Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
09ADDISABABA805
2009-04-10 10:06:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Addis Ababa
Cable title:  

SUDANESE SEEKING QUIET, PRIVATE DIPLOMATIC TALKS

Tags:  PREL SU 
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VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDS #0805/01 1001006
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 101006Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4339
INFO RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 1179
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 7794
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 000805 

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/SPG, AND AF/RSA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2019
TAGS: PREL SU
SUBJECT: SUDANESE SEEKING QUIET, PRIVATE DIPLOMATIC TALKS

REF: KHARTOUM 468

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 000805

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/SPG, AND AF/RSA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2019
TAGS: PREL SU
SUBJECT: SUDANESE SEEKING QUIET, PRIVATE DIPLOMATIC TALKS

REF: KHARTOUM 468

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DONALD YAMAMOTO, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) Summary: Sudan's top two diplomats in Ethiopia called
on the Ambassador to initiate quiet dialogue between our two
Embassies on improving bilateral relations in support of the
new U.S. Administration. The Sudanese questioned the
veracity of USG sources of information about Sudan, and they
offered to provide names of Sudanese with a good
understanding of American policy as interlocutors. End
Summary.


2. (C) As part of our ongoing consultations with Arab
Ambassadors in Ethiopia, the Ambassador and USAU
Political/Economic Chief met on April 7 with Sudanese
Ambassador Mohieldin Salim and Deputy Head of Mission
Ambassador Akuei Bona Malwal to explore the potential for
quiet private talks on improving U.S.-Sudan relations.
Ambassador Salim made clear that he had instructions from his
Foreign Ministry to make this overture, adding that he was
personally optimistic about a warming of relations now that
the new U.S. Administration was in office. Addis is now a
good venue with the seat of the African Union and the open
and regular meetings initiated by the American Ambassador
with the Arab Ambassadors. "Psychologically, my people are
ready to deliver in this area," he said. His message of
optimism echoed that of Sudanese MFA Under Secretary Muttrif
Siddiq, who met with Special Envoy for Sudan Major General J.
Scott Gration on April 2 (see reftel).


3. (C) The Special Envoy's first visit to Sudan has made a
good first impression in the GOS, Salim said, referring to
the Special Envoy's positive statement upon arrival in
Khartoum in which he told the media he was seeking friendship
and cooperation from the GOS. While the GOS may have
welcomed the Special Envoy's offer of greater engagement,
Salim emphasized that the ICC arrest warrant for President
Bashir remains "one of the most annoying issues in Sudan."
He warned that the arrest warrant will complicate Sudan's
planned elections in February 2010.


4. (C) Salim questioned where the USG was getting its
information about Sudan, saying so-called friends of the
United States "have their own interests in Sudan." Salim
opined that some U.S. decisions were based on information
that is either "false information or misinformation." He

singled out the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and
Egypt as sources that should be checked, but he did not
elaborate. The USG should consult with other friends about
Sudan, such as Ethiopia, but also the Saudis and Emiratis.
"They all know us very well and they can convey messages
better," he added.


5. (C) He also suggested that the new Administration do a
better job than its predecessor in assessing Sudan. He said
the new U.S. President offers a unique opportunity that Sudan
did not want to miss. "We are ready to work together for our
interests and in the interests of the United States," Salim
said. The Sudanese that the USG engaged with from 1958-1964
when General Abboud presided over Sudan are the same Sudanese
today, he continued. "Those governing now are not devils."


6. (C) Salim proposed that the two embassies provide their
good offices to facilitate a dialogue that is quiet, private,
and open-minded, and that informs U.S. and Sudanese
decision-makers and builds confidence. He said the GOS could
provide names of helpful "American-oriented" interlocutors
(e.g. former Ambassador to the U.S. Mahdi) "who know how to
talk to the other side." Ambassador Malwal, a U.S.-educated
diplomat from South Sudan, echoed Salim's sentiments, saying
it was time to turn a new page in U.S.-Sudan relations.


7. (C) The Ambassador promised to convey this message to
Washington and to USUN, and urged the GOS to instruct its
Charge in Washington to engage with U.S. officials as well.
He reviewed with the Sudanese who will be shaping the
Administration's Africa policy, and the vital role certain
U.S. Senators and U.S. agency officials play in that regard.
The issue of Darfur has been both a domestic and foreign
policy issue in the United States, and thus of great interest
to Congress. The Ambassador urged the Sudanese to carefully
consider the repercussions of their decision to expel NGOs
from Darfur as this sends a negative message to Congress and
the Administration. The GOS also must be careful not to
antagonize UNAMID troop contributors such as Ethiopia and
Rwanda, he said. With regard to the SPLM, the Ambassador
reminded the Sudanese of the close relationship that exists
between the U.S. and the people and government of South
Sudan. Both sides agreed that no one wants a return of civil
war between North and South.


8. (C) Comment: This is not the first time that the USG and
the GOS have discussed the possibility of holding quiet talks
in Ethiopia with the aim of improving bilateral relations.
We will urge Ambassador Salim to furnish the list of
"American-oriented" interlocutors to Embassy Khartoum and the
USG can assess whether this is a diplomatic channel worth
pursuing. It is also possible that the GOS is counting on
normalization of relations with the U.S. to relieve some of
the political pressure it is facing.


9. (C) Comment continued: Embassy Addis and USAU want to
emphasize to the Sudanese that we are ready to talk with them
mission-to-mission, not government-to-government. Moreover,
we defer to Embassy Khartoum and AF/SPG on this overture and
the process forward should the AF Bureau consider this an
opportunity. We are not the experts and we do not negotiate.
Embassy Addis offers its services as facilitator for
Washington-based officials to come to come to Addis to meet
with the Sudanese officials. End Comment.
YAMAMOTO