Republic. With arms, drugs,
transportation and communication all quick and easy to come
by thanks to improvements in technology and infrastructure,
traditional caravan routes have accelerated, making it easier
for imported ideologies to prey on fringe elements of Tuareg,
Arab, African and other groups that roam the Sahara. Local
contacts in southern Algeria told us that no single group is
responsible for supporting Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM) cells in the region, but noted that AQIM could not
survive in the desert without support from local lifelines in
the form of food, fuel and arms. END SUMMARY.

FAR, FAR AWAY FROM ALGIERS
--------------


2. (S) Algeria's distant, 2,600-kilometer-long southern
frontier has been a preoccupation for central planners in
Algiers since the country's independence in 1962. Ransom
kidnappings, smuggling activities, drug and weapons
trafficking and terrorism are modern manifestations of an old
problem: how to assert control over a vast territory that is
home to several widely dispersed, culturally and
linguistically distinct populations, and where smuggling and
freedom of movement across borders has been a way of life for
centuries. The wilaya of Tamanrasset alone covers 214,750
square miles -- an area slightly larger than France -- but is
home to a population of just over 200,000. During our late
March visit to Tamanrasset and Djanet, local officials,
Tuareg leaders and businessmen shared with us their views on
instability in the Sahel, on who is behind the region's
various smuggling and kidnapping activities, and on what is
being done to keep violence from destabilizing Algeria's
South.

SOURCES OF INSTABILITY
--------------


3. (S) Abdelkrim Touhami is a retired school teacher who
spent nine years in Agadez, Niger, as Algeria's vice-consul.
During a March 25 meeting in Tamanrasset, Touhami described
the Sahel as a region in which instability flourishes as a
result of poverty, weak local government institutions and the
absence of government control. The armed conflicts in
northern Mali and Niger, he asserted, were direct
consequences of underdevelopment that, until resolved, will
leave the region exposed to violence and criminal activity.
It was in those conditions that the imported Arab terrorists
of AQIM took root. Saying that several factors were to
blame, Touhami contrasted each Sahelian state's handling of
the situation, clearly believing Algeria was on the right
track. Prolonged periods of drought in the area have reduced
the amount of land suitable for agriculture and herding, he
said, meaning fewer traditional sources of income and
employment for nomadic Tuareg tribes. A growing influx of
immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa, displaced by drought and
conflict, has exacerbated the situation and sent thousands of
additional migrants north into Algeria. As the natural
gateway to North Africa, Tamanrasset has seen its population
swell to over 130,000 from only 1,500 in 1962. Meanwhile,
the construction of roads and the use of trucks to transport
goods have replaced traditional camel caravans and
dramatically accelerated the movement of people. School
attendance among nomad children has become more common;
however, many of the skills they learn are not suitable for a
nomadic lifestyle. Taken together, Touhami said, these
trends have made nomadic life impractical.


ALGIERS 00000463 002 OF 004


"NOT OUR TUAREGS"
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4. (S) Touhami's explanation of the link between poverty and
instability was a common refrain in many of our meetings in
the south. But when asked who or what groups were
responsible for recent kidnappings of foreigners in northern
Mali, most of our interlocutors blamed imprecise Arab or
"Moor" others, insisting that Algerian Tuaregs were not the
problem. In Tamanrasset, local Tuareg leader Mokhtar Zounga,
founder in 1974 of what is now Tamanrasset's oldest travel
agency, explained that Tuaregs defined themselves against
others -- more by who they are not than by who they are.
Like Berbers, he said, Tuaregs are a jumble of ethnicities,
and as such see themselves as "not Arab" and "not Black
African." The Tamanrasset-based Amenokal (tribal king) of
the Kel Ahaggar Tuaregs, Ahmed Edaber, told us Algeria's
Tuaregs have no links to terrorism, explaining that such
affiliation "is simply not in our interest." As to the
region's smugglers and traffickers, Edaber insisted that
these groups are "not our Tuaregs," but rather Arab tribes
and criminal networks of sub-Saharan Africans. Tamanrasset's
mayor, Ahmed Benmalek (a Tuareg belonging to the Taitok
tribe) gave us a similar assessment, blaming sub-Saharan
Africans more than any other group: "For centuries the Moors
have controlled smuggling in the area. Algerian Tuaregs are
not involved."


5. (S) Touhami offered us a more nuanced profile of
hostage-takers and smugglers. Vibrant trade routes that rely
on bartering continue to thrive in the Sahel, providing
economic stability as well as ample opportunities for
smuggling contraband. Touhami warned, however, that the
assumption that all smugglers have ties to extremist groups
is dangerous and misleading. He said that illegal trade is
not controlled by any one group, taking his experience in
Agadez as an example of an atmosphere in which Tuaregs,
Arabs, Cameroonians, Congolese and Chadians smuggled gas,
cigarettes and a variety of other contraband. Most smugglers
in the Sahara, he noted, were merely economic opportunists:
"They know what they are doing is wrong, but they see an
opportunity and take advantage of it in order to survive."
Touhami added that a smaller, more radicalized subset of the
smuggling trade was responsible for kidnappings, arms
smuggling and drug trafficking. These fringe elements, he
said, were not drawn from any single group but from a
cross-section, with the common theme of using local
development problems as political cover for extremist views
imported from outside the Sahel. Touhami lamented that
recent ransom payments were counter-productive, creating a
"market" for future kidnappings and luring more smugglers
towards these activities.

AG BAHANGA: LIBYA'S FRANKENSTEIN?
--------------


6. (S) Zounga, echoing a theme we heard throughout our trip,
painted an unflattering picture of Libya's role in the
Sahara. He told us on March 26 that Libya's Qadhafi "has
always had a vision" of himself as custodian of an ancient
Tuareg homeland spanning the bulk of the Sahara. Zounga said
that Qadhafi does not feel he is beholden to any current
leader or system of borders, and can simply show up
unannounced anywhere in the Sahara for a visit. Looking back
at Libya's sporadic 1978-1987 war with Chad, Zounga explained
that when Qadhafi realized the war was not going well, he
recruited, trained and armed groups of Tuareg tribesmen from
other parts of the Sahara. The legacy of the gradual end of
the conflict in the late 1980s and early 1990s, according to
Zounga, was a militarized Sahara, with armed Tuareg
mercenaries "ready for a fight" elsewhere, and who had bought
into Qadhafi's irreverence for sovereignty and modern
borders. This fueled the initial Tuareg rebellions in
northern Mali and Niger in the 1990s. "This is Ibrahim ag
Bahanga," he added, referring to the maverick Tuareg rebel
leader known to seek refuge in Libya when not fighting the
Malian government in northern Mali.


7. (S) Algiers businessman Mohamed Lahreche, who is
supervising the construction of two Sonatrach guest villas in
downtown Djanet, also said that Libya had been playing an
unhelpful role in the region. Lahreche told us that security
at the Libyan border -- just 80 km away -- was relatively
permissive, and that smugglers had no trouble moving
cigarettes, fuel, drugs and people across the desert. Sidi
Abdelkader, a Djanet hotel manager, confirmed that many local

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tour guides turn to smuggling in the off-season, which
generally runs from May to November. Abdelkader and Lahreche
both agreed that there was "no need" for smugglers and Tuareg
opportunists to trade in arms, since "weapons came in for
free from Libya." Lahreche said that a fragmented Tuareg
population, a lack of discipline, and traditional smuggling
patterns all made for fertile ground for Libya to cultivate.
Qadhafi, said Abdelkader, "is inciting the Tuaregs towards
autonomy."

UNCOOPERATIVE NEIGHBORS
--------------


8. (S) MFA Director General for African Affairs Lounes
Magramane told us on May 3 that Algeria was increasingly
frustrated with Malian handling of Sahel security, and with
Malian President Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT) in particular.
Magramane said that Malian territory had become "a source of
concern," and was turning into a sanctuary for terrorists.
Whether kidnappings occurred in Niger, Tunisia or anywhere
else in the area, Magramane said, "they always seem to end up
in Mali." He went on to say that he thought ATT and his
government had the capacity but lacked the will to launch the
necessary sensitivity and outreach campaign to the tribes of
northern Mali. This, Magramane said, was the only way to
create the critical tribal relationships that contribute to
border security and reduce the temptation to cooperate with
bandits and terrorists.


9. (S) Touhami suggested the international community could
help by urging officials in Mali and Niger to start listening
to Algeria. He said that from his experience working in
Agadez, Niger generally refused cooperation and avoided
asking Algeria for help in managing the Tuareg unrest in the
northern part of the country. Magramane told us that Algeria
was looking forward to the postponed Bamako summit of
Sahelian heads of state, upon which Algeria was "hanging a
lot of hope." He said Algeria was prepared to offer a wide
range of assistance, including joint patrols and operations
in the border regions.

ONE SOLUTION: THE ALGERIAN APPROACH
--------------


10. (S) Touhami said Algeria's efforts to bring stability to
the region have been underway since 1962. The key to
neutralizing the cycle of violence in northern Mali and
Niger, he believed, is grass roots development. Touhami
argued that the development process needs to be consultative
in order to succeed. "Governments need to ask the people in
these regions what they need to improve their lives and then
develop a growth strategy around those objectives," he
explained. Touhami believed Algeria's experience in this
regard is relevant and could be a bridge for dialogue, but
that Algeria "can't do it alone." Tamanrasset Mayor Ahmed
Benmalek added that the Algerian side of the border is "well
controlled," with helicopter, airplane and 4X4 patrols, as
well as surveillance technology. The same, he said, could
not be said of the Malian and Nigerien sides.


11. (S) Unlike the situation in neighboring regions across
the border described by Touhami, we were struck by the
overwhelming presence of state institutions in the Algerian
South. Tamanrasset appeared to be overtaken with
infrastructure projects, employing crews of Chinese workers
on round-the-clock shifts to build roads and a USD 2 billion
project to construct a 750-kilometer water pipeline from In
Salah to Tamanrasset. The Ministry of Education recently
completed the construction of a university campus in
Tamanrasset and construction has begun on a cultural library
to honor the region's Tuareg traditions. Tuareg tour guide
Mohamed Zounga, Mokhtar's son, told us that support in
Tamanrasset for the government in Algiers and for the
flagship National Liberation Front (FLN) was almost absolute.
"Why should we complain," he asked, citing the university,
the water pipeline and the Tuareg library project, "when
everytime we ask for something, we get it?"


12. (S) French expat and longtime Tamanrasset resident
Nicolas Loisillon told us that the relative security on the
Algerian side of the border was due to Algeria's effective
management of tribal relations among the Kel Ahaggar Tuareg
tribes around Tamanrasset, and among the Kel Ajjer Tuaregs
based around Djanet and Illizi. The wali (governor) of
Tamanrasset is from Algiers, while the mayor is a local
Tuareg. Amenokal Ahmed Edaber is also a member of the lower

ALGIERS 00000463 004 OF 004


house of the national parliament in Algiers (1,600 km to the
north),and the central government intervened during the
tribal succession deliberations following the death of
Amenokal Moussa ag Akhamoukh in 2005. Akhamoukh's son,
Mohamed Akhamoukh, asserted his right to succeed his father
instead of Edaber, Akhamoukh's nephew. Edaber was the
government's choice, and when the tensions threatened to
disrupt the local calm, the Algerian government made Mohamed
Akhamoukh a senator in Algiers, ensuring that both factions
were placated with political spoils.


13. (S) Edaber said that although Tuareg unity had been
fractured by several decades of modern borders transecting
the Sahara, he still uses his contacts to assist the Algerian
security services. With a satellite phone, he can
disseminate a message asking for information on stolen
vehicles, smugglers' caravans, or kidnappers, and receive
answers almost instantly, along with reports of security
incidents in isolated regions of the Algerian desert. Local
Tuareg leader Mokhtar Zounga said that satellite
communications had merely accelerated the traditional mode of
communication across the vast desert. "If a child is born in
Niger today," Zounga told us, "I will know about it
tomorrow." Edaber made it clear to us that the Algerian
authorities rely on this traditional Tuareg information
network to reach out into the desert and help secure the
border regions. He said that although modern borders make it
difficult for him to reach out to Tuareg leaders in Mali and
Niger, he has "their phone numbers" and is trying to
communicate more aggressively with them, with the
encouragement of the Algerian security services.

COMMENT
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14. (S) The modern battle for control of the Sahara has
heated up in recent years, with movements of people, weapons
and contraband accelerated by Toyota land cruisers and
improvements in technology and infrastructure. Several
decades of post-colonial borders have broken Tuareg unity,
creating tension between individual state security efforts
and those such as Libya's Qadhafi who appeal to a glorified
nomadic past. Trade routes traditionally controlled by
Tuareg tribes, including inventoried merchandise and
documented passage, are now up for grabs to a constellation
of Tuareg, Arab, African and other groups who continue the
commercial tradition as smugglers. Millions of euros in
known ransom payments, free weapons and new infrastructure
projects have created a market in which desert tribesmen are
encouraged to take hostages and increase drug and other
traffic, offering the spoils to the highest bidder.
According to our contacts, the tiny AQIM cells that have
taken up residence in the desert would not survive if the
smugglers who act as their umbilical cord saw greater
opportunity elsewhere. Among the groups roaming the Sahara,
Algeria has placed its bet for security on the Tuaregs,
relying on a combination of economic development and
carefully managed relationships with key tribal figures.
While difficult to translate to neighboring countries with
different ethnic, security and economic situations, this
approach does appear to have brought relative stability to
the Algerian Sahara. Above all, said Zounga, what the region
does not need "is more guns."
PEARCE