Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09AITTAIPEI7
2009-01-05 08:44:00
UNCLASSIFIED
American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
Cable title:  

MEDIA REACTION: CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS

Tags:  OPRC KMDR KPAO TW 
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RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHIN #0007 0050844
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 050844Z JAN 09
FM AIT TAIPEI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0648
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8831
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 0291
UNCLAS AIT TAIPEI 000007

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - NIDA EMMONS
DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPRC KMDR KPAO TW
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS

Summary: Taiwan's major Chinese-language dailies focused their
January 3-5 news coverage on the ongoing probe into former President
Chen Shui-bian's legal cases, and on the economic challenges facing
the Ma Ying-jeou administration in the coming year. In terms of
editorials and commentaries, a column in the pro-independence
"Liberty Times" discussed the six-point speech recently delivered by
Chinese President Hu Jintao toward Taiwan. The article said it
appears that the Ma administration is ready to accept Hu's letter
summoning Ma's surrender. An editorial in the pro-independence,
English-language "Taipei Times," however, said Taiwan will not bite
at Hu's bait. End summary.

A) "Hu's Six-Point Speech Is a Letter Summoning Ma to Surrender"

Dr. Lo Chih-cheng, associate professor at Soochow University's
Political Science Department, wrote in the "Weekly Commentary"
column in the pro-independence "Liberty Times" [circulation:
700,000] (1/4):

"Chinese President Hu Jintao delivered a speech on the last day of
2008, marking the 30th anniversary of China's [January 1, 1979]
'Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,' in which he laid out the
framework for future interactions and negotiations between the two
sides of the Taiwan Strait. ... To summarize Hu's speech, 'one
China' will serve as a principle in terms of the future development
of cross-Strait relations, with 'unification across the Taiwan
Strait' as its final outcome and the 'one country, two systems' as
its keynote. Also, China will push for the goal of making Taiwan a
'de facto' part of China on the basis of ensuring that Taiwan is a
'de jure' part of China. ...

"What is worrisome for Taiwan is that Hu's six-point speech reveals
a very high degree of confidence on the part of the Beijing
authorities in dealing with cross-Strait issues now, and such
confidence is obviously based on its judgment of the [cross-Strait]
situation since the Ma Ying-jeou administration took office. ...
Evidently, Beijing believes that changes in Taiwan and in the
international community have further consolidated the one China
principle and rendered the prospect of cross-Strait unification all
the more plausible. ...

"It seems worrisome that the Ma administration has been using its
initial agenda of 'no unification, no independence and no use of
force' as a tool to cover up - or even to package - the Beijing
authorities' goal of 'ultimate unification.' The result of close
collaboration between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party is to
allow China to fulfill its strategic goal of achieving Taiwan's
submission without having to go to war. It is very clear that in
the foreseeable future, be it the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation
Agreement or a peace accord, both will be included in the agenda for
cross-Strait talks. It appears that the Ma administration is ready
to accept Hu's six-point letter summoning his surrender. But what
about the views of the Taiwan people? Are they ready to accept that
as well? ..."

B) "Taiwan Won't Bite at Hu's Bait"

The pro-independence, English-language "Taipei Times" [circulation:
30,000] editorialized (1/5):

"... Although Hu says the CCP is willing to have contact with
different Taiwanese parties, the premise for such contact is that
the parties must stop working for Taiwanese independence. This is
tantamount to requesting surrender and it is unlikely that Taiwan's
democratic parties would accept such a condition. Hu may have given
his own 'Message to Compatriots in Taiwan,' but it was surely
directed at CCP cadres, not the Taiwanese public. While the premise
and content of the speech may have held some novelty value, it was
but a rehash of old clichs for Taiwan. Hu may also have offered
Taiwan a few more tidbits in the shape of participation in
international organizations, a peace agreement and economic
cooperation, but this does not change the fact that these offers are
mere bait. If Taiwan bites rather than shows caution and restraint,
the consequences will be dire."

YOUNG