DALAI LAMA VISIT ROILS CROSS-STRAIT TIES, TAIWAN'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L AIT TAIPEI 001082

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/02/2019
TAGS: PREL PINR AEMR PGOV PHUM XE CH TW
SUBJECT: DALAI LAMA VISIT ROILS CROSS-STRAIT TIES, TAIWAN'S
INTERNAL POLITICS

REF: A. TAIPEI 1076

B. TAIPEI 1064

Classified By: The Director for reasons 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) Summary: While the initial fall-out from the Dalai
Lama's visit to Taiwan should be manageable, the trip could
damage Beijing's confidence in President Ma Ying-jeou in the
longer term, according to the KMT official responsible for
China affairs. The visit has been a major topic in Taiwan
domestic politics and Ma's decision to approve the visit
could steal thunder from critics who claim he is too willing
to please Beijing. End Summary.

"So Far, So Good" on Cross-Strait Blowback
--------------


2. (C) Managing the short-term impact of the Dalai Lama's
visit to Taiwan on cross-Strait relations should be
relatively easy, KMT Mainland Affairs Division Director Chang
Jung-kung told PolOff on September 1. Chang described
President Ma's handling of the issue as "so far, so good."
In approving the visit of the exiled Tibetan leader, the
President took pains to stress the humanitarian nature of the
trip and to rule out meeting the Tibetan leader himself. In
another nod to PRC sensitivities, the government convinced
the Dalai Lama to cancel a scheduled news briefing on August
31, the second day of his visit. Noting that party-to-party
contacts remained an essential cross-Strait communication
channel, Chang confirmed that KMT spokesman Lee Chien-jung,
representing party Chairman Wu Po-hsiung, had traveled to
China to explain the Dalai Lama decision.


3. (C) Chang was unfazed by PRC leaders' expressions of
"clear and firm" opposition to the visit which, they warned,
would affect cross-Strait relations. Importantly, he
observed, Beijing had put most of the blame on the opposition
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) for having issued the
invitation. In the event, although Taiwan media reported
that China had cancelled or delayed several ceremonies and
meetings in response to the visit, its actual short-term
economic impact on Taiwan appeared to be limited (ref A). In
particular, Chang dismissed as unlikely the suggestion made
by some media sources (as well as by Vice President Siew -
see ref B) that the proposed Economic Cooperation Framework
Agreement (ECFA) would be affected.

Too Soon to Assess Long-Term Impact
--------------


4. (C) For his part, in a September 2 interview with a Taiwan
television station, the Dalai Lama said it would take six
months to one year to assess the impact of his visit on
cross-Strait ties. China was in a bind, Chang argued. While
wanting to express displeasure, it did not want to harm Ma
politically, given his aggressive promotion of improved
cross-Strait ties since taking office last year. In the
longer-term, however, Ma's decision would erode Beijing's
trust in him, Chang suggested. He noted that Ma had
irritated China's leaders before, citing his appointment of
Lai Hsin-yuan, whose pro-independence views were no secret,
as head of the Mainland Affairs Council. As these episodes
accumulated, Chang said, Beijing would reevaluate Ma's
reliability as a partner.


5. (C) This, in turn, could make China less inclined to
accommodate Taiwan's wish for a higher profile on the global
stage and in international organizations, Chang said. For
example, he argued that Beijing would not have agreed to give
Taiwan observer status at the World Health Assembly meeting
in May had the Tibetan leader's trip occurred earlier. Local
media reflected additional worries that China might insist on
the downgrading of Taiwan's representation at the annual
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum summit; former vice
president and honorary KMT chairman Lien Chan attended the
last one.


6. (C) To prevent this erosion of trust, the KMT's Chang
said, the President should take steps to assuage Beijing's
unease by, for example, reaffirming a 2005 KMT-CCP communique
on cross-Strait ties or dispatching a personal emissary to
Beijing to explain his decision. In a separate conversation,
Spencer Yang, acting president of Chinese Culture University,

said he expected Ma would move to placate China, perhaps by
showing more flexibility in allowing Chinese investment on
the island.


7. (C) Officials and analysts closer to the President offered
a more upbeat assessment. In a September 3 meeting with the
Director, Premier Liu Chao-hsiuan suggested that it had
allowed Ma to finesse a difficult situation. (Septel covers
other issues discussed in the meeting.) The President had
been roundly criticized for putting off an earlier Dalai Lama
request to visit and had to extend an invitation at some
point in his tenure, Liu said. As long as the Dalai Lama
avoided politics while on Taiwan, Liu said, Beijing should be
content to blame the DPP and get back to business with Ma.
China Council of Advanced Politics Secretary General Andrew
Yang offered PolOff a similar assessment, noting that the
Dalai Lama had no reason to get sucked too deeply into
Taiwan's internal politics.

Domestic Politics Loom Large
--------------


8. (C) Initially, when Kaohsiung Mayor Chen Chu and other DPP
officials invited the Dalai Lama to visit after he expressed
interest in consoling victims of Typhoon Morakot, some
commentators called the move a master political stroke. Some
in Taiwan's opposition thought that Ma would not allow the
visit out of concern it would disrupt cross-Strait relations.
This, in turn, would cause Ma's popularity -- already
reeling from the botched typhoon recovery effort -- to
plummet further yet. Instead, the DPP has been criticized by
the media for using the Dalai Lama and the typhoon victims to
advance its own political fortunes. A September 1 editorial
in the KMT-leaning United Daily News said the DPP had "fallen
into the political trap it had constructed" for Ma.


9. (C) DPP International Affairs Director Bikhim Hsiao told
PolOff on September 2 that the party's polling indicated a
strong majority on Taiwan supported the Tibetan leader's
visit. Two-thirds of respondents said the visit was
religious and not political in nature; half said the
opposition was not attempting to embarrass Ma in issuing the
invitation. Although the KMT's Chang said many here scoffed
at inviting a Tibetan Buddhist who did not speak Chinese to
comfort the largely Christian population in the disaster
area, the Dalai Lama clearly struck a chord with many during
his visit. More than 10,000 people attended the memorial
service he presided over on September 1 in Kaoshiung, and
television showed emotional images of him hugging villagers
in the worst hit regions.


10. (C) Comment: Cross-Strait relations for now appear to be
weathering the storm created by the Dalai Lama's visit to
Taiwan. Although Chang Jung-kung's concern that Beijing
could lose trust in Ma over his handling of the visit bears
watching, he may be overstating the danger given his close
relationship to Lien Chan, who is a longtime rival of Ma's
within the KMT. Indeed, continuous opposition accusations
that Ma has been a Chinese puppet may be less convincing
after he approved the Dalai Lama's visit over Beijing's
strong objections. He may now have some additional space to
push forward improved ties with China, which remain the
cornerstone of his administration's policies. Last but not
least, Ma's approval of the visit may in fact be helpful in
underscoring to Beijing the domestic political constraints
within which Ma has to operate.
STANTON